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1. Introduction
Motivation
In order to meet the increasing demand for energy, many industrialised countries,
to a substantial extent, still rely on nuclear energy sources. Proponents of atomic
technology promote its efficiency and potential to guarantee an autonomous na-
tionwide energy supply. Furthermore, since the process of generating nuclear en-
ergy avoids the release of carbon emission into the atmosphere, they assume the
technology’s ecological footprint to be environmentally sound in contrast to the
generation of energy by means of fossil resources.
Nevertheless, the utilisation of nuclear forms of energy involves various sources of
risk that confront societies with a variety of problems to be dealt with. Prominent
sources of risk are the construction, the operation and the maintenance of nuclear
power plants. Human error, technical malfunction, terrorist attacks or natural
catastrophes like earthquakes or tsunamis, for example, can trigger off a sequence
of events that could result in a meltdown of the reactor core. As a consequence,
radioactive material released into the environmental system would involve serious
problems for human health, substantial environmental damage as well as extensive
losses within the economic system. Another important source of atomic risk is the
increasing stock of nuclear waste. Scientists all over the world are busily engaged
in finding an adequate solution for ultimate and final disposal. The long-term
isolation of harmful substances contained in nuclear waste by means of a natural
1
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rock barrier constitutes the most encouraging option according to current scientific
standards. So far, however, nuclear waste producing economies have not been able
to install a well-performing permanent disposal site and, therefore, have to resort
to interim storage facilities thereby exposing societies to the uncertain hazards
emanating from radioactive waste.
On the one hand, societies are well aware of the potentially adverse consequences
of the generation of nuclear energy and the corresponding worst-case scenarios.
Therefore, the atomic energy industry is a sector, which has to comply with a
wide range of obligations and statutory requirements imposed by regulatory au-
thorities. On the other hand, severe nuclear accidents are assumed to be rather
low-frequency events. The probability of a core melt accident to occur for an
average nuclear power plant is estimated to range between one in ten thousand
years and one in a million years, respectively. Consequently, citizens in western
economies relying on nuclear energy like the United States, Japan or France seem
to be accustomed living with the corresponding social risk. Within this context,
the predominant general refusal of nuclear technology within the German society
is rather an exception.
Eventually, it is the sudden appearance of catastrophic events that cause the so-
cial risk implied by the generation of nuclear energy to gain centre stage of political
and public debates. The occurrence of a partial core meltdown at ’Three Mile Is-
land’ (USA) in 1979, the ’maximum credible accident’ in Chernobyl (Ukraine) in
1986 and, of course, recent alarming events at nuclear installations in Fukushima
(Japan) serve as vivid examples. Within this respect, furthermore, it is important
to point out the regular cross-border transport of nuclear waste from specific in-
stallations to reprocess radioactive fuels in France to the interim storage facility
in Gorleben (Germany). These so-called ’CASTOR transports’ routinely cause
substantial responses on the part of Germany’s civil society and arouse intense
2
debates about consequences and sustainability of nuclear technology. In fact, it
was the strong presence of the latter debate in German and Austrian media that
stirred the interest in the topic and initiated the economic examination of nuclear
risk within the present thesis.
Nuclear energy, at the moment, is still a pillar of economic growth and prosperity
in many industrialised countries. In this respect and despite all security concerns,
it is a matter of priority to be dealt with in a most efficient way. Correspond-
ingly, the adequate management of nuclear risk in a socio-economic context is an
essential question that should be addressed separately to the question of principle
concerning the general justification of the use of nuclear technology. From the per-
spective of the German legislator, the utilisation of nuclear energy forms is still an
important technology to bridge the gap between the increasing demand for energy
and the rather slow technological development of renewable energy sources. Be-
sides general theoretical aspects, the further analysis pays special attention to the
institutional arrangements in Germany made in order to control and to minimise
nuclear risk for society.
It is beyond question that nuclear risk can be referred to as one of the most
hazardous forms of economically driven industrial risk and, not least, it is the
extraordinary time dimension associated with all forms of nuclear risk that urges
societies and policy makers to accept, analyse and overcome enormous challenges.
For example, due to the strongly limited assimilative capacity of the environmental
system, atomic waste will occupy the resources of a large number of future gener-
ations until the material’s nuclear radiation will reach a level that is uncritical for
human health.
Importantly, however, the present thesis proceeds from the basic idea that there
is no genuine connection a priori between a certain type of risk and expected losses
for society. It is argued that the final impact of the generation of nuclear energy
3
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on social well-being depends on society’s capability to adapt to the specific cir-
cumstances of nuclear technology and the associated social hazard. The adaptive
capacity, in turn, is shaped by various policy measures and the institutional frame-
work installed by legal authorities. Thus, the thesis tries to answer the following
research questions.
Research Questions
 Based on results of economic theory, what is the adequate institutional and
commercial attitude towards nuclear risk?
A main concern of the present thesis is, therefore, to collect and to systematise
the contributions of economic theory within the domain of nuclear risk and, sub-
sequently, to evaluate the institutional framework provided by the German policy
maker as well as the strategies chosen by German nuclear plant operators and
potential victims of atomic hazard in response to these statutory requirements.
To this end, the thesis introduces the concept of nuclear risk management and
examines the relationship between nuclear hazard and policy measures aiming at
a socially efficient distribution of nuclear risk. Furthermore, it addresses the po-
tential adaptation strategies on both the supply and the demand side of nuclear
energy in response to the institutional framework provided by the policy maker.
In order to answer this first research question, the thesis aims to accomplish
the following objectives: firstly, to arrange different policies, which are currently
applied within the scope of nuclear risk management into a coherent system; sec-
ondly, to identify the optimal policy measures from an economic viewpoint; thirdly,
to present the current legal and economic adjustments to the generation of nuclear
energy in Germany and to evaluate them according to the acquired results of
economic theory.
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The last part of the thesis, on the basis of economic theory, tries to shed light
on the current political and public debate in Germany regarding the legal exten-
sion of a nuclear installation’s operational lifespan. To this end, it focuses on
the relationship between atomic generation of energy, the prevalence of scientific
uncertainty and nuclear policy and analyses the economic arguments in respect
of a precautionary principle – a principle, stating that certain hazardous actions
should not be undertaken until scientific uncertainty has been unravelled, even
if the commitment to the principle would entail substantial socio-economic costs.
The research question, therefore, reads as follows:
 From an economic viewpoint, is a precautionary principle generally justified
within the regulation process of atomic energy generation? In particular,
which economic motives could serve as a rationale of a precautionary princi-
ple in the specific context?
In order to answer the second research question, the approach of the present thesis
is, firstly, to analyse various existing economic models of ’decision-making under
uncertainty’ and, secondly, to identify the adequacy of the models within the
nuclear context.
The thesis, in this regard, refers to the discussion on the concept of the ’option
value’ in the fields of environmental economics, which was raised inter alia by Ar-
row & Fisher (1974). Specifically, articles by Fisher (2000) and Gollier & Treich
(2000) and (2003) are addressed. The thesis, furthermore, briefly presents a paper
by Weitzman (2007), which constitutes an alternative approach to model the prob-
lem of decision-making under uncertainty. The overall discussion on the precau-
tionary principle is structured according to a conceptual contribution by Sunstein
(2005).
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1. Introduction
1.1. Outline
Chapter 2 introduces the concept of social risk management (SRM), illustrates
the realisation process of social risk and provides an insight into SRM related
strategies, namely, risk prevention, risk exposure reduction, risk mitigation
and risk coping, respectively. Furthermore, it states the objectives of nuclear
risk management (NRM) and discusses the different instruments for policy
makers within an NRM context, namely, regulation and economic incentives.
Chapter 3 addresses potential policy measures aiming at nuclear risk prevention.
Based on established results of economic literature, it outlines an economic
efficiency criterion and proceeds with the associated discussion on optimal
civil liability rules in the context of the generation of nuclear energy. The
basic principles and the organisational structure of the main international
nuclear liability regimes are introduced. The chapter concludes with a dis-
cussion on nuclear liability in Germany and its incentive effect for risk pre-
vention.
Chapter 4 focuses on different strategies aiming at an optimal level of victim
compensation, namely, liability insurance, the building of financial reserves,
risk-sharing pools, government provided compensation and financial market
solutions, respectively. Both efficiency and applicability of each strategy are
analysed in the context of atomic energy in Germany.
Chapter 5 turns to the question about the adequacy of precautionary measures
within the nuclear context. It explicitly takes account of the prevalence
of scientific uncertainty and analyses the arguments against, and in favour
of a precautionary principle as a potential guideline for political landmark
decisions in the field of nuclear energy.
6
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Chapter 6 concludes and provides an executive summary of the main results.
7

2. Nuclear Risk Management
The previous Chapter 1 gave an overview over the different sources of atomic risk
and its characteristics pointed the significance of the nuclear industry in Germany.
The following discussion analyses nuclear risk from an economic point of view.
It does not challenge nuclear generation of energy in general. Instead, it outlines
the question of the adequate institutional and commercial attitude towards risk.
Therefore, taking as given both the employment of nuclear energy sources and
society’s exposure to specific forms of nuclear hazard, the objective of the following
Chapters 2, 3 and 4 is to address the scope and the various challenges of nuclear risk
management (NRM). To this end, the relation is analysed between atomic hazard,
policy measures aiming at an efficient distribution of social risk and adaptation
strategies on both the supply and the demand side of nuclear energy.
2.1. Social Risk Management
A first challenge of the analysis is to find an adequate framework in order to ar-
range both a variety of problems associated with nuclear hazard and corresponding
possible solutions in a coherent way. It is useful at this stage to borrow from theo-
retical concepts of social risk management (SRM).1 One of the basic ideas of SRM
is that there is no genuine connection between a certain type of risk and expected
1Social risk management is a conceptional framework that analyses possible strategies for house-
holds, governments and other institutions to deal with various sorts of risk, such as natural
9
2. Nuclear Risk Management
losses for society. For example, societal and economic implications of a catas-
trophic event need not inevitably be disastrous; on the other hand, even modest
changes in the environmental system may cause irreversibilities that raise serious
problems for society: ”It all depends on the effectiveness of societies’ adaptive
capacity, which is shaped by policies and institutions” (Heltberg et al. 2009: 89).
Therefore, technological, industrial or natural risks do not directly influence ex-
pected social welfare. In fact, it is the impact of various adaptation mechanisms
– e. g., insurance arrangements, technological safety measures or precautionary
schemes – that plays an important role in determining the social loss due to haz-
ardous activities finally realised. Furthermore, the decision by any agent within
a risk generating process whether or not to implement a certain adaptation strat-
egy crucially depends on the underlying institutional framework, which has to be
provided and designed by governments and other decisive authorities.
To capture these aspects, Figure 2.1 follows the notion of a ’risk vulnerability
chain’ (cf. Heltberg et al. 2009) and conceptualises the relation between risk, risk
management arrangements and expected losses for society, respectively, realised
social welfare.2 The framework is presented in order to show the capabilities of
SRM within the realisation process of social risk and to enable the reader to gain
insight into the logical succession of social risk management related issues.
Policy makers can impose compulsory regulative standards or create adequate
economic incentives in order to maximise the expected rate of return of a specific
disasters or global climate change caused by human activity. The main concerns of SRM
are welfare improvement and equity, economic development and growth, as well as poverty
alleviation. For a more detailed discussion on the diverse strategies of SRM and its possible
objectives see inter alia Holzmann & Jørgensen (2001) and Heltberg, Siegel & Jørgensen
(2009).
2The figure is based on Heltberg et al. (2009: 92); the illustration is slightly altered for the
specific purposes of the present thesis.
10
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Risk, Hazardous Event
⇓
Exposure, Sensitivity to Risk
⇓
Expected Losses
⇓
Social Risk Management ⇓ Risk Prevention
Objective: Maximise Net Benefit l
Instruments: Incentives, Regulation Risk Exposure
l
ex ante Risk Mitigation
ex post Risk (realised) l
⇓ Risk Coping
Expected Losses (realised)
Figure 2.1.: Social Risk Management and the Risk-Impact Chain
hazardous (economic) activity, respectively, minimise the expected net damage of
a certain risk for society. Four risk management strategies can be identified.
Risk Prevention: The aim of prevention strategies is to reduce the probability of
a catastrophic event to happen. In the context of nuclear energy generation,
these strategies among other things entail setting mandatory safety standards
and defining adequate liability rules for nuclear operators.
Risk Exposure Reduction: Risk exposure reduction is a measure to alleviate the
sensitivity of households or society to specific types of risk. Depending on
11
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the characteristics of a certain risk, there are numerous ways to reach such
an immunisation against hazardous events. In the specific context, both
the supply and the demand side of atomic energy can, in principle, make
provisions against the negative impacts of risk. Regulators can create legal
rules in order to establish such provisions. Furthermore, they can invest
in, or accelerate research on alternative energy sources, which would reduce
society’s currently claimed necessity to expose itself to nuclear risk.
Risk Mitigation: The target of risk mitigation strategies is to reduce the potential
adverse impacts of a future realised hazard. In the case of nuclear risk,
mitigation measures imply the regulation of compensation standards or the
design of a suitable legal framework that guarantees various compensation
mechanisms to be established in an efficient way. (Liability) insurance or risk-
sharing agreements serve as examples for such compensation instruments.
Prevention, mitigation and sensitivity reduction can be referred to as ex ante
strategies of SRM, since actions are undertaken before a shock occurs. They are
accompanied by an ex post instrument of SRM, which comes into use after an
adverse event takes place.
Risk Coping: The aim of coping strategies is to relieve the impact of the risk
once it has occurred. Public compensation funds or catastrophic relief pro-
grammes serve as examples.
It is important to emphasise the interconnection between the different measures
of SRM, since it shows that the potential success of a certain policy cannot be
identified independently from the application of other instruments. For example,
mitigation strategies can outperform the effect of measures that directly aim at
12
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prevention, while the specific design of coping arrangements has significant reper-
cussions on all other strategic levels of SRM.3
Heltberg et al. importantly point out that all strategies of risk management
entail real as well as opportunity costs and should ideally result in the ”ability to
avoid the negative impacts of risky events and recover from them” (ibid. 2009: 92).
Obtaining an intuition for those (opportunity) costs and presenting concepts to
estimate them is one of the major challenges of the thesis.
2.2. Objectives of Nuclear Risk Management
The following discussion on nuclear risk management (NRM) will focus on the
levels of risk prevention, risk mitigation and risk coping. However, it has transpired
to be methodologically convenient to refer to a slightly different classification of
risk management measures.
The following analysis, therefore, is arranged in the following way. On the one
hand, Chapter 3 focuses on the NRM measure of risk prevention. It analyses the
instruments aiming at the direct reduction of the risk of nuclear accidents. On
the other hand, Chapter 4 provides the main arguments in respect of several risk
compensation strategies. That is, it combines the concerns of both risk mitigation
and risk coping mechanisms, respectively. It is important to bear in mind that all
regulations in respect of compensation – being anticipated by the parties involved
in the risk generating process – have a strong effect on the realised level of risk
prevention. Thus, instruments aiming at the adequate remuneration of victims
potentially entail an indirect reduction of the risk of nuclear accidents.
To further unravel the complexity of NRM, besides the differentiation between
economic incentives and regulation, the dichotomy of supply and demand is ac-
3Section 2.2 discusses this complexity in more detail.
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centuated throughout the analysis. Both sides react to, and are affected by the
institutional framework provided by governmental authorities.4 It is helpful to
give attention separately to both the impact of, and the response to nuclear pol-
icy by the nuclear plant operators on the supply side and by potential victims of
nuclear energy, which may also represent the demand side of atomic energy. This
conceptualisation of NRM, which serves as a guidline for the following chapters,
is illustrated in Figure 2.2.
Nuclear Risk Management
Objective: Maximise Net Benefit Prevention
Instruments: Incentives, Regulation l
Institutional Framework ←→ Supply/Demand
l
Compensation
Figure 2.2.: Nuclear Risk Management
Therefore, the main task of NRM is twofold, namely, to reach an optimal level
of prevention and to guarantee an adequate amount of compensation (Faure &
Fiore 2009: 103): Firstly, policies must be designed in order to minimise the risk
ex ante of the generation of nuclear energy. Risk prevention can be achieved
 through economic incentives, by installing an adequate legal framework so
that nuclear plant operators will internalise the total cost of their hazardous
activities, or
4The emphasis throughout the following Chapters 3 and 4 lies on the adaptation strategies
implemented by the supply side. However, the role of the demand side is explicitly addressed
in Sections 3.1.1 and 4.4.1.
14
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 through regulation, by identifying compulsory safety standards.
Secondly, NRM has to implement policies that aim at minimising the social loss ex
post from nuclear risk. In general, governments may employ three types of policies
that enable the compensation of victims of nuclear accidents:
 They may create liability rules so that nuclear plant operators themselves
will search for efficient solutions to meet potential compensation require-
ments. (These solutions include contracting liability insurance, accumulating
reserves, participating in mutual risk-sharing pools or relying on the financial
market through specific nuclear catastrophe bonds.)
 They may create a suitable legal and economic environment, respectively,
ensure the necessary conditions for the insurance industry to cover nuclear
risk.
 Finally, policy makers may establish rules for tax-based victim compensation.
The complexity of theses dimensions has already been mentioned. By way of ex-
ample, three possible cases illustrate the problem of interconnection. The design
of the legal and economic framework for victim compensation mechanisms has a
strong impact on the precautionary measures nuclear plant operators are willing to
undertake voluntarily. Clearly, this effect is not constrained to prevention within
the production processes; the threat of potential future compensation require-
ments urges nuclear plant operators to choose a location that minimises society’s
sensitivity to nuclear risk in the first place. Furthermore, the way nuclear reac-
tor operators deal with both prevention and compensation requirements changes
substantially whether governments ex ante determine rules for public compensa-
tion funds or whether they prefer to decide on public catastrophe alleviation on
an ad hoc basis once an adverse event has occurred. Consequently, conceptual
overlapping is somewhat inevitable but explicitly identified throughout the thesis.
15
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Importantly, the use of the term ’nuclear risk’ within Chapters 3 and 4 has to be
determined. In order for expected value analysis to be applicable in the case of a
certain form of risk, it is necessary to be able to assign objective risk probabilities.
Hence, ’nuclear risk’ solely refers to the possibility of a reactor core melt accident,
which is accompanied by scientific certainty. Off-site or transportation related
accidents are explicitly excluded from the analysis. Furthermore, other sources of
nuclear hazard like the final storage and disposal of nuclear waste are neglected,
since due to the lack of scientific certainty the methods of NRM do not apply.5
Thus, the objective of the further analysis is:
 firstly, to arrange the policy measures currently applied into a coherent sys-
tem;
 secondly, to identify the policies that are, based on economic reasoning,
favourable to the concern of NRM;
 finally, both to present and to evaluate current legal and economic adjust-
ments to the generation of nuclear energy in Germany.
5A methodological approach to nuclear hazard and uncertainty will be presented in Chapter 5.
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Prevention
In a first step, it is necessary to define an optimality criterion that guarantees
the efficient level of prevention. Within this context, policies based on economic
incentives show that they outperform those approaches resorting to regulation.
Nuclear risk prevention, i. e. taking precautionary measures in order to avoid a
core meltdown, is a complex engineering process:
The engineering of safety into nuclear plants is based on the ’defense
in depth’ principle: a sequence of safety mechanisms is built into the
plant, any one of which is capable of halting a developing accident.
For an accident to occur at a commercial nuclear reactor there must
be an ’initiating event’ followed by a sequence of failures by safety
components.6 (Heyes 1995: 1029)
Probabilistic Risk Analysis, a method used to quantify the probability of low-
frequency events, distinguishes between two possible sources of ’initiating events’,
namely, external hazards and human error (cf. Heyes 1995: 1030).7
6For example, an initiating event such as the loss of offsite power will only lead to a reactor
meltdown under the following scenario (cf. ibid.): firstly, it is failed to deactivate the turbine
generator; secondly, emergency power is not available; thirdly, secondary heat is not removed.
7A more detailed catalogue including the sources of nuclear accident risk is presented in
17
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Of course, it is a crucial question, whether a certain ’initiating event’ can be
referred to as exogenous or endogenous to a nuclear plant operator. One the one
hand, human error or technical failure clearly are in the range of influence of the
operator and, therefore, endogenous. On the other hand, natural events like earth-
quakes or tsunamis, or terrorist attacks seem exogenous at a first glance. This
perception, however, could be challenged bearing in mind the nuclear plant oper-
ator’s general possibility to take precautionary steps even against those extreme
events.
Within the context of the criterion for optimal prevention, it is important to
highlight the crucial role human error plays within the process of nuclear en-
ergy generation. The risk stemming from human action, be it accidental or ma-
licious, is a factor that has not been satisfactorily incorporated in nuclear PRA
(Heyes 1995: 1028). From this point of view, it seems extremely difficult to for-
mulate an optimality criterion for the efficient level of prevention that provides
a clear guideline for a command-and-control approach. A policy maker cannot
observe every detail within the chain of safety mechanisms. In particular, s/he
cannot monitor and control error-prone human operation. Nuclear policy based
on regulation can, therefore, not rely on conceptual criteria but has to resort to
current scientific findings.
In contrast, economic theory provides a distinct efficiency measure that enables
a nuclear policy approach relying on economic incentives. Therefore, with respect
to policy instruments that aim at an optimal level of risk prevention, the discussion
starts with addressing the optimal design of civil liability. Bearing in mind the
conceptual framework developed in the previous sections, it should be highlighted
Trebilcock et al. (1997: 218): ”[D]esign errors, errors in construction, human errors in op-
eration, errors or failure in computer systems or in monitoring or detection systems, failures
from the running of aging equipment, and risks created by externally initiated events such as
natural disasters or malicious interventions.”
18
that the policy measures to be discussed primarily entail responsiveness on the
supply side.
The economic efficiency criterion can be derived from a simple social objective
function, which aims at minimising the sum of both prevention costs c(x) born by
nuclear plant operators and total expected damage d(x) born by potential victims,
where x denotes the level of prevention (Scha¨fer and Mu¨ller-Langer 2005: 3).8 For
simplicity, we act on the assumptions of risk neutrality, the absence of administra-
tion costs and a constant level of production. Furthermore, the analysis refers to
the case of unilateral accidents. Hence, the policy maker’s objective function and
the corresponding first order condition read as follows:
min c(x) + d(x) (3.1)
c′(x) = −d(x) (3.2)
This suggests that nuclear plant operators have to extend their precautionary effort
up to the point where the marginal cost of prevention is equal to the victims’
marginal benefit.
A necessary condition for this criterion to be met is the full internalisation of
total costs on the supply side, which includes the entire costs of externalities caused
by the hazardous activity:
[S]ince they generate risks for the environment and for human health,
from an economic perspective, nuclear operators have to be exposed
to the full risk costs that they generate. This means that efficient
internalization [. . . ] mechanisms have to be designed to cover these
risks. (Faure & Fiore 2009: 103)
A small economic model, presented below, illustrates that in the specific context
full strict liability is the adequate liability rule to assure full cost internalisation
8Clearly, c′(x) > 0 and d′(x) < 0.
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and hence to reach the efficient level of prevention. However, it is valuable to
provide for terminological clarity beforehand.9
Terminology
Civil Liability: Civil liability is defined as a legal regime, which, from an economic
perspective, aims at exposing potential tort-feasors to total damage costs, in
order to provide them with the necessary incentives for prevention.
Strict Liability: According to the principle of strict liability tort-feasors are held
liable irrespective of their actual behaviour. Specifically, in the case of a
nuclear accident, there is no need for victims to prove the negligence of the
plant operator.
Full Strict Liability: Corresponding to this principle tort-feasors are held liable
without limit.
Negligence: The negligence rule guarantees that tort-feasors will be held liable
only if their precautionary effort falls short of a certain prevention level of
due care defined by the policy maker.
Channelled Liability: Under the principle of channelled liability, the downstream
supplier, i. e., the plant operator, is held liable exclusively, regardless of any
upstream supplier’s negligent bahaviour.
Unilateral Accident: A unilateral accident is characterised by the potential vic-
tims’ inability to influence the magnitude of expected damage. Accident risk
9For a more detailed discussion on civil, strict and channelled liability see e. g. Faure & Fiore
(2009: 108 et seq.) and (2008a: 229 et seq.), and World Nuclear Association (2010: 2). The
difference between strict liability and negligence is discussed inter alia in Shavell (1980) and
(1986), and Scha¨fer & Mu¨ller-Langer (2008).
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is solely determined by the plant operator’s behaviour.
Judgement-Proofness: A tortfeasor is called ’judgement-proof’ if expected com-
pensation requirements by far exceed the net worth of the tortfeasor’s assets,
once an accident has occurred.
3.1. Civil Liability
The following discussion, which summarises the main results of a model by Shavell
(1980), has mainly two objectives. Firstly, to contrast strict liability to the liability
rule of negligence; secondly, to highlight that in the specific context, full cost
internalisation is a necessary and sufficient condition to reach the optimal level of
prevention.
The Model
Good y (nuclear power), denoted in income equivalents, is sold on a competitive
market. Nuclear plant operators are assumed to act as profit-maximising price
takers and, therefore, gain zero profit. Production technology exhibits constant
returns to scale and entails an external, unilateral accident risk, which is, in the
absence of any civil liability, entirely born by victims. Furthermore, it is assumed
that parties are risk-neutral and that victims are strangers in the sense that neither
operators nor the representative consumer are affected by accident risk themselves.
Finally, operators are supposed not to be judgement-proof, i. e., they either have
unlimited net worth or can purchase liability insurance on a perfectly competitive
insurance market.10
Denoting unit prevention costs by c(x) and expected unit liability payments by
10The latter assumption is explicitly formulated in Trebilcock & Winter (1997: 222).
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L, the operator’s cost minimisation problem is defined by:11
min
x
c(x) + L (3.3)
Let p be the market price; then the zero-profit condition is given by:
p = c(x) + L (3.4)
Customers maximise utility, which is composed of the consumer’s gross benefit of
y, b(y), his expenses on y and expected accident damage he has to face, D:12
max
y
b(y)− py −D (3.5)
Equations (3.3), (3.4) and (3.5) jointly determine the equilibrium for p, y and x.
The social planner’s solution serves as the benchmark for an efficient outcome.
Taking into account the (consumption) benefits of good y, as well as both the
operator’s cost of prevention and the victim’s unit damage cost, d(x), the policy
maker aims at maximising social welfare:13
max
x,y
b(y)− yc(x)− yd(x) (3.6)
The efficient level of prevention, x∗, is the solution to the following cost minimi-
sation problem, which coincides with the optimality criterion of equation (3.2):
min
x
c(x) + d(x) (3.7)
The efficient level of activity, y∗, is then determined by:
max
y
b(y)− y (c(x∗) + d(x∗)) (3.8)
11It is assumed that c′(x) > 0 and c′′(x) > 0.
12It is assumed that b′(y) > 0 and b′′(y) < 0. For the moment, is is further assumed that
consumers and potential victims are two diverse groups of individuals, i.e. D = 0.
13It is assumed that d′(x) < 0 and d′′(x) > 0.
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Since under the absence of any civil liability the operator is not held responsi-
ble, s/he does not internalise any risk costs s/he generates and refrains from any
precautionary effort. Clearly, the level of prevention is socially inefficient. As a
consequence, a low market price induces the consumers to demand an amount of
nuclear energy, which is also inefficient from a social perspective.14
Under strict liability the nuclear operator has to minimise both expenditures on
prevention and entire expected damage costs. This liability rule, therefore, guar-
antees full cost internalisation in the specific context. As a result, the operator’s
decision problem resembles the social planner’s solution. Due to the adequate legal
and economic incentive, the efficient level of prevention is chosen and the market
equilibrium price sends the right signal for consumers to demand the socially de-
sirable amount.15
In contrast, the negligence rule implicates an inefficient outcome in two different
ways. Firstly, supposing the due care level of prevention is small enough, such that
the operator has an incentive to act non-negligently16, the market price does not
reflect total risk costs, which results in a socially inefficient consumption level of
nuclear energy.17 In other words, the operator is able to ”escape” cost internalisa-
tion by acting non-negligently. Secondly, under fairly weak assumptions, it can be
14 If L = 0, the operator’s optimal decision according to equation (3.3) is x = 0. x < x∗, since
in general x∗ > 0. In equilibrium the market price equals therefore to p = c(0). To examine
the consequences for equilibrium activity level, we have to compare the first order conditions
of equations (3.5) and (3.8), i. e. b′(y) = c(0) and b′(y∗) = c(x∗) + d(x∗), respectively. (Note,
that is was assumed that victims are strangers, i. e. D = 0.) Since c(0) < c(x∗) + d(x∗) and
b′′ < 0 it follows that y > y∗.
15Strict liability implies that L = d(x). Therefore, equation (3.3) equals equation (3.7) and
x = x∗. Furthermore, p = c(x∗) + d(x∗) and from equation (3.5) it follows that y = y∗.
16I. e. the enacted level of prevention, x¯, is small enough such that c(x¯) ≤ min c(x) + d(x).
17The operator chooses x = x¯; therefore p = c(x¯) and for analogues arguments as in footnote 14
it follows that y > y¯, where y¯ denotes the socially optimal level of activity, given x¯.
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shown that the policy maker defines a safety standard, which exceeds the socially
preferable level of prevention, since ”it is socially desirable to compensate for [the]
inability to control the activity level by forcing injurers to exercise special care”
(Shavell 1980: 12).
It is still possible to challenge the assumption according to which consumers do
not have to bear any consequences of accident risk themselves.
Strict liability remains to yield efficient results. Again, the operator has to
internalise total risk costs, which is reflected in the market price, and chooses an
optimal prevention level. Consumers – due to full financial compensation – do not
have to bear any losses caused by a nuclear accident and will demand the socially
efficient level of nuclear energy.
Under the absence of civil liability, in general, prevention and activity levels
are inefficient, except when consumers are perfectly informed and perceive the
risk correctly. The latter case is highly implausible and can be ruled out based
on results of empirical economics, which suppose that individuals tend to treat
the probability of low-frequency events as essentially zero.18 Furthermore, even
if individuals would not exhibit this kind of irrational behaviour, the assumption
of symmetric information between plant operators and victims can be rejected on
theoretical grounds.
It is, therefore, reasonable to assume that the consumers misperceive, i. e., under-
estimate, nuclear accident risk.19 Under a negligence-regime, again, the operators
can escape liability, complying with the enacted safety standard. Since, there-
fore, accident costs are external to the operator, the market price is too low and
consumers, underestimating the risk of a nuclear accident, purchase an amount of
18For a detailed discussion and experimental results see inter alia Sunstein (2005) and
McClelland, Schulze & Coursey (1993).
19Expected accident damage D, therefore, equals to y(1 + λ)d(x), where λ < 1.
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nuclear energy, which is socially inefficient.20 (On the contrary, if consumers were
perfectly informed and the policy maker was able to define the socially optimal due
care level of prevention, a negligence rule could lead to an efficient outcome. For
the reasons mentioned above and due to problems of controlling and monitoring
discussed at the beginning of Chapter 3, this can be rejected in the specific case.)
The aim of the preceding analysis was to highlight the theoretical convenience
of holding the nuclear industry strictly liable, which can be summarised as follows:
Strict liability internalizes the costs of the accident to the transaction
that is generating the risk. Care decisions are efficient under strict
liability because the producer bears the full social costs and benefits of
increased care. The activity level, or quantity of the commodity pur-
chased, is efficient because the market price for the commodity reflects
the full marginal social cost of production, including the costs of acci-
dents. The product is consumed up to the point where the marginal
social value of consumption equals the marginal social cost. (Trebilcock
& Winter 1997: 222)
Additionally, strict liability entails further practical advantages. Firstly, strict
liability is a cost-effective strategy in relation to negligence in the sense that it
entails less administrative expenses (Scha¨fer & Mu¨ller-Langer 2008: 6 et seq.).
Defining a prevention level of due care is a costly process. Given the adequate
economic incentive, plant operators are better informed to choose the efficient
level of prevention at minimum cost. Furthermore, monitoring the operator’s
behaviour and proving negligence is also involved and expensive. In addition to
20If x = x¯ it follows that L = 0 and p = c(x¯). The first order condition of the consumers’
maximisation problem reads as b′(y) = c(x¯) + (1 + λ)d(x¯). In comparison with the social
planner’s problem b′(y¯) = c(x¯) + d(x¯), and since λ < 0, respectively b′′ < 0, it follows that
y > y¯.
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these cost saving potentials on the side of policy makers and courts, strict liability
financially alleviates civil action by potential victims. This increases the pressure
for operators to engage in precautionary activity. Secondly, strict liability might
be preferable from a distributive point of view. In the case of a nuclear accident, it
is assured that victims are fully compensated under all circumstances, since plant
operators cannot escape liability by acting non-negligently.21
3.1.1. Magnitude of Liability
The benchmark case presented above is conditioned on restrictive assumptions and
although strict liability has an established juridical tradition, disagreement about
the extent of the nuclear sector’s liability still remains. The following discussion,
based on Trebilcock & Winter (1997: 221 et seq.), shows that the specific charac-
teristics of nuclear risk are by no means an argument against unlimited liability
as the socially preferred rule.
A first point of critique refers to both the nature of atomic externality and
the role of the consumer as a potential victim: It can be argued that since con-
sumers of nuclear energy are potentially affected by nuclear hazards, an efficient
outcome could be achieved through bilateral negotiation.22 In this case, incentives
for prevention do not depend on civil liability rules (’Coasian irrelevance’). An
individual consumer does indeed take into account the personal risk s/he faces due
to an extra unit of nuclear energy purchased, but s/he does not account for the
potential losses born by third parties. ’Coasian irrelevance’, therefore, only takes
place under the unrealistic assumption that all consumers and victims as well as
21Clearly, the latter argument does only hold under the assumption that the corresponding
standard of justice is the so-called polluter-pays-principle (PPP), a principle which is widely
accepted in environmental law but still divergently appreciated in different legal regimes.
22A concept first to be discussed in a famous article by Coase (1960).
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the operator reach a mutual agreement. Consequently, the argument is not strong
enough to reject full strict liability.
Secondly, it can be questioned to what extent nuclear risk can be referred to
as unilateral. Bearing in mind the possibility of reducing sensitivity to risk23,
it can be argued that nuclear operators as well as potential victims should bear
responsibility. The latter can essentially reduce expected accident damage, since
they are free to choose a residence far away from nuclear plants. Under that
point of view, a legal regime holding operators exclusively liable fails to create
the right incentives on the side of potential victims. Nevertheless, victims would
have to invest in information about nuclear risk and technology – expenses that
operators will incur anyway to reduce on-site damage costs. Furthermore, the
opportunity costs of an uninhabited risk zone and the consequent loss of economic
activity would be enormous. Based on the principle of ’least-cost avoidance’, this
argument can consequently be rejected.
Thirdly, critics of an unlimited liability rule refer to the inefficiencies of the
tort system. Identifying and compensating victims, indeed, involves substantial
transaction costs. But this is true for any compensation mechanism. Furthermore,
only tort law and its liability mechanism can guarantee total cost internalisation
and create efficient safety incentives.
Finally, Trebilcock and Winter address the issue of second-best considerations.
In contrast to alternative methods, the low carbon footprint of atomic energy re-
covery is used as an argument in favour of subsidising the nuclear industry by
reducing liability. Nevertheless, they argue, such comparison of externalities is
awkward, since a subsidisation rather creates perverse incentives against preven-
tion. Policy makers are well advised to treat different externalities – such as
pollution or nuclear risk – autonomously. Accordingly, second-best considerations
23Cf. section 2.1 on social risk management .
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do not challenge the principle of full strict liability in the specific context.
3.1.2. Liability and Regulation
The nuclear industry is a highly regulated sector. Based on an elaborate eco-
nomic model, Trebilcock & Winter (1997) try to examine whether the presence
of compulsory safety standards can make a case for a limitation of liability at
the social optimum. The analysis emanates from the fact that the regulator is
confronted with a plurality of different safety dimensions. Some of them, which
can be officially monitored – such as the nuclear plant’s initial design features or
modifications of its equipment –, and some of them, which cannot be controlled
– such as various human decisions and (hidden) actions within the operator’s risk
preventing activity.
In the case of preventive measures that can be monitored on a ’zero-one’ basis
– e. g., the quality of plant material – full liability is efficient on all accounts, irre-
spective of the level of regulation. The underlying intuition is that an expansion
of liability will further minimise social costs, while it cannot create perverse in-
centives for the operators to further engage in inefficiently high prevention levels
in over-regulated safety dimensions. In the presence of regulative measures that
can only be monitored with an observation error – e. g., the accuracy of plant em-
ployees – unlimited liability remains optimal, as long as the policy maker does not
impose a safety standard that exceeds the socially efficient level. In that particu-
lar case, the operator would have an incentive to misleadingly extend preventive
efforts.24 The authors’ results can be summarised as follows:
[F]ull strict liability dominates limited liability in providing efficient
incentives for safety even if the existing regulatory standards are ex-
24It seems rather improbable though that policy makers would over-regulate dimensions, which
cannot be monitored adequately.
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cessive in dimensions, such as the physical design requirements of the
plant, that are monitored without error. In this sense the most basic
principle in the economics of torts – that the assignment of a higher
share of accident costs to a single tort-feasor will improve the tort-
feasor’s incentives to avoid the accident – extends to the case of a
mixed tort-regulation incentive system. (ibid.: 227)
3.1.3. Liability and the ’Insolvency Problem’
So far, the desirable impact of full strict liability on prevention levels has been
shown, supposing plant operators to be perfectly solvent in the case of an accident.
Importantly, economic theory provides evidence that this result is not robust, once
the latter assumption is rejected. In the case of anticipated insolvency, the policy
maker is confronted with a moral hazard problem of serious consequence, since a
tort-feasor has no incentive to internalise costs s/he presumable cannot be held
liable for. It has been shown that strict liability leads potentially judgement-proof
tort-feasors to engage in inefficiently low levels of precaution (Landes & Posner
1984: 420).
This can be illustrated using the model by Shavell (1980), presented above. If
an operator’s assets do not suffice to meet total compensation requirements, once
a severe nuclear incident has occurred, the operator will only partly internalise
damage costs, i. e., compensation payments that assumingly exceed the operator’s
net worth are external to the firm’s cost minimisation problem. Assuming that
both marginal prevention costs and expected marginal expenses on liability are in-
creasing in the level of prevention, a de facto limit on liability due to the operator’s
judgement-proofness will lead to under-deterrence. Again, the market mechanism
will transfer the price signal into socially undesirable levels of activity.25 (This
25L = µd(x), where µ < 1, and equation (3.3) cannot yield the efficient outcome of equation
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effect is still dominant under the alternative assumption that prevention reduces
expected accident damage at a decreasing rate.26)
Insolvency is a highly probable scenario in the case of nuclear incidents. Relating
to the possible off-site consequences of a severe accident, Heyes et al. (2000: 94)
note that a comparison of various expert studies suggests a ”reasonable” estimate
to be anything between $1 and $100 billion. Faure & Fiore (2009: 117) refer to
expert estimates of worst-case damages that range between ¿10 billion and ¿100
billion. This potential catastrophic impact is a strong economic argument for pol-
icy makers to commit operators to purchase financial coverage (Faure 2007: 343).
Making liability insurance compulsory is especially important in the case of
strict liability, since it has been shown inter alia by Shavell (1986) that tort-
feasors do not have any incentives to purchase financial coverage voluntarily. Given
liability insurance were obtained, Shavell furthermore illustrates that – except
when insurance companies were perfectly able to monitor the operator’s preventive
behaviour – care levels were too low from a social perspective.
The notion to completely solve the ’insolvency problem’ through an obligation
to purchase liability insurance is based on two rather unrealistic assumptions.
First, the insurance market has the capacity to provide sufficient funds to cover
entire expected damage costs; secondly, the insurance market does not exhibit
informational asymmetries. Accordingly, it has to be analysed whether relaxing
(3.7). Assuming that c′′ > 0 and d′′ > 0, comparative statics imply that x < x∗, since in the
optimum dx/dµ > 0. Furthermore, price equation (3.4) and consumer’s utility maximisation
(3.5) suggest that y > y∗.
26Here, d′′ < 0: A necessary though plausible condition for the result to hold is that marginal
prevention costs increase more rapidly than marginal costs of liability decrease, proportion-
ately to the expected cap on liability. If L = µd(x), comparative statics from equation (3.3)
show that dxdµ = − d
′
c′′+µd′′ . It follows that dx/dµ > 0 if −µd′′ < c′′ and dx/dµ < 0 other-
wise, respectively. This condition is not considered by Scha¨fer et al. (2008: 9) who wrongly
conclude that under strict liability under-compensation in general leads to under-deterrence.
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these assumptions provides an argument against holding nuclear operators fully
liable.
Trebilcock & Winter (1997: 228 et seq.) argue that the first point of critique
– according to which the insurance market cannot entirely cover nuclear risk – is
inappropriate to oppose unlimited liability, in general: Firstly, extended liability
always creates positive incentives for prevention. Secondly, the private insurance
market can be completed by government provided liability insurance and even if
premiums were set too low, unlimited liability is preferred, since a cap on liability
actually corresponds to a public liability insurance at zero-cost, preventing full
internalisation of accident costs.
The prevalence of asymmetric and imperfect information between operator and
insurance company is an inadequate argument, too. The authors are able to show
mathematically that, again, full liability ensures the social optimum. Even the
slightest possibility to monitor the operator’s behaviour will create incentives to
raise the prevention levels beyond official safety standards, given liability is ex-
tended. The following statement concludes the discussion on the ’insolvency prob-
lem’ and the optimal level of liability:
To argue for unlimited liability, it is enough to point out that [a] limit
[. . . ] is equivalent in its incentive effects to the provision to of liability
insurance at a zero price. (ibid.: 231 et seq.)
Results
So far, the two main insights provided by the analysis can be summarised as
follows:
 Since strict liability – from a point of view of prevention – creates op-
timal economic incentives on the supply side, it should be preferred to
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a negligence rule.
 For similar reasons liability should be unlimited. This result does not change,
no matter whether basic assumptions of the benchmark case are weakened,
regulation is included into the analysis, or the ’judgement-proof’ problem is
considered, respectively.
3.1.4. ’Channelling’ of Liability
To complete the discussion on the optimal civil liability regime for nuclear plant
operators, the issue is addressed whether responsibility of upstream suppliers of
components and services should be ’channelled’ to the operator.27
Indeed, given both the absence of administration costs and unlimited net wealth
as well as ignoring distributive effects, the Coase theorem implies that the down-
stream producer of nuclear energy and upstream suppliers will reach a mutual
agreement, which guarantees both efficient levels of prevention and activity, ir-
respective of the initial allocation of liability. Furthermore, since the contracting
parties’ objective is to minimise total costs, the mutual agreement ends up in trans-
ferring liability to the party, which is best informed in order to avoid risk costs,
i. e., the plant operator. The rule of ’channelled’ liability, therefore, seems efficient
from a social perspective referring to the ’best-placed decider’ argument. Neverthe-
less, this result changes in the presence of the ’insolvency problem’. ’Channelling’
amplifies the negative consequences of a de facto limit on responsibility:
The channeling of liability to the operator magnifies the effect of the
limit by forcing the limit to apply to the total liability of the operator
plus all input suppliers. The negative incentive effects on both care and
activity are magnified correspondingly. (Trebilcock et al. 1997: 233)
27The presented arguments resort to Trebilcock & Winter (1997: 232 et seq.).
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The authors advise against mandated ’channelling’ of liability and conclude that
in addition to a strict liability rule for plant operators, upstream suppliers should
optimally be held liable for nuclear accidents on a negligence basis.
3.2. Liability Regimes
The aim of the following section is firstly to provide a short overview of the dif-
ferent liability regimes, presenting the international conventions on nuclear energy
currently in force28 and secondly, to evaluate the liability rules based on the theo-
retical results that have been achieved so far.
According to the World Nuclear Association (WNA), an international organisa-
tion to promote the concerns of currently 85 percent of the world’s nuclear energy
producing operators, most international conventions and national laws regarding
nuclear third party liability are based on 5 basic principles:
 Operators are held strictly liable: On the side of the victims, the obstacle
to proof negligence is suspended in order to unburden the litigation process.
On the side of operators, this policy creates the adequate incentives for
prevention. Economic theory advocates this approach.
 Operators are exclusively liable: It has been shown in the previous section
that ’channelling’ of responsibility leads to perverse incentives for prevention
in the presence of limited liability or presumed insolvency. Nevertheless,
this policy measure does not only influence behaviour on the supply side.
In defence of this principle, one has to highlight its objective to alleviate
litigation, i. e., to encourage potential victims to insist on their right for
compensation. Since under ’channelled’ liability operators are confronted
28The overview is based on World Nuclear Association (2010) and Faure et al. (2008a), (2008b)
and (2009), respectively.
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with a higher quantity of expected civil lawsuits, this particular nuclear
policy might in fact create positive incentives for prevention. However, the
dominant effect cannot be identified a priori.
 The operators liability is limited in amount and in time: Undoubtedly, these
limits represent a socialisation of nuclear risk. Following the arguments of
WNA, this is just the fair price society has to pay in order to profit from
nuclear energy, since the state has to take risk for any major infrastruc-
ture facility to materialise. Needless to say, such reasoning is not supported
by economic theory. Wrong incentives and market distortions outweigh the
value of nuclear energy for society. Taking account of the potential catas-
trophic harm due to atomic hazards, any form of subsidisation should be
avoided from an economic perspective.
 Operators are mandated to purchase financial coverage: According to eco-
nomic theory, this is necessary to avoid that operators become insolvent in
the case of an accident. Nevertheless, the following sections will illustrate
that current international arrangements are not suitable to guarantee both
an efficient level of prevention and an adequate amount of compensation.
 Finally, the principle of ’exclusive jurisdiction’ states that only the legal en-
tity in which an accident takes place is legally responsible: On the one hand,
this provides the operators with a degree of certainty. On the other hand, it
further alleviates the litigation process, which especially is advantageous in
the case of transport related off-site accidents.
There exist two international regimes regulating nuclear liability; furthermore,
several states refer to individual arrangements.
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3.2.1. OECD Regime
Nuclear liability of most OECD member states is governed by the Paris Conven-
tion (1960), which came into force in 1968 and is currently ratified by 14 states
including inter alia France, Sweden, the United Kingdom and Germany. It was
supplemented by the Brussels Convention (1963) and was amended in the years
1964, 1982 and 2004, respectively.
The Paris/Brussels Conventions incorporate the principles illustrated above and
distribute liability among three levels – the first tier being privately funded, the
remaining two being financed on a public basis: the operator, the individual state
of a potential accident, and the community of the conventions’ member states.
Currently, most nuclear operators in the OECD area profit from a cap on lia-
bility, which is defined by the individual member state and does not exceed the
amount of ¿210 million. For example, French operators are individually liable for
third party claims up to ¿91 million (Faure & Fiore 2008a: 231); the remaining
risk of damage up to ¿360 million is allocated to French taxpayers and to the com-
munity of all contracting parties to the Paris/Brussels Conventions, respectively.
The liability caps before and after the last amendment of the Paris Convention in
2004 are presented in Table 3.1.29 Importantly, the 2004 amendment has yet not
been ratified by enough countries to pass into force. Five concerns though attract
attention:
Firstly, a future ratification involves a remarkable increase in both total and
especially in operators’ liability. Nevertheless, ¿1.5 billion is a negligible amount
compared to actual estimates of worst case scenarios between¿10 and¿100 billion.
This tension is even more remarkable since, secondly, the definition of ’nuclear
damage’ will be extended to the concepts of environmental harm and economic
29Data stem from Word Nuclear Association (2010); caps according to the Paris Convention’s
1982 amendment are converted from special drawing rights (SDR) into ¿ by a factor of 1.2.
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Paris/Brussels Conven-
tions
Paris/Brussels Conven-
tions
2. Amendment (1982) 3. Amendment (2004)
Operator’s
Liability Cap cap 700
State’s
Intervention 210 – cap 500
Contracting Parties
Coverage 150 300
Total 360 1,500
Table 3.1.: Liability Caps according to Paris/Brussels Conventions (in million ¿)
loss. From a viewpoint of efficient prevention, although substantially increased,
the 2004 protocol’s liability caps, therefore, cannot be supported by economic
reasoning. Thirdly, the amendment extends the limitation on liability in time. In
the case of death or individual harm, the prescription delay for a lawsuit against
operators is specified to 30 years, while other types of damage must be sued for
debt within a period of 10 years. Finally, the 2004 protocol explicitly allows
member states to pursue a policy of unrestricted liability. However, it has to be
highlighted that, in contrast to all other countries in the OECD area, German
nuclear legislation was already able to establish a policy of unlimited liability.
3.2.2. Alternative Regimes
The second international regime to regulate nuclear liability joins the member
states of the IAEA under the Vienna Convention (1963), which came into force in
1977 and is currently ratified by 10 states. Its 1997 amendment became effective
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in 2003 and is characterised inter alia by an operators’ liability cap of approxi-
mately ¿360 million and a definition of ’nuclear damage’ that includes ecological
harm. A joint convention in 1988 regulates liability between the parties of the
Paris/Brussels Conventions and the Vienna Convention, respectively.
Countries like China, India, Japan or the United States, which bear significant
nuclear capacity, rely on their own liability arrangements. US American nuclear
law serves as an important benchmark. Liability in the United States is governed
by the Price Anderson Act (PAA) (1957), which was amended last in 2005. Most
notably and in contrast to the OECD regime, under the PAA the government
does not bear any financial burden in the case of a nuclear accident. The indi-
vidual operator is held liable up to $300 million. Additional capital, summing up
to approximately $10.5 billion, is provided through a mutual fund by all nuclear
operators. Emanating from modest estimates of accident scenarios, financial pro-
visions are sufficient to cover entire damages. Consequently, US American nuclear
law guarantees full cost internalisation – the necessary condition to reach efficient
levels of risk prevention. Of course, if one factors in possible scenarios entailing
nuclear damage that far exceed $10 billion, the nuclear policy regime in the United
States loses part of its merits.
3.2.3. Implicit Nuclear Liability Subsidy
On the grounds of economic theory, it has been already argued that a liability cap
on the side of plant operators prevents the risk of nuclear energy generation from
being considered within the production process in a socially efficient way.
It has been shown in the literature that such restrictions on liability, there-
fore, constitute an indirect subsidy to the nuclear industry (Faure & Fiore 2009;
Heyes & Heyes 2000; Dubin & Rothwell 1990). Evaluations of the annual nuclear
subsidy for operators in France, Canada and the United States, respectively, sug-
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gest that the negative consequences of a liability cap on prevention levels are by no
means negligible.30 Faure & Fiore (2009: 118 et seq.) estimate the implicit nuclear
subsidy of an average nuclear operator in France to range between ¿140,000 and
¿3.3 million.31 This corresponds to the additional costs per reactor-year a nuclear
operator would have to come up for without restrictions on liability – though un-
der the (unrealistic) assumption that private liability insurance would be available
without limit, at the actuarial price. The results translate into a subsidisation of
the French nuclear industry in the amount of ¿8.12 million, respectively ¿191.4
million per year. The authors underline that the average subsidy would decrease at
a rate of 44.2 percent under the arrangements of the 2004 protocol. Nevertheless,
they conclude, the non-internalised risk costs would still cause socially inefficient
prevention levels.
Besides concerns regarding an insufficient level of prevention, the indirect sub-
sidisation is subject to further criticism. Firstly, it causes competitive distur-
bances; full cost internalisation would alter the competitiveness of the nuclear
sector within the whole energy industry. Faure & Fiore (2009: 123), nevertheless,
are able to show that an internalisation of total risk costs would be financially
sustainable in the case of the French nuclear industry, since the implicit subsidy
currently at most accounts for 11.26 percent of the industry’s average annual ben-
efit. Furthermore, the industry could transfer the burden of cost internalisation
30The estimations are based on a technique developed by Dubin & Rothwell (1990), which was
supplemented by Heyes & Liston-Heyes (1998). The method is particularly convenient, since
it specifies the density function of nuclear damage using only two pieces of information;
data on private liability insurance arrangements and data on expert estimates regarding the
probability and the dimension of nuclear worst-case scenarios. The subsidy is defined as the
expected value of the non-internalised damage, i. e., the expected value of loss above the
liability cap.
31The wide range results from the different estimates of accident probabilities, worst-case sce-
narios and the risk aversion of the insurance industry.
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entirely to consumers of energy without any substantial loss in competitiveness.
Secondly, implicit subsidisation prevents potential victims from being fully com-
pensated. It is argued that victim compensation is not merely a distributional
issue. Considering the potential catastrophic consequences of a nuclear accident
the question of adequate victim compensation appears to be a matter of economic
efficiency.32
Currently, German legislation does not offer any explicit liability cap to the
nuclear industry. Prima facie, the concept of a nuclear liability subsidy does
not, therefore, seem to be applicable. Nevertheless, if one takes into account the
strongly debated issue of the ’insolvency problem’, and if one factors in the poor
arrangements currently made for victim compensation ex ante, the question about
an implicit subsidy for German operators is still predominant.
3.3. Nuclear Liability in Germany
Germany is a member country to the Paris/Brussels protocols. Therefore, nuclear
operators are strictly liable, which is uncontroversial from an economic point of
view. According to German nuclear law, operators additionally have to come
up for entire accident damage.33 This policy of unlimited liability is unique in
current international liability regimes. As has been shown in the previous sections,
economic theory encourages this approach.
German nuclear operators are individually obliged to provide financial coverage
up to ¿2.5 billion. The amount of coverage is defined in relation to the risk
32The issue of Compensation is discussed in detail in the following Chapter 4.
33Nuclear legal regulation in Germany is formulated in Gesetz u¨ber die friedliche Verwendung der
Kernenergie und den Schutz gegen ihre Gefahren (Atomgesetz – AtG) and Verordnung u¨ber
die Deckungsvorsorge nach dem Atomgesetz (Atomrechtliche Deckungsvorsorge-Verordnung –
AtDeckV), respectively. For a brief summary see e.g. Deutsches Atomforum (2010).
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of an individual plant.34 The plant’s productive capacity, denoted in megawatt
(MW), serves as proximity. It shows that the marginal burden for operating plants
above a capacity of 1004 MW is zero. Thirteen out of 17 German nuclear plants
capitalise on this legal cap on compulsory provision. For example, the operator
of the largest nuclear installation in Germany (Isar-2) did not have to internalise
risk costs correlating to 418 MW in the year 2010. This can be equivalently
interpreted as an indirect subsidisation, since the operator does not have to provide
for additional compensation funds in the amount of ¿1.2 billion. Clearly, this cap
undermines the incentive effect of the policy.
Since the insurance market is not able to supply sufficient funds, the duty to
provide for financial security is furthermore accomplished via a risk-sharing pool
including all nuclear operators.35 Producers of nuclear energy in Germany are
individually insured against third party accident damage up to ¿256 million, while
the mutual fund is supposed to cover the remaining amount of ¿2.244 billion.
German compulsory liability provisions, although comparatively extensive, are not
sufficient to cover expected financial requirements in the case of an accident. In
respect of direct financial precaution, nuclear law in Germany does not, therefore,
assure the economic condition for efficient risk prevention. Although it outperforms
regulation standards according to the Paris/Brussels protocols, it cannot create
the strong incentives entailed in US American law.
In Germany there are currently six different operating companies managing the
operation of up to six nuclear power stations, which are mainly organised as limited
liability companies.36 Operating companies are subordinate to one of four major
34Cf. §9 AtDeckV.
35A detailed discussion on both nuclear insurance and mutual risk-sharing pools is presented in
the following Chapter 4.
36German operating companies (numbers of nuclear power stations are indicated in brackets):
E.ON Kernkraft GmbH (6), EnBW Kernkraft GmbH (4), KKW Grundremmingen GmbH
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German energy groups, which are organised as joint-stock companies.37
To compensate for insufficient direct financial precaution, operating companies
in Germany are liable for damages that exceed the ¿2.5 billion level with their
entire assets. This policy is in line with economic theory.
Nevertheless, its expected effect crucially depends on the extent an individual
operator can be assumed to be ’judgement-proof’. If the operator’s net worth
in the case of an accident is presumed to be lower than expected total losses, it
can consequently be argued that the operator’s ex post asset value constitutes an
indirect cap on liability, which would prevent entire cost internalisation.38 Hence,
efficient prevention levels may not be reached within the German liability regime.
Table 3.2 summarises the results achieved so far.
Tier of Guarantee Coverage Incentives for Prevention
Operator’s individual
liability insurance
¿256 million High incentives relative to common
liability regimes in OECD area.
Risk-sharing pool up to ¿2,244 million Strong incentive relative to average
OECD countries; weaker effect in
comparison to US PAA.
Operator’s assets theoretical: unlimited coverage
de facto: net worth ex post
In theory, policy creates efficient
incentives; de facto the operator’s
expected net worth ex post consti-
tutes an implicit liability cap; effi-
cient prevention level are not guar-
anteed.
Table 3.2.: Nuclear Liability in Germany – Incentives for Preveniton
To provide a final evaluation of German nuclear policy from the standpoint of
(2), RWE Power AG (2), KKW Brunsbu¨ttel GmbH (2) and KKW Lippe-Ems GmbH (1).
37German energy groups: E.ON, RWE, EnBW and Vattenfall.
38Cf. previous Section 3.2.3 on the implicit nuclear subsidy.
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prevention, it is necessary to clarify whether unlimited liability is a credible threat
to avoid insolvency related issues of moral hazard. Two driving forces behind the
occurrence of the ’insolvency problem’ can be identified:
One argument for nuclear operators to consider themselves as ’judgement-proof’
has already been mentioned: Operators have no incentives to internalise entire
risk costs if a firm’s anticipated net asset value ex post, i. e., once an accident has
occurred, is lower than expected third party liabilities. It is reasonable to assume
an operator’s stock exchange value to suffer from substantial losses in the case of
an accident. In particular, it will presumably draw near zero, since it is the nuclear
installation itself which constitutes the main net worth. The 2009 financial reports
of German energy groups reveal that subordinate limited companies operating up
to four nuclear power plants do not exhibit an adequate capital base in respect of
future liability claims. Values on equity capital range from ¿10 million to ¿166
million.39 According to this scenario, four operating firms running 9 out of 17
nuclear plants in Germany de facto would face an implicit cap on liability in the
amount of ¿2.5 billion – the sum, which obligatorily has to be made available
ex ante. RWE power AG, showing a capital base of approximately ¿2 billion, is
an exception. As far as the level of operators is concerned, a policy of full strict
liability does not entirely solve insolvency related issues.
Nevertheless, individual operators are subordinate to large parent companies
and German energy groups like RWE, E.ON or EnBW might exhibit significant
equity capital to cover future third party claims. Table 3.3 lists German energy
groups’ capital resources and relates them to the individual group’s share of nuclear
risk in Germany.40 It appears that three parent companies, which jointly account
39Cf. RWE (2010), Vattenfall Europe (2010) and EnBW (2010); data in respect of E.ON
Kernkraft GmbH are not included in the reports.
40Data on equity capital are drawn from firms’ 2009 business reports RWE (2010), E.ON (2010),
Vattenfall Europe (2010) and EnBW (2010), respectively. Firms’ share on nuclear risk is
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Energy Group Risk Share in % Equity Capital in bn. ¿
E.ON AG 45 44
RWE AG 27 13.7
Vattenfall Europe AG 7 9.8
EnBW AG 22 6.4
Table 3.3.: German Nuclear Energy Groups: Risk Share and Equity Capital
for 78 percent of nuclear risk in Germany, individually hold sufficient capital to
cover expected damage costs, employing low-level estimates of nuclear catastro-
phes. Consequently, NRM in Germany, to some extent, is able to create correct
economic incentives for prevention. It is necessary, however, to abstract from worst
case scenarios above the ¿10 billion level and to assume that the disposable equity
capital of the parent company constitutes the de facto limit on liability.
Four points of critique remain: Firstly, the system does not provide an efficient
incentive effect for EnBW, an energy group owning an operating company manag-
ing four nuclear power stations and accounting for 22 percent of atomic energy in
Germany. Under full strict liability, an equity base of ¿6.4 billion is not sufficient
to rule out the possibility of the energy group’s ’judgement-proofness’. Secondly,
the social outcome of German nuclear regulation has to be adjusted in virtue of
the uncertainty correlating with ex post asset values. Thirdly, the results above
are based on the assumption of a specific low-level estimate of nuclear damage
costs. If one considers the possibility of worst case scenarios in an amount of up
to ¿100 billion, the nuclear liability regime in Germany loses part of its incentive
effect for efficient prevention. Fourthly and most importantly, operating firms and
parent companies are two distinct legal entities. It is a crucial question whether
calculated as fraction of total production of nuclear energy (in MW). Data on operators’
productive capacity are provided by Bundesamt fu¨r Strahlenschutz (2010).
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the unlimited liability of the individual operator can be exhaustively transferred
to the superior corporate level.41
A second argument for the ’insolvency problem’ to occur refers to the role of the
government and its specific concerns in the case of a severe nuclear incident. It can
be argued that companies of this size are too important to fail from a national eco-
nomic perspective. Once an accident has occurred, policy makers have an incentive
to act in a way, such that losses in employment are minimised. Furthermore, a
mandated insolvency presumably causes the energy market to become even more
monopolistic. In total, the social planner, therefore, has a strong incentive to devi-
ate from a predefined behaviour and to bail out nuclear operators. Not least, this
argument draws upon WNA’s statement on Liability for Nuclear Damage.42 It is
argued that above various provisions for victim compensation guaranteed ex ante
”there is at least a tacit acceptance that the installation state will make available
funds to cover anything in excess of these provisions, just as is the case with any
major disaster – natural or other” (WNA 2010: 5). This would, of course, reduce
the credibility of the threat to become insolvent and full strict liability could not
guarantee an efficient level of prevention. As seen from this perspective, German
nuclear regulation seems to be deficient in comparison to, for example, the US
American PAA, since in the latter case, sufficient compensation funds have to be
assured ex ante and policy makers prevent being on the horns of a dilemma.
41This is a delicate judicial concern, which is beyond the scope of the present analysis. The lack
of legal precedence further exacerbates accurate predictions.
42Note that all nuclear energy groups involved in the German energy market currently are
members of WNA.
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Evaluation
 German legislation in reference to the tier of direct financial provision does
not create optimal incentives for nuclear risk prevention.
 If recourse claims of potential victims can only resort to capital funds of
the operating companies, the policy of unlimited liability does not solve the
’insolvency problem’.
 Efficient prevention levels are guaranteed by the German liability regime
if it is the case that parent companies can be held liable with their entire
assets. Nevertheless, the argument is invalid if expert estimates of worst-case
scenarios beyond the level of ¿40 billion are to be believed.
 Regardless of the policy of unlimited liability, it can be argued conclusively
that nuclear risk management in Germany does not guarantee the optimal
level of risk prevention as long as the ’insolvency problem’ is not solved
satisfactorily. To this end, the policy maker would have to ensure adequate
arrangements for victim compensation ex ante, respectively, to substantially
extend compulsory financial provisions in order to cover the entire needs of
potential victims.
3.4. Nuclear Safety Regulation
At the beginning of Chapter 3, it already has been stated that nuclear safety
regulation constitutes an inferior approach in relation to policies of economic in-
centives. Referring to the principle of ’least-cost avoidance’, it has been argued
that, given the adequate economic incentive, nuclear plant operators are assumed
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to reach the socially desirably level of risk prevention in a cost-effective way.43
Nevertheless, it has transpired that both (implicit) caps on liability and the
predominance of the ’insolvency problem’ lead to an insufficient preventive effort
on the side of power plant operators. Hence, an incentive policy might de facto
fail to develop its desired effect. Therefore, the question arises whether prudent
safety regulation is able to fill this gap in a satisfactory way.
Faure & Fiore (2009: 126 et seq.) point to the role of international institutions
like IAEA and EURATOM, which – in the form of standards and recommendations
– exercise a ”draconian control” on the member countries’ nuclear installations.
Safety rules appear to be ”much stricter than in any other industrial risky activity”.
In Germany, nuclear safety standards are enforced via a continual supervisory
review, which assesses the ”actual status of existing installations [. . . ] according
to the latest scientific and technological developments” (Vorwerk 2002: 11). In
addition, German operators are individually obliged to perform safety reviews
according to specific guidelines. Results of the reviews have to be submitted to
nuclear authorities after a timespan of ten years.
Within this respect, it is possible to point at a first disadvantage of the command-
and-control approach in relation to policies of economic incentives. The regulation
process appears to be static and inflexible. The sequence of command, in order to
enforce new safety standards, consists of the Federal Ministry for the Environment,
the ’La¨nder’, the Reactor Safety Commission and the operators of nuclear plants,
respectively (Vorwerk 2002). In regard to flexible and efficient risk prevention,
therefore, nuclear safety regulation is clearly not an instrument favoured by eco-
nomic theory (Faure & Vanden Borre 2008). A second disadvantage has already
been mentioned in previous sections. The authority’s capability to monitor plant
43Cf. Section 3.1.1. A more detailed discussion can be found inter alia in Faure & Fiore (2009),
Faure & Vanden Borre (2008) and Shavell (1984), respectively.
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operators is substantially limited a priori, which impedes an efficient regulation
process. Thus, one has to object to the notion of nuclear safety regulation as a
perfect substitute for the instrument of civil liability.
47

4. Nuclear Risk Management and
Compensation
At this point of the thesis, the reader should be able to understand the role of ex
ante policy measures of nuclear risk prevention. Three insights should be kept in
mind: Firstly, creating economic incentives is a strong tool, which can avoid the
shortcomings of a command-and-control approach. Secondly, economic theory is
able to formulate a distinct efficiency criterion. Although an abstract argument,
it can be applied to tort law – holding plant operators strictly liable without limit
guarantees an efficient outcome. Thirdly, from an economic point of view, various
objections, which question the criterion’s applicability in the context of atomic
energy generation, are not convincing. Furthermore, the capability of Germany’s
nuclear policy to incorporate results of economic theory has been analysed, relating
its performance to both alternative regulatory approaches and their outcomes,
respectively.
The following section, in contrast, focuses on ex post policy instruments aim-
ing at an efficient level of compensation. In order to avoid textual overlapping,
the following analysis abstracts from the influence of compensation rules on the
outcome of policy instruments aiming at risk prevention. Instead, it concentrates
on the policy maker’s challenge to guarantee compensation payments both at a
highest possible amount and at adoptable costs, respectively. The discussion re-
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views the main methods of compensation currently in use: insurance, reserves and
risk-sharing pools. Furthermore, alternative compensation mechanisms – like com-
pensation or financial market solutions – and the potential role of the government
as (re)insurer of nuclear risk are critically assessed.
Referring to the conceptual framework presented in Sections 2.1 and 2.2, three
important questions have to be kept in mind throughout the subsequent discussion:
 What are the nuclear plant operator’s costs of implementing different mea-
sures for compensation? Which mechanism can be considered as cost-effective
and sustainable on the supply side? In what follows, a compensation mecha-
nism is defined as cost-effective if it guarantees a given level of remuneration
at lowest possible costs for the plant operators.
 Which methods are suitable from a demand side point of view? That is,
which compensation instruments are able to satisfy the claims of potential
victims in an extensive way? The level of compensation least required to
meet the demand side criterion is set to ¿10 billion per accident.
 What are the necessary economic and legal conditions for the different com-
pensation mechanisms? What role should the government play in respect of
these requirements?
Accordingly, the objective of the section is to identify the economically favourable
compensation instruments in order to evaluate the provisions made by plant op-
erators in response to current nuclear policy in Germany.
4.1. Liability Insurance
Insurance companies conventionally set their premiums according to the expected
value of loss, i. e., the probability of an adverse event multiplied by the amount
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of damage resulting from it. There exists a wide range of estimates regarding the
probability of a nuclear accident.44 The values employed in the further analysis
are p1 = 10
−4, p2 = 10−5 and p3 = 10−6 per reactor, per year. The corresponding
’worst case’ scenarios entail losses in the amount of l1 = 10, l2 = 40, l3 = 70 and
l4 = 100 billion ¿, respectively.
Here, it is assumed that a core melt down is solely the result of malfunction;
’initiating events’ like human error or terrorist attacks, which are highly uncertain
and, therefore, cannot be associated with a certain probability, are not taken into
account (cf. Faure et al. 2009: 117).
The literature assigns conditional probabilities to the magnitude of an accident,
once a core meltdown has occurred (Faure & Fiore 2008a: 234 et seq.). The con-
ditional probability of an accident to involve losses below ¿1 billion is set to 81
percent; conditional on a meltdown, there is a remaining chance of 19 percent
that the quantity of radioactive releases emitted is high enough to cause damage
between ¿1 billion and ¿100 billion . Since these ’minor’ and ’major’ accidents
are assumed to be uncorrelated, and since in Germany the mandated sum in-
sured is such that the insurance companies’ expected losses are not effected by the
magnitude of the accident, conditional probabilities can be ignored hereafter.
Consequently, the actuarial premium – in order to insure against losses up to
¿256 million – ranges from ¿256 to ¿25,600 per reactor per year. Nevertheless,
nuclear plant operators in Germany have to come up for premiums in the amount
of ¿13 million per reactor-year (Scheer 2010: 358), which – even if the most catas-
trophic scenario is considered – exceeds the ’fair’ value by a factor of 500.
In respect of the requirements mentioned above, private liability insurance does
not seem to be an adequate solution from an operator’s point of view. It shows
44Cf. Faure et al. (2009), Heyes et al. (2000), Dubin and Rothwell (1990), and the citations
therein.
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that this is not a specific problem to be solved by decent policy; instead, structural
explanations highlight the extraordinary and abnormal role nuclear risk is playing
within the insurance industry.45
First of all, the generation of nuclear energy – as one of the most hazardous in-
dustrial activities – does in fact constitute a non-actuarial risk: Neither the insurer
can build his expectations on empirical evidence suggesting a reliable estimate of
risk probability, nor the number of risks is high enough such that actual total
damage statistically approaches the insurer’s expectations; nuclear risk, therefore,
cannot be diversified. Moreover, uncertainty emanating from a long time horizon
of nuclear hazard exacerbates entering into conventional insurance contracts, since
insurers may be confronted with indemnity claims a long time after an insurance
contract has expired. It is consequently reasonable to assume that insurance com-
panies will charge an extra premium, reflecting their aversion against uncertainty,
associated with nuclear risk. In addition to this ambiguity-markup, the actuarial
premium can be extended by three additional cost factors: insurance companies’
administration or loading costs, VAT taxes on insurance contracts and finally,
the insurance industry’s monopolistic structure, which allows companies to charge
profit premiums.
Faure & Fiore (2008a; 2008b) find that all factors potentially contribute to the
excessively high premiums for nuclear operators all over the world. The private
insurance market for nuclear liability is highly monopolistic and organised on a
national basis. Different insurers (and re-insurers) join forces in mutual insurance
45A short but very instructing critical summary on both the assumptions and the basic results
of classical insurance models is presented in Gollier (2005). The benchmark case predicts
competitive markets to guarantee a Pareto-efficient allocation of social risk and a socially
efficient level of risk prevention; public intervention translates into market distortion. It is,
however, obvious that the model’s restrictive assumptions are not applicable to the special
case of nuclear risk.
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pools in order to guarantee sufficient capacity. On the one hand, this alleviates
the engagement of the private market in an ultra-hazardous segment; besides the
financial incentive, a monopolistic and regionally differentiated market structure
facilitates the monitoring process. On the other hand, this system inevitably en-
tails the potential for substantial profit markups. Furthermore, missing pressure
of competition allows for loading costs that could far exceed the conventional
estimated 30 percent markup on the ’fair’ insurance premium. Hogarth and Kun-
reuther (1985) are able to show empirically that ambiguity aversion is especially
remarkable for low probability events of risk, where opportunities for learning over
time are limited. Still, current premiums in Germany could only be rationalised if
the insurers’ ambiguity aversion would account for an additional markup of more
than 200 percent. This huge divergence between actuarial values and commercial
premiums suggests the following thesis:
Since the nuclear risk is exceptional and non-diversifiable, the insurer
might prefer to determine his premium as a percentage of the esti-
mated damages, rather than relying on the objective value of the risk.
(Faure & Fiore 2008a: 238)
Therefore, the non-actuarial characteristic of nuclear risk cannot entirely explain
the insurance industry’s behaviour. Radetzki et al. (2000) identify two additional
problems regarding all sorts of industrial risk, potentially resulting in losses of
catastrophic dimension:
Firstly, the consequences of a nuclear accident exceeds the insurance companies
financial capabilities. Although the latter may exhibit an equity capital base to
cover potential catastrophic losses, nuclear risk is not consistent with a standard
insurance principle, according to which expected losses of each individual risk
should be covered by premium income from the same insurance class, at any
point of time. Clearly, if premiums were set to their actuarial values, under the
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specific circumstances it would take an insurance company several centuries to
build adequate reserves. On the contrary, actual insurance contributions of all
nuclear plant operators enable the insurance industry to meet the criterion within
a timespan of one year.
Secondly, of all non-actuarial risks industrial hazards seem to exhibit a special
status within the insurance community. The industry notably shows diverging
attitudes towards industrial risks on the one side and natural hazards on the other
side. This appears to be odd, since latter events themselves entail catastrophic
harm; the private insurance market was able, for example, to cover insured dam-
ages in the amount of $17 billion when Hurricane Andrew devastated the state
of Florida in 1992 (Rabin et al. 2005: 45). Yet, the insurance industry’s cau-
tious approach towards industrial risk can be explained: On the one hand, risk
consequences of natural events are precisely defined and insurers do not have to
deal with uncertainty with reference to compensation entitlements. On the other
hand, constant occurrence of catastrophic events facilitates both a rapid building
of reserves and an actuarial approach.
Evaluation
From a nuclear risk management point of view, two main results should conclu-
sively be underlined:
 For various conceptual reasons, Germany’s nuclear policy regime is inefficient
from a supply side point of view. Resorting to private liability insurance to
cover parts of potential compensation requirements entails excessive costs
for nuclear operators if the actuarial insurance premium is employed as the
adequate reference value.
 Under the aspect of adequate victim compensation, private liability insurance
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is an inappropriate instrument, too.
– The insurance industry would not be able to provide coverage in the
amount of ¿10 billion, which would at least be necessary to satisfy the
needs of potential victims.46
– A mandated increase in direct provisions for compensation would clearly
not be sustainable for operators; extrapolation suggests annual premi-
ums in the amount of ¿0.5 billion per reactor.
4.2. Reserves
An alternative method to provide for third party liability is the building of financial
reserves on the operator’s balance sheet. The literature points to the instrument’s
considerable cost saving potential, since financial reserves do not constitute ’sunk
cost’. Annual expenses on insurance premiums in the amount of ¿13 million are
’sunk’ to the operator under all circumstances. A reserve set aside for victim
compensation – although temporarily immobilised – will still be available to the
company if no accident occurs during the plant’s operational lifetime.47
Despite this apparent advantage, the compensation mechanism at hand gives
rise to four critical considerations. The first points to the protection of potential
victims and the role of regulatory authorities. A necessary condition to qualify the
employment of reserves as an adequate instrument for self-insurance is a statutory
framework, which prevents the amount set aside from being invested or used for
alternative purposes. In the case of an operator’s insolvency induced by a nuclear
incident, the policy maker has consequently to give priority to victim compensation
46Kunreuther et al. (1993) point to the potential limit on insurability of risks entailing strong
ambiguity aversion.
47A detailed discussion on operating firms’ opportunity costs of the building of financial reserves
is presented below.
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on a legal basis. German nuclear policy takes provision in respect thereof to some
extent; recourse claims of other operators, for example, are subordinate to potential
victims’ charges (Pelzer 2007: 45).
The second point of critique refers to the instrument’s disposability on the sup-
ply side. Pelzer (2007) hints at the limited potential for individual plant operators
in order to build reserves. Of course, operators in Germany are subsidiaries of huge
parent companies, the latter being able to supply the requisite capacity. Neverthe-
less, such cooperation is a delicate issue, since operator and parent company are
distinct legal entities. (The further analysis acts on the assumption that parent
companies support individual nuclear plant operators.)
Thirdly, the issue of economic incentives to build reserves has to be addressed.
Faure & Fiore (2008a: 239) allude to current international accounting standards,
according to which reserves set aside for uncertain types of risk are part of firms’
capital funds and, therefore, not tax-deductible. This clearly does not create in-
centives to build reserves to comply with mandated liability provision. In a related
matter, the German policy maker did accommodate nuclear plant operators; re-
serves set aside for atomic waste disposal are tax-exempt. It could be argued,
therefore, that the political intent in Germany would, in principle, support the
instrument of reserve building. Critics nevertheless argue that such a tax policy
primarily creates a distorting competitive advantage on the side of nuclear energy
generation (cf. Scheer 2010: 358).
Fourthly and most importantly, reserves are idle resources to the operating firms.
Therefore, although assets will eventually be fully disposable once accidents have
successfully been prevented for an entire operating period, the building of reserves
entails opportunity costs on the side of the operator in the form of forgone returns.
In order to estimate those expenses Faure & Fiore (2008a; 2008b) resort to the
capital asset pricing model (CAPM). They are able to show that – in the case
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of nuclear energy generation in France – replacing insurance coverage by financial
reserves entails a cost saving potential of 75 percent.
4.2.1. Capital Asset Pricing Model
The CAPM was the first theoretical framework to relate the risk of an investment
with its expected return.48
ki . . . Expected rate of return of capital fund i
rf . . . Risk-free interest rate
rm . . . Market interest rate
(rm − rf ) . . . Risk premium
βi . . . ’Financial beta’
49
In equilibrium, i. e., in a state where investors cannot outperform the market, the
expected return of a certain capital fund has to be equal to the risk-free interest
rate plus a risk premium, corresponding to the market premium multiplied by a
measure of the fund’s relative risk towards entire market risk:
ki = rf + βi(rm − rf ) (4.1)
The model appears to be appealing for the purposes of NRM, since – under several
restrictive assumptions – a moderate degree of information is sufficient to evaluate
the implicit costs of building reserves. The risk-free interest rate compares with the
long-run return of state bonds and the market premium is the stock market’s long-
run excess return above the yields of government loans. All key figures, together
with the risk coefficient, can easily be inferred from the companies’ annual business
reports.
48The concept was developed inter alia by Sharpe (1964) and Lintner (1965). For a critical
discussion cf. e.g. Perold (2004) or Fama & French (2004). The further analysis adopts part
of the notation used in Faure & Fiore (2008a).
49βi > 1 implies the risk of company i to be higher than average market risk, and vice versa.
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Faure et al. (2008a; 2008b) refer to a specific application of the CAPM, ac-
cording to which the expected return, ki, can be interpreted as direct costs of
the capital fund. This is possible under CAPM’s assumption that investors aim
at maximising profitability while trying to minimise risk. Therefore – from an
investor’s standpoint – ki constitutes the rate of profitability required from the
company’s resources. Consequently, it represents the operator’s opportunity cost
of building reserves (Faure et al. 2008a: 241).
Table 4.1 captures the conditions of making financial provision for German en-
ergy groups in terms of CAPM’s criteria. It presents both the upper and lower
limits found in the firms’ 2009 financial reports50 and the corresponding values for
the capital funds’ costs. Following the arguments above, data imply that investors
High evaluation Low evaluation
rf 4.5% 4%
(rm − rf ) 5% 4%
βi 1.1 0.78
ki 10% 7.12%
Table 4.1.: Cost of Capital Funds for German Energy Groups
demand a yield between 7.12 and 10 percent in order to give consent to the building
of reserves. Given this information, it is possible to estimate the average annual
expenses on reserves per reactor, evaluated at the time of plant commissioning:51
AR =
[(
R− R(1− p)
T
(1 + ki)T
)
+
(
T∑
t=1
R · p
(1 + ki)t
)]
· 1/T (4.2)
50Cf. RWE (2010), E.ON (2010) and EnBW (2010). The reports include the numbers for the
years 2008 and 2009, respectively.
51According to the approach by Faure et al. (2008a; 2008b), it is for simplicity assumed that
within a nuclear plant’s operational lifetime there can only occure one accident.
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Estimated costs are composed of two parts. The first captures the notion of re-
serves, R, being immobilised in the first period, but returning to company’s avail-
able funds once accidents have been avoided for the entire operational lifespan,
T ; since ki constitutes the firm’s opportunity cost of building reserves, it is used
as the adequate time discount factor. The second cost element takes account of
the fact that reserved capital will be mobilised for victim compensation, once an
accident has occurred; the expected value of total loss over the entire operational
period, again, is properly discounted.
The reference point to evaluate average reserve costs is the average annual in-
surance premium, evaluated at the first period of plant operation:52
AI = 1/T ·
T∑
t=1
P
(1 + δ)t
(4.3)
Equations (4.2) and (4.3) enable the evaluation of nuclear policy in Germany
– which obliges operators to cover accident damage up to ¿256 million by means
of liability insurance – from a supply side point of view: On the one hand, aver-
age insurance costs, AI , amount to ¿7.26 million, respectively, ¿8.28 million per
reactor-year, depending on the average operator’s time preference rate.53 On the
other hand, the annual costs of reserves, AR, would account for ¿7.12 million,
respectively, ¿7.62 million. Table 4.2 illustrates the situation.54 German data im-
52Faure et al. (2008a) mistakenly reference to the actual annual insurance premium, P .
53The insurance premium, P , is equal to ¿13 million. An average operating period of a nuclear
plant, T , is assumed to be 32 years (Vorwerk 2002: 10). The upper boundary of the time
preference rate, δh, is set according to the risk-free interest rate indicated in the financial
reports of German large energy groups and, therefore, assumed to be 4 percent (cf. EnBW
2010). The lower boundary of the time discount factor, δl, is set to 3 percent (cf. Faure &
Fiore 2008b: 307).
54Reserves, R, equal to ¿256 million, and accident probability is assumed to be p = 10−5. High-
end calculations resort to kh = 10% and δl = 3%. Low-end calculations use kl = 7.12% and
δh = 4%.
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Coverage: ¿ 256 million AI (P = 13) AR (R = 256)
high evaluation 8.28 7.62
low evaluation 7.26 7.12
Table 4.2.: Average Costs per Reactor-Year (in million ¿)
ply that operators could reduce their average annual costs by 8 percent. It seems,
therefore, that the compensation instrument of reserve building is more favourable
to operators in order to meet current legal requirements.
One has to call attention to an important caveat. Fama & French (2004) suggest
the empirical relationship between the β-factor and expected returns to be flatter
than CAPM predicts55, and claim applications of the model to be interpreted with
special attention. They are able to show that up to a β-factor of 1.3 costs of equity
capital, ki, tend to be undervalued systematically. Potential savings of 8 percent
inferred from the results above, therefore, need not be a final argument in favour
of financial reserves. Nevertheless, sensitivity analysis shows that – suggesting the
opportunity costs of equity capital to be 15 percent – the building of reserves still
bears potential cost savings in the amount of 4.5 percent.
Having stated the supply side’s financial advantage of building reserves as op-
posed to contracting liability insurance, the question remains whether the com-
pensation mechanism, in general, is suitable to cover the entire needs of potential
victims. (To be accurate, conditional probabilities in order to differentiate be-
tween minor and major accidents should be included in the analysis for reserves
that exceed the level of ¿1 billion.56 Consequently, equation (4.2) would have
to be extended, which would slightly reduce average annual reserve costs. Since
results do not change substantially, conditional probabilities are ignored in the
55Cf. equation (4.1)
56See Section 4.1.
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further analysis.) It shows that a provision of ¿10 billion would entail annual
expenses ranging between ¿278 million and ¿298 million per reactor, an amount
which cannot be born by an individual operator.
Furthermore, setting aside ¿10 billion for each reactor would even be unsustain-
able for parent companies. The following formula is used to calculate annual costs
to cover the risk of several nuclear installations, where ni denotes the number of
nuclear plants according to the company’s interest in nuclear installations:57
AR,i =
[
Ri − Ri(1− p · ni)
T
(1 + ki)T
+
T∑
t=1
Ri · p · ni
(1 + ki)t
]
· 1/T (4.4)
For example, E.ON, the largest energy group in Germany currently operating
five nuclear plants and holding shares of six other installations, would have to
build reserves in amount of ¿72.6 billion, which would entail annual expenses of
approximately ¿2.1 billion.58 Clearly, this approach would not be sustainable for
the supply side of nuclear energy.
If German nuclear policy would be designed such that each company would
be obliged to build a single reserve of ¿10 billion to cover the risk of all their
nuclear installations, the costs of adequate victim compensation could, of course,
be decreased substantially.
Table 4.3 presents the high and low-end scenarios according to equation (4.4),
summarising the corresponding annual costs of reserves for German energy groups.59
Results suggest that, given that compulsory financial provision is legally sufficient
to cover the risk of all installations, even large energy groups in Germany could not
easily bear the annual costs of reserves. Estimates of average costs range between
57For example, RWE runs two nuclear plants and participates in the operation of three further
installations with a share of 87.5%, 75% and 75%, respectively; therefore, nRWE = 4.38;
correspondingly, nE.ON = 7.26, nEnBW = 4 and nV attenfall = 1.37.
58Here, nE.ON = 7.26, RE.ON = R · nE.ON = 72.6, and kE.ON = 0.0802.
59High evaluation: kh = 10%, nh = 7.26; low evaluation: kl = 7.12%, nl = 1.37.
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Coverage: 10,000 AR,i (Ri = 10ni) AR,i (Ri = 10)
High evaluation 2,163 298
Low evaluation 381 278
Table 4.3.: Average Reserve Costs for Parent Companies (in ¿ million)
¿278 million and ¿298 million per year. Furthermore, even multinational compa-
nies like Vattenfall or RWE cannot easily set aside ¿10 billion for self-insurance
against third party liability; for example, necessary funds would correspond to
nearly one half of E.ON ’s total reserves in 2009.
Evaluation
Conclusively, three findings should be kept in mind from a nuclear policy perspec-
tive:
 To qualify financial reserves as an adequate instrument for future victim
compensation, nuclear law has to restrict the use of the funds entirely to
third party liability requirements.
 In contrast to liability insurance the building of financial reserves constitutes
a more favourable instrument on the supply side. Economic theory suggests
that German operators should be free to choose reserves instead of liability
insurance in order to provide for the first tier of third party liability provision.
 Given that parent companies can be obliged to take over responsibility and
supposing that legal provision binds reserves to liability claims, financial re-
serves still do not seem to constitute a sustainable compensation mechanism
in order to provide for victim compensation in an extensive way.
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4.3. Risk-sharing Pools
This section examines the functionality and the economic implications of a nuclear
risk-sharing pool (NRSP) – an instrument which is implemented in current German
nuclear policy. The concept is based on the notion of rational agents diversifying
the risk of assets with identical but random returns, which was initially formu-
lated by Rothschild and Stiglitz (1971). In its restated version, the ’diversification
theorem’ is applicable to the community of nuclear plant operators:
[I]dentical risk-averse individuals facing the same distributions of losses
gain by sharing losses equally. (Skogh & Wu 2005: 35)
A NRSP is a mutual agreement ex ante between operators in order to distribute
the liability of each single operator to all members of the pool. The first success-
ful application of this approach was undertaken by US American operators who
mutually provide for compensation requirements in amount of $10.5 billion under
the Price Anderson Act. In Germany, to fulfil the obligation to provide financial
coverage in the amount of ¿2.5 billion per incident, in 2001 the four parent com-
panies currently operating 17 nuclear power plants joined in a national risk pool,
declared in the Solidarity Agreement (”Solidarvereinbarung”) (SA);60 additional
to individual liability insurance, the pool guarantees a second tier of compensation
in the amount of ¿2.244 billion per accident, ”provided neither the operator nor
the respective parent company are in a position to provide the money necessary
for the compensation” (Pelzer 2007: 44).
A NRSP has to overcome theoretical challenges, since nuclear installations ap-
pear not to exhibit the same distribution of expected losses bearing in mind various
differences in age, size or technique. The responsibility of an individual pool mem-
ber can be specified according to two differentiation criteria: the level of care and
60This approach is explicitly encouraged by German nuclear law (cf. §13 AtG and §1 AtDeckV).
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the level of activity, respectively (Faure et al. 2008b). Within this respect, a major
advantage is the instrument’s independence of governmental regulation, since oper-
ators themselves are best informed to identify adequate differentiation attributes.
The level of care, on the one hand, includes the individual operator’s compliance
of existing safety standards, the location of the plant and its construction type;
nevertheless, nuclear installations in Germany are quite similar within this context
and the measure of differentiation is, therefore, negligible. The second criterion,
on the other hand, is applied by the NRSP of German energy groups. The share
each company has to contribute to the pool is specified according to its proportion
in the generation of total thermal reactor power (Pelzer 2007: 44).
In contrast to conventional liability insurance, the pooling of risk has three con-
ceptual advantages (Faure & Fiore 2008b, Skogh & Wu 2005): First, a risk pool
circumvents the actuarial problem. In contrast to insurance companies, members
of a pool do not have to be certain about both actual probabilities of an accident
and the amount of damage. As long as the participants are subject to the same
(uncertain) risk, it is sufficient to have moderate information about minimal cri-
teria that measure the relative difference between the member’s contribution to
total risk.
Secondly, pool members are in a favourable position to control other partici-
pants; by comparison, insurers often lack information and technical knowledge for
an efficient monitoring process. Clearly, pool participants have furthermore strong
economic incentives to develop efficient control criteria, which, in turn, reduces the
pool members’ possibility of free riding. Therefore, the institution of a NRSP is
a valuable instrument to contribute to the process of risk prevention, discussed
in Section 3.
Thirdly, the approach entails huge cost saving potentials. Analogously to the
argument in Section 4.2, a risk-sharing pool does avoid ’sunk costs’ on the side
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of the operators. Furthermore, since the instrument does not require a pricing of
risk ex ante, which only results in an actuarial price in the presence of sufficient
empirical evidence, it avoids costs due to the ambiguity of nuclear risk.
Based on an economic model by Skogh & Wu (2005), it is possible to argue
that, given the opportunity, operators led by self-interest will voluntarily reach a
mutual agreement in order to build a risk pool under most circumstances. In the
presence of varying expected losses, information about relative differences between
the pool members is sufficient to reach a Nash-equilibrium, as is currently the case
in respect of the German NRSP. Such an equilibrium might not be reached if
differences exist within the probability of risk; nevertheless, this eventuality was
excluded for nuclear generation of energy in Germany. The authors are furthermore
able to show that equilibria even arise if risk aversion differs among pool members.
Consequently, the approach of nuclear risk management in Germany to enable
operators to organise liability requirements via a mutual risk pool seems to be a
promising and sustainable policy.
Faure & Fiore (2008b) provide a method to evaluate the operators’ (oppor-
tunity) costs of participating in a NRSP.61 There exist three different possible
arrangements in order to provide for the risk pool’s funds: Firstly, pool members
set aside funds ex ante reserved for future contributions ; secondly, operators pay
contributions ex ante; thirdly, contributions are allocated ex post.
As previously mentioned, each pool member’s contribution payment is set con-
forming to its share on total nuclear risk generation; Table 4.4 summarises current
arrangements made by German energy groups.62 Importantly, the amount of each
member’s contribution does not vary along with the method of payment; never-
theless, corresponding costs change substantially (Faure & Fiore 2008b: 309).
61The notation used by the authors is changed in parts within the further analysis.
62Data are drawn from companies’ 2009 financial reports.
65
4. Nuclear Risk Management and Compensation
Energy group i E.ON RWE EnBW Vattenfall
Share vi 42% 25.9% 24.9% 7.2%
Table 4.4.: Companies’ Shares on German Nuclear Risk Pool
If contributions to the pool are guaranteed through the building of reserves
ex ante (RSP1 ), a pool member’s average costs per year are defined as follows:63
ARSP1,i =
[
Ci − Ci(1− p · n)
T
(1 + ki)T
+
T∑
t=1
Ci · p · n
(1 + ki)t
]
· 1/T (4.5)
(Again, the formula takes into account the pool members’ opportunity costs of
the building of financial reserves, since the idle use of temporarily immobilised
resources involves forgone profits in substantial amount.)
Clearly, the method entails two advantages: Firstly, in comparison to liability
insurance, contributions Ci are not ’sunk’; if no accident occurs in one of the pool
members’ nuclear installations, they can be carried over to the next period and
will ideally return to the companies’ property once the agreement has expired.
Secondly, in contrast to the building of individual reserves, the distribution of
total costs distinctly alleviates the provision process on the supply side. The
approach, nevertheless, requires legal effort on the side of the policy maker; trustees
in bankruptcy must in general be refused to have access to the funds.
63For a derivation and an interpretation of the formula, compare the remarks on equations (4.2)
and (4.4) in the previous section. Opportunity costs of building reserves, ki, are assumed
to range between 7.12 and 10 percent. For simplicity, conditional probabilities are ignored,
therefore p = 10−5. The average lifespan of nuclear plants T = 32. Each pool member’s
payment Ci = C · vi, where C denotes the total financial capacity of the risk-sharing pool,
and values of the risk share vi range from 7.2% to 42% (cf. Table 4.4). The total number of
nuclear installations within the risk-sharing pool, n, is equal to 17.
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In the case of contributions to be paid ex ante (RSP2 ), the average annual
expenses for a company running ni nuclear plants can be calculated in the following
way:64
ARSP2,i =
[
Ci − Ci(1− p · n)
T
(1 + δ)T
+
T∑
t=1
Ci · p · n
(1 + δ)t
]
· 1/T (4.6)
In contrast to the latter, this approach guarantees compensation funds to be im-
mediately available in the case of an accident, regardless of any government in-
tervention. Assuming this organisational form of an NRSP is made compulsory, a
further convenience is that members of the risk pool are not confronted with high
opportunity costs of holding reserves.
The third possibility to organise a mutual risk pool is to collect contributions
retrospectively (RSP3 ), which is applied by current nuclear risk management in
Germany. In this case the regulator obligates pool members to subject themselves
to a regular certification process confirming the funds availability in case of an
accident.65 This process may entail costs in amount of G. Average annual costs
to the members of the risk pool, evaluated at the time of plant commissioning, are
defined as follows:
ARSP3,i =
[
T∑
t=1
Ci · p · n
(1 + δ)t
+G
]
· 1/T (4.7)
In Germany, the certification process, which identifies the solvency of sufficient
means, is included in the annual year-end accounting of the company (Pelzer
2007: 45). Therefore, costs of the guarantee, G, play a rather insignificant role
in the case of the generation of nuclear energy.
This approach is characterised by enormous saving potentials for the companies,
since assets reserved for potential victim compensation are not immobilised, as long
as accidents are avoided. Faure & Fiore (2008b: 308) claim insolvency not to be a
major issue within this respect; in the specific case of insolvency of an individual
64Again, the time discount rate, δ, is assumed to range between three and four percent.
65See §13 and §14, AtG.
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operator, funds for victim compensation are not reduced, since the remaining pool
members have to cover for the respective amount. Consequently, this type of
nuclear policy creates strong incentives for an efficient monitoring process among
the risk pool members, which entails positive effects on the level of risk prevention.
Nevertheless, the argument refers to the situation of US American nuclear policy,
where the mutual agreement is made between 103 nuclear operators, each of them
taking responsibility for a small part of total risk. In the case of Germany, however,
insolvency issues might arise, since liability is only diversified between four large
energy groups.
It shows that a nuclear risk-sharing pool constitutes a cost effective instrument
on the supply side of atomic energy generation in Germany. As already mentioned,
in addition to the first tier of liability insurance in the amount of ¿256 million per
reactor, the four members of the NRSP in Germany guarantee for a second tier
accounting for ¿2.244 billion per year. Table 4.5 contrasts the corresponding av-
erage costs per reactor-year, highlighting the enormous cost advantages of mutual
risk pooling systems.66 Each of the three approaches to finance the risk pool by
Coverage: ¿2,244 AI AR ARSP1 ARSP2 ARSP3
High evaluation 72.61 66.81 3.94 2.97 0.014
Low evaluation 63.65 62.37 3.68 2.55 0.013
Table 4.5.: Average Annual Costs per Reactor (in ¿ million)
far outperforms the other two instruments, i. e., liability insurance and individual
reserve building, respectively. Average expenses between ¿13,000 and ¿3.94 mil-
lion per year imply that financial provision currently mandated by German policy
66Average reactor: RAR = 2, 244, CAR = 2, 244/17, PAR = (13/256)·2, 244; p = 10−5; kh = 10%,
kl = 7.12%, δh = 4%, δl = 3% and T = 32. According to arguments mentioned above it is
assumed that G = 0.
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is sustainable even on an operator basis.
Data in respect of the German nuclear industry furthermore point to the ca-
pability of an NRSP to provide for capital funds in the amount of ¿10 billion,
which are defined as necessary in order to meet potential victims’ entire claims.
Estimations of average annual costs range from ¿56,000 to ¿17.55 million for an
average nuclear installation, respectively from ¿68,000 to ¿125.28 million on the
level of German energy groups. Results are summarised in Table 4.6.67
Coverage: ¿10,000 ARSP1 ARSP2 ARSP3
Plant Level
High evaluation 17.55 13.23 0.064
Low evaluation 16.40 11.35 0.056
Energy Group Level
High evaluation 125.28 94.44 0.455
Low evaluation 20.07 13.89 0.068
Table 4.6.: Average Annual Costs – Plant and Energy Group Level (in ¿ million)
A nuclear risk-sharing pool based on ex post contributions (RSP3 ) obviously
constitutes a sustainable method on the supply side. Nevertheless, supposing
that annual audits are sufficient to resolve any insolvency related moral hazard
problems, this approach does still raise the question of the victims’ access to the
compensation funds, once an accident has occurred. This critical consideration is
based on two arguments – the first referring to the legal status of the NRSP in
Germany, the second pointing to tort law and economic incentives.
67High evaluation: Ch = C · vh, where vh = 42%; kh = 10% and δh = 4%. Low evaluation:
Cl = C · vl, where vl = 7.2%; kl = 7.12% and δl = 3%. n = 17, T = 32 and Car = 10, 000/17.
G is again assumed to be zero.
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Firstly, Pelzer (2007: 49) underlines that the German risk pooling system – in
contrast to US American nuclear risk management – is not based on a statutory
framework. Instead the Solidarity Agreement (”Solidarvereinbarung”) constitutes
a voluntary contract, which includes the options of amendment and annulment.
Accordingly, Faure & Vanden Borre (2008: 283) point to the negative consequences
on the side of potential victims. If due to its voluntary nature a private pooling
arrangement would be modified subsequently ”there would be little guarantee that
money would effectively be available to compensate victims after an accident”.
Legal authorities could circumvent the problem by changing the legal status of the
risk pool; nevertheless, this turns out to be a non-trivial problem:
Legislators that impose an obligation on operators to use their private
means to cover or contribute to covering the legal liability of another
operator might conflict with guaranteed property rights. (Pelzer 2007: ibid.)
In contrast, Faure et al. (2008: ibid.) are ”not convinced that these legal problems
cannot be overcome if the legislature can at least justify why in this specific case
the pooling through retrospective premiums must be introduced”.
Secondly – independent of the voluntary characteristic – if funds are not mo-
bilised ex ante, potential tort-feasors have strong incentives to impede the process
of tort law to the detriment of potential victims. Evidence of this presumed be-
haviour of members to the risk pool can be found in the mutual agreement on risk
sharing (SA):
The partners furthermore undertake to support the operator liable in
claims handling. In doing so, they in particular deploy infrastructure
and specialised manpower. They will use their influence to achieve
additional assistance from their respective group of companies [Section
2 of the Agreement]. (Pelzer 2007: 45)
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Bearing in mind potential victims’ excess expenses to sue for damages, it can con-
sequently be argued that a risk pool financed on an ex post basis is an inadequate
compensation instrument on the demand side.68
Another point of critique refers to the presumed negative effect on risk pre-
vention, discussed in Section (3). If funds are not set aside ex ante, and if the
community of nuclear energy producers provides for mutual legal assistance, the
expected value of loss due to third party liability claims will be reduced substan-
tially. Consequently, individual nuclear plant operators do not have to internalise
full damage costs, which finally reduces the operators incentives for efficient pre-
cautionary measures.
The first approach (RSP1 ) does not entail these inconvenient features but ap-
pears to be disadvantageous in respect of the social planner’s necessity to make
special legal provision; furthermore, pool members have to bear the burden of
high annual reserve building costs. Therefore, it is argued in this thesis that a
risk-sharing pool based on ex ante contributions (RSP2 ) should be preferred from
the point of view of victim compensation. Of course, this financing method has
to be embedded into a statutory framework, which appears to be a crucial is-
sue; but arguments have already been brought forward that mitigate such critical
considerations.
Nevertheless, it is still not clear whether such an approach – entailing average
costs between of ¿11.35 million and ¿13.323 million per reactor-year, respectively
ranging from ¿13.89 million to ¿94.44 million per year on the level of German
energy groups – is sustainable on the side of energy supply.
68In respect of the potential victims’ economic incentives to engage in a litigation process, it has
to be highlighted that, within continental law regimes, the winner of a tort lawsuit goes free
and does not have to bear any process costs.
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To answer this question, it is examined whether the nuclear industry in Ger-
many, in the presence of additional costs due to extensive financial third party
provision, is still competitive in relation to other energy producing sources. The
production costs per kilowatt hour (kWh) of various energy sources are summarised
in Table 4.7, which shows that currently the production of atomic energy is one of
the most cost-effective methods in Germany.69 Nuclear operators bear production
Energy Source Production Costs
Brown coal 2.9
Coal 3.3
Nuclear power 3.5
Natural gas 4.2
Wind power (on-shore) 9.6–14.4
Biomass 9.6
Hydropower 10.2
Wind power (off-shore) 12.1–18
Photovoltaics 52–62
Table 4.7.: German Energy Sector – Production Costs (in Cent/kWh)
costs of 3.5 cent per kWh, while energy producers employing ecological energy
sources like biomass, hydropower or wind power have to account approximately
for the triple amount. Energy sources actually competing with nuclear power are
brown coal, pit coal and natural gas, which entail corresponding production costs
between 2.9 and 4.2 cent per kWh, respectively.
To calculate the additional production costs per kWh of pool member i in or-
der to provide for potential third party liability, the present analysis applies the
69Data are based on calculations by Universita¨t Stuttgart, Institut fu¨r Energiewirtschaft und
Rationelle Energieanwendung (Wissel et al. 2008: 13 et seq.).
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following formulae:
KRSPj,i =
ARSPj,i
kWhi
(4.8)
kWhi = MWi ·H · φi (4.9)
kWhi indicates total annual energy supply of pool member i, MWi denotes the
total capacity of the pool member’s nuclear installations, H is the maximum annual
operating time, and φi stands for average power plant utilisation.
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Table 4.8 presents the high and low-end estimates of the additional costs per
kWh a risk pool member has to bear in order to provide for third party liability in
the amount of ¿10 billion.71 The analysis above implied the approach of an NRSP
Coverage: ¿10 bn. KRSP1 KRSP2 KRSP3
Plant Level
high evaluation 0.18 0.14 0.00066
low evaluation 0.17 0.12 0.00058
Energy Group Level
high evaluation 0.17 0.13 0.00061
low evaluation 0.17 0.12 0.00059
Table 4.8.: Additional Costs (in Cent per kWh)
financed on the basis of ex ante contributions (RSP2 ) to be preferable from the
viewpoint of potential victims. Accordingly, operators would have to face excess
70Trivially, H = 8760 hours. Data on MWi are drawn from Bundesamt fu¨r Strahlenschutz
(2010). Operators’ websites provide information on the plants’ occupancy rates φi and (par-
tially) on total energy supply kWhi.
71Average reactor: Car = 10/17, MWar ≈ 1265.7, φar ≈ 87.1% and therefore kWhar ≈ 9.7 ·109.
High evaluation: Ch = C · vh, where vh = 42%; kWhh = kWhE.ON ≈ 75 · 109; kh = 10% and
δh = 4%. Low evaluation: Cl = C · vl, where vl = 7.2%; kWhl = kWhV attenfall = 11.6 · 109
kl = 7.12% and δl = 3%. Again, n = 17 and T = 32.
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production costs accounting for 0.12 cents, respectively 0.14 cents per kilowatt
hour . This amount is negligible in respect of the relative performance of nuclear
power within the German energy sector.72 On the one hand, generation of nuclear
power is still much cheaper than the production of energy by means of natural
gas or renewable sources. On the other hand, increased production cost in the
amount of 3.64 cents per kWh does not substantially change its competitiveness
in relation to the most cost-effective energy sources in Germany, i. e., brown coal
and pit coal. It can consequently be argued that operators are, in principle, able
to pass additional costs on to the consumers of energy.
Having demonstrated both the merits of a risk pooling system based on ex ante
contributions from a victims’ perspective and its financial sustainability on the
side of energy supply, the latter compensation mechanism can finally be identified
as efficient from a viewpoint of nuclear risk management .
Evluation
Theoretic arguments, applied aspects and policy related results, respectively, can
be summarised as follows:
 Economic theory strongly supports the installation of a nuclear risk-sharing
pool as a cost-effective instrument to provide for third party liability.
– Given the opportunity, potential risk pool members will efficiently reach
a mutual agreement. Both the identification of optimal differentiation
criteria and an effective monitoring process are guaranteed through eco-
nomic incentives. The presumed loss of efficiency in context of an al-
ternative command-and-control approach can be avoided.
 Three different ways exist to organise a risk pool. Pool members prefer
72Cf. Table 4.7.
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to contribute on an ex post basis, which constitutes the most cost-effective
approach from a supply-side point of view. From a victims’ perspective, nev-
ertheless, pool members should be obliged to pay the contributions ex ante,
in order to secure the access to the funds and to avoid perverse incentives
within the process of risk prevention.
 Nuclear policy in Germany successfully employs the compensation mecha-
nism. Results of the latter analysis indicate three suggested improvements:
– To guarantee the availability of compensation funds the risk-sharing
pool should be legally based on statutory obligation.
– To avoid moral hazard issues and to protect the demands of potential
victims, the risk pool should be financed via contribution payments ex
ante. Suppliers of atomic energy can bear the additional costs.
– From a standpoint of victim compensation, direct financial provision by
German energy groups should be substantially extended. According to
various estimates, this policy would be sustainable for the supply side
of nuclear energy. Production costs would only increase marginally,
leaving the industry’s competitiveness rather unaffected.
4.4. Alternatives
The analysis so far discusses compensation mechanisms to be applied on the
supply-side. This section, in contrast, addresses the potential role of both the
demand-side and the government within the process of victim remuneration.
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4.4.1. First Party Insurance
Based on the principle of ’least-cost avoidance’, it is, in principle, possible to
ask the question whether potential victims should purchase first party insurance
in order to individually cover losses caused by nuclear accidents. Empirically,
first party insurance proves to be a sound instrument to cover various sorts of
(natural) risk entailing catastrophic harm. Its theoretical advantage in contrast to
third party liability insurance is that it allows ”a much better adaptation of the
premium and policy condition to the risk and thus a better risk differentiation”
(Faure 2007: 345). Since premiums are set according to individual exposure to
loss, the selective pressure of the insurance industry on potential victims would
guarantee an efficient exposure to risk on a social level;73 for example, individuals
would optimally avoid locating in flood-prone areas. Of course, the argument does
not necessarily translate into the case of industrial risk.
In Section 3.1.1, arguments have been presented that oppose the notion of po-
tential victims of nuclear accidents being involved in the process of risk prevention.
It has been argued that nuclear plant operators are better informed in order to
reduce risk in a cost-effective way (the principle of ’least-cost avoidance’). Nuclear
risk, it has been intended, constitutes a ’unilateral’ hazard. However, the question
still remains whether, from the viewpoint of NRM, first party insurance should be
considered as an auxiliary instrument to provide for sufficient victim compensation
– a notion based on the inefficiency of both tort law and third party liability in
the presence of ’judgement-proof’ tort-feasors. It shows, nevertheless, that the
approach can be qualified as inadequate within this respect. Two main arguments
have to be highlighted.
Firstly, there are no reasons to believe that potential victims would resort to
first party insurance voluntarily (Faure 2007: 346 et seq.). They do not have any
73See Section 2.1 on social risk management (SRM).
76
4.4. Alternatives
incentives to insure against personal damage, since social security systems will
automatically cover parts of the risk, once an accident has occurred. Furthermore,
’moral hazard’ problems arise, since potential victims can expect at least some kind
of ad hoc government support. Finally, psychological arguments refer to reduced
incentives to contract first party insurance due to a distorted risk assessment on
the individual level (especially of low-frequency events), and due to a so-called
’status quo’ bias, according to which individuals prefer a highly uncertain loss to
the purchase of insurance coverage at certain costs.
It could be argued that in the specific case, the policy maker should mandate
potential victims, i. e., individuals who are located in the direct environment of
a nuclear installation, to purchase adequate first party insurance coverage. This
could, in principle, affect the choice of residence of potential victims and therefore
reduce the expected societal losses due to nuclear accidents. Nevertheless, one
can object this reasoning, since secondly, arguments presented in Section 4.1 on
liability insurance remain. The structure of the private insurance market as well as
the special characteristics of nuclear risk impede an efficient use of this approach.
Furthermore, the latter would entail negative distributional effects, since it clearly
violates the ’polluter-pays-principle’, which is commonly accepted in environmen-
tal policy.
Conclusively, it can be argued that unlike natural catastrophes such as hurri-
canes or earthquakes, where first party insurance is a feasible option preferred by
economic theory, nuclear catastrophes, in principle, do not allow for the adop-
tion of this demand-side compensation mechanism. Therefore, if it transpires that
measures of remuneration on the supply-side are insufficient to cover all expected
third-party losses, policy makers have to resort to government provided compen-
sation.
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4.4.2. Government Provided Compensation
Experience with major nuclear accidents shows that the dimension of public dis-
aster relief should by no means be underestimated. For example, government
spending in order to alleviate the aftermath of the Chernobyl accident accounted
for 22.3 percent of the Belarusian national budget in 1991; at the beginning of the
century, between five and seven percent of public expenses in Ukraine still had to
be devoted to Chernobyl-related relief programmes (IAEA 2006).
Public intervention within the process of victim compensation is arranged through
two different institutional channels.
A first part of victim remuneration is based on the social security system. This
tier of compensation is an automatic process guaranteed mainly through the pub-
lic health care system. Furthermore, unemployment insurance or public pension
systems have to be mentioned within this respect. These institutions – securing
a basic protection for all potential victims ”in order to enable everybody a dig-
nified and self-organised existence” (Magnus 2006: 130) – alleviate the aftermath
of a severe nuclear incident; policy makers do not have to intervene actively. Im-
portantly, however, social security does not aim at full compensation of occurred
damage.
To provide a second tier of public relief, governments may implement specific
catastrophe funds. The question of the optimal design of such a fund is not
trivial. Firstly, it can be organised structurally; i. e., specific terms and conditions
regarding the legal validity of, and the entitlements to the fund are defined by the
policy maker ex ante. Secondly, governments can prefer to decide on specific funds
ad hoc, once an accident has occurred. Pros and cons of both approaches have
been broadly discussed in the literature (cf. Faure 2007).
On the one hand, economic theory distinctly advocates the ad hoc solution, since
– unlike a public compensation fund defined ex ante – it does not cause substantial
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’moral hazard’ problems:74 If potential victims of any catastrophic event antici-
pate to be compensated for losses in the future, they will not purchase insurance
coverage; ex post, governments might be forced to intervene. Furthermore, they
could even be encouraged to develop a risk-loving behaviour; a phenomenon la-
belled ”bet for resurrection” (Gollier 2005: 10). It has so far been underlined that
potential victims of atomic risk should entirely be excluded from taking respon-
sibility. Therefore, objections against structural funds seem invalid in the case of
nuclear threat. Nevertheless, it can be argued that ’moral hazard’ issues corre-
spondingly apply to the supply-side of nuclear risk generation. In the presence
of ex ante arrangements for catastrophe funds, nuclear operators have less incen-
tives to provide for third party remuneration. And clearly, a structural disaster
fund would undermine the threat of unlimited liability and, therefore, diminish
the incentives for efficient risk prevention.
On the other hand, from a legal perspective, statutory rules in respect of public
victim compensation are preferred to ad hoc decisions. First of all, the approach
creates legal certainty – rules that determine whether a victim is entitled to com-
pensation or not are established by the policy maker. Faure (2007) accepts this
argument in respect of compensation via social security in order to guarantee vic-
tims’ basic needs, i. e., provide compensation for lost income and health expenses;
beyond that, it can be challenged whether public intervention for property damage
can be justified in this context.75 Secondly, a statutory approach does not raise
equity issues, since potential victims of a specific catastrophic event are not dis-
criminated against groups of victims being affected by other disasters at another
point of time. In contrast, the implementation of funds case-by-case crucially de-
pends on both media and political attention; consequently, amount and procedures
74Within this respect, Faure (2007) inter alia resorts to theoretical results of Gollier (2005) and
Epstein (1996). A more applied analysis can be found in Gron and Sykes (2002).
75Cf. Faure (2007: 353 et seq.) and footnote 33 therein.
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of, respectively entitlements to compensation may change substantially.
Faure (2007: 354 et seq.) suggests that – if necessary at all – a public compen-
sation fund should be organised ex post according to three criteria. Firstly, reim-
bursement payments should be determined after the ’principle of subsidiarity’, i. e.,
victims should be obliged to primarily make use of any third party compensation
claim, respectively any existing first party insurance coverage. This should mainly
avoid ’free rider’ issues on the side of victims. According to the arguments above,
this criterion seems to be inadequate in the case of nuclear accidents. It might,
on the contrary, be indicated to support victims publicly in the first place, since
tort law is a long and costly process; this is in line with the following criterion.
Secondly, if in the case of a catastrophe, it is politically preferred to deviate from
the ’subsidiarity principle’, the public compensation fund should be assigned the
victim’s right to sue the tort-feasor for damage. This type of policy guarantees a
maximum support of victims, while it sustains the incentives for nuclear operators
to take efficient precautionary measures. Thirdly, Faure suggests that catastrophe
funds should, whenever possible, be financed by those who actually contribute to
the risk.
Public Victim Compensation in Germany
In the case of a catastrophic event, social security in Germany covers the cat-
egories of personal illness and injury; furthermore, victims are reimbursed for
property damage ”where persons lack a sufficient economic basis for life” (Magnus
2006: 122). Non-pecuniary losses like pain or suffering are not covered by the so-
cial system. In order to avoid negative incentives, social insurers are theoretically
entitled to use tort law against the tort-feasors (ibid.: 138). Nevertheless, Faure
(2007: 343) criticises that ”given the high costs of these recourse actions there is
a tendency by (social) insurers in some countries not to use these rights”.
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There does not exist any statutory instrument dealing exclusively with public
compensation of catastrophic damage. Nevertheless, experience regarding recent
events of disastrous magnitude shows that German policy makers tend to employ
ad hoc compensation funds. The Act on Flood Victim Solidarity (Flutoperhil-
fesolidarita¨tsgesetz ) following the flood disaster in August 2002 – which provided
extensive means in the amount of ¿8.1 billion – serves as an example. It can be
regarded ”as a model of how Germany reacts in cases of catastrophes of national
importance” (Magnus 2006: 123). Legislation meets the first two criteria stated
above. Firstly, the Act allocates financial means according to the ’principle of sub-
sidiarity’. Secondly, the principle is suspended if the process of tort law turns out
to be unacceptable for the victims’ short term needs; in this case, the compensation
fund acquires the victims’ right to sue tort-feasors. Finally, the compensation fund
is financed on a public tax base. To uniformly distribute the burden of industrial
risk over society clearly contradicts the ’polluter-pays-principle’. Nevertheless, in
respect of nuclear accidents, this financing method is inevitable since a public
catastrophe fund will theoretically only come into force after the financial means
of both the tort-feasor and the risk-sharing community are exhausted.
 Conclusively, it can be summarised that nuclear risk management in Ger-
many incorporates the results of economic analysis in respect of state-aided
victim compensation, since it tries to support potential victims at the maxi-
mum amount while adequate incentives on the side of nuclear energy gener-
ation are maintained as far as possible.
4.5. Financial Market Solutions
It has been shown that a recourse to state-funded victim compensation is a rather
questionable approach from the viewpoint of economic theory. Therefore, an im-
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portant task of nuclear risk management is to search for alternative sources if
both the insurance industry and the community of nuclear operators lack suffi-
cient financial capacity within this respect. Relying on the financial markets to
cover potential compensation requirements in a context of nuclear energy gener-
ation has so far not been considered as an option within NRM. Nevertheless, to
complete the discussion, it is appropriate to briefly outline the concept of specific
nuclear catastrophe bond (NCB).76
So far, financial markets have gained some experience regarding risk diversifi-
cation of natural hazards. Since 1996, various catastrophe bonds (cat-bonds) have
been issued in order to provide insurance against disastrous events like hurricanes
or earthquakes. Although an emerging market, its global volume currently ac-
counting for $15 billion is relatively small (cf. Triebe 2010).
A cat-bond is a floating-rate loan issued by (re)insurers or banks, carrying a
special option on catastrophic events. Investors have to pay a nominal value at
the beginning of the contract period, which is in general invested in state loans.
Should a predefined event occur, the cat-bond falls in value, respectively loses its
entire worth and the corresponding amount is transferred to the emitters in order
to cover their losses. To compensate investors for the possibility of the asset’s
complete failure, the cat-bond’s interest rate usually exceeds the market rate by
up to six percent (cf. Stein 2005).
Similarly, the idea of a nuclear cat-bond is to transfer the consequences of nuclear
risk to large-scale players on the financial markets like pension funds, hedge funds
or other portfolio managing entities. Radetzki et al. (2000: 189) conjecture that
”these institutions would be more willing and better able than insurers to handle
the very large size of potential damage liabilities represented by industrial [. . . ]
76The section mainly refers to results of Radetzki & Radetzki (2000), which are discussed criti-
cally.
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catastrophes”. In respect of the present thesis, nuclear cat-bonds could be an
instrument of special interest in order to cover nuclear damage amounting to ¿100
billion in the most pessimistic worst-case scenario.
Nuclear cat-bonds could be issued by specific groups of insurers of nuclear op-
eration or by a pool of operators, respectively. The collected funds of the NCBs
would be released for victim remuneration in occurrence of losses that exceeded
the harm insured on the private market or on the base of a mutual risk-sharing
fund. For instance, investors in German nuclear cat-bonds would lose (part of)
their capital if a nuclear accident would involve damage accounting for at least
¿2.5 billion.
The challenge of the policy maker would be to create adequate legal and eco-
nomic preconditions: Firstly, sources of nuclear risk must be explicitly held liable
without limit. It has again to be highlighted, however, that it is a non-trivial issue
to effectively enforce this policy, i. e., to solve any insolvency related problems.
Secondly, efforts have to be made in order to establish markets in which nuclear
cat-bonds can be traded.
A supply-side argument supports the approach. Economic literature on ’time-
diversification’ identifies the financial market as a perfect substitute to conven-
tional insurance under the assumptions of both the economic agent’s infinite life-
time and the absence of any borrowing constraints (Gollier 2005 and 1994). These
assumptions seem to apply to large energy groups rather than to individuals. It
can, therefore, be argued that generators of nuclear risk would have efficient incen-
tives to employ financial market solutions in order to provide for future liability
requirements.
According to economic analysis, four advantages of NCB can be identified:77
Firstly, in contrast to the insurance industry’s restricted capacity to meet potential
77Cf. Radetzki & Radetzki (2000).
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payment requests, the capacity of the financial market does not seem to have any
binding limits as to this respect. On the one hand, this conjecture can be objected
to insofar as it has been shown empirically that – in respect of the diversification
of catastrophic risk – financial markets are nationally segmented. ”A possible
explanation for the home bias of individual portfolios comes from various tax
incentives for retirement funds to invest within the country” (Gollier 2005: 7 et
seq.). For example, US American investors hold 94 percent of their assets in
domestic securities.78 Clearly, this would entail a certain limitation on the demand-
side of the instrument, reducing the available financial means. On the other hand,
Radetzki et al. (2000: 189) highlight that the amount required from a nuclear cat-
bond, which they assume to account for $100 billion, would only represent 0.3
percent of the financial market’s total capacity in the United States.
Secondly, funds could be provided at substantially low costs. Considering the
extremely low probabilities of a nuclear catastrophe, the authors suggest that
holders of nuclear cat-bonds would just require a risk premium exceeding the
risk-free interest rate by a small fraction of 1 percent (ibid.). To issue a NCB
in the amount of $100 billion, according to their estimations, expenses for an
average nuclear reactor in the OECD area would range between 0.017 and 0.17
US cents per kWh (Radetzki & Radetzki 1997). Bearing in mind the results of
the previous sections, costs seem to be sustainable from the perspective of nuclear
energy supply.79
Nevertheless, it can be challenged whether the market solution would, in fact,
ensure the socially efficient solution. Gollier (2005) identifies two problems, which
cause an ’insurability problem’ due to inefficiently large risk premiums regarding
78Gollier refers to results by Baxter & Jermann (1997) and French & Porteba (1991).
79In contrast, according to the analysis in Section 4.3, estimated costs of a risk-sharing pool
to cover third party liability up to ¿10 billion account for 0.12 cent per kWh, per average
reactor in Germany.
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the securitisation of catastrophic risk. The first one has already been mentioned,
namely, the ’home bias’ effect reduces the number of investors that are willing to
bear part of the risk. The second problem refers to the structure of the investors’
community observed on financial markets:
Given that many people do not hold any stock portfolio, they do not
hold shares of (re)insurance companies that are considering covering
catastrophic risks. The remaining shareholders will require a larger risk
premium to participate, because of the larger size of the risk. (ibid.: 7)
The latter objection might be of less importance if large pension funds would par-
ticipate in the coverage of nuclear hazard. Nevertheless, a third point of critique
refers to the results presented in Section 4.1 regarding the insurance industry’s
attitude to nuclear risk. There is no reason to believe that private investors would
act in a more actuarial way. Their investment behaviour might as well be charac-
terised by a strong aversion against uncertainty and ambiguity.
A third merit of nuclear cat-bonds constitutes their independence of the busi-
ness cycle; cat-bonds potentially stabilise the value of portfolios. This desirable
feature would make nuclear cat-bonds an interesting option for large-scale portfo-
lio managers and would consequently mitigate some of the objections mentioned
above.
Finally, Radetzki et al. argue that the implementation of nuclear cat-bonds bears
the potential to gain substantial scientific insight into the field of nuclear risk
generation. According to their thesis, unlimited liability together with the transfer
of nuclear risk to private financial markets would ideally accentuate an objective
price of nuclear hazard.
If the transfer of the top risk to a particular risky industry through
the suggested arrangements were to involve costs making the industry
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non-viable, then that would be an important signal that the markets
do not find the activity worthwhile. (Radetzki & Radetzki 2000: 192)
Nuclear Catastrophe Bonds in Germany
The financial market, in principle, is able to provide capital for victim compensa-
tion that far exceeds the capacity of both German energy groups and the insurance
industry, respectively. From this point of view, the instrument of a nuclear catas-
trophe bond appears to be an interesting alternative in addition to compensation
arrangements presented in the previous sections. Various advantages of the ap-
proach have been opposed to points of criticism – some of them being theoretical
in nature, the others referring to empirical evidence.
 Conclusively, it can be argued that the outcome of a policy resorting to
private solutions via the financial markets cannot be identified a priori.
 It has to be underlined that the success of this approach crucially depends
on the policy maker’s effort to avoid the ’insolvency problem’.
 The instrument of an NCB has to be tested empirically before it is possible
to suitably evaluate this strategy.
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The previous Chapters 3 and 4 gave an overview over the different policy options
to handle the specific characteristics of atomic risk. The aim of the following
sections, instead, is to focus on the relationship between atomic generation of
energy, nuclear policy and the prevalence of (scientific) uncertainty.
It is examined whether including uncertainty into the analysis gives rise to ar-
guments in favour of a precautionary principle (PP). A principle, stating that
certain hazardous actions should not be undertaken until uncertainty has substan-
tially unravelled – even if the commitment to this principle would entail substan-
tial (socio-economic) costs. The latter would translate either into an immediate or
into a dynamic strategy to back out of the exploitation of nuclear energy sources.
Instead of identifying and evaluating different policy measures and adaptation
strategies, the chapter addresses questions more general in nature:
 Can economic theory be applied to political landmark decisions in the field
of nuclear energy?
 From an economic viewpoint, is a precautionary principle generally justified
within the regulation process of atomic energy generation?
 If so, which particular economic motives can serve as a rationale of a precau-
tionary principle in the specific context?
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Current Debate
A (partial) answer to these questions would be valuable not least in respect of
the political and public debate in Germany regarding the legal extension of a nu-
clear installation’s operational lifespan. Arguments both in favour of, and against
precautionary measures concerning the proper handling of nuclear hazard narrow
down to ideological manifestations. Advocates and opponents basically differ in
the reference on distinct expert opinions, respectively, vary in their confidence in
a wide range of scientific results, which divergently assess the risk stemming from
the generation of nuclear energy. So far, arguments considering the presence of
structural uncertainty have not found their way into the discussion.
In 2002, the German government incorporated a precautionary claim into nu-
clear policy when an amendment of the Atomic Energy Act came into force, reg-
ulating the phase-out of the use of nuclear power. The German legislator came to
the conclusion that despite high domestic safety standards in comparison to nu-
clear policy on an international level, the commercial use of nuclear energy should
be restricted, since the possibility of major accidents cannot be fully ruled out.80
Firstly, the German legislator decided not to allocate further licences to new nu-
clear installations. Secondly, rules had been determined regulating the expiration
of operating licences. Each nuclear installation was assigned a particular residual
amount of electricity to be produced, based on an average operational period of
32 years. To maintain flexibility, the operators were allowed to transfer permitted
electricity volumes between their own installations. The resulting average resid-
ual operation period of a nuclear reactor, consequently, accounted for 11.5 years
(cf. Vorwerk 2002: 9 et seq.).
In recent years, the German government departed from this strong precaution-
80Cf. OECD (2001: 58) and (2002: 76). The following remarks on the phase-out of nuclear energy
in Germany draw on an article by Vorwerk (2002).
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ary policy approach. The legislator decided to extend the lifetime of 17 nuclear
reactors in Germany by an additional 12 years on average. In particular, the oper-
ational period of nuclear installations that were built prior to 1980 was increased
on average by 8 years in comparison to the initial phase-out path. More modern
reactors were allowed to be maintained in the power grid for an additional 14 years
on average. The corresponding amendment to the Atomic Energy Act was passed
by the German Bundestag at the end of 2010 (cf. OECD 2010: 76).
In response to recent alarming events in Japan and (supposedly) anticipating
upcoming elections, the German government pronounced a moratorium in respect
of the planned extension of operating lifespans holding in suspense both the de-
cisions about the adequacy of a precautionary principle and the future of nuclear
forms of energy generation in Germany, respectively.
5.1. General Issues: Stock Pollutants, Irreversibility
and Uncertainty
Before the economic principle of precaution is discussed in detail, the following
section addresses some basic theoretical concepts and introduces a few fundamen-
tal problems that jointly arise with the generation of nuclear energy. Gollier &
Treich (2003: 79 et seq.) identify four common features of various forms of indus-
trial, natural or environmental risk that magnify the complexity of the subject
and further complicate the challenges of regulatory policy, namely, the long time
horizon, the occurrence of irreversibilities, the prevalence of scientific uncertainty
and the potential of scientific progress, respectively.
Crucially, the use of the term ’nuclear risk’ is re-specified within the further
analysis. ’Nuclear risk’, from now on, additionally refers to various types of hazards
emanating from (scientific) uncertainty regarding the ultimate storage and disposal
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of atomic waste. It shows that the above mentioned characteristics are applicable
to ’nuclear risk’ being understood in this sense.
Time Horizon and Stock Pollution
It is beyond question that the time horizon to be dealt with in respect of nuclear
risk is tremendous. Nuclear waste is a highly accumulative stock pollutant, since
in the specific case, the environmental system barely offers any assimilative capac-
ity. In contrast to pure flow pollutants like traffic noise or other stock pollutants
like carbon emission, where the ecosystem is partially able to absorb negative ex-
ternalities, nuclear waste exhibits a persistence rate close to one hundred percent
– at least in respect of a medium-term time horizon covering a significant number
of present and future generations. For example, the half-life period of one of the
possible fission products in nuclear reactors, the isotope Plutonium-239, accounts
for more than 24,000 years. Accordingly, the decay process has to persist hundreds
of thousands of years until the material’s nuclear activity can be classified as safe
for human health.
Irreversibility
Closely linked to the problem of pollutants accumulating over time is the idea of
irreversibility emanating from various sorts of risk. Clearly, the generation of nu-
clear waste constitutes a physical irreversibility – at least within a reasonable policy
time frame complying with the needs of both the present and several future genera-
tions. Furthermore, besides the material aspect, Gollier & Treich (2003: 79) point
to another source of irreversibility, namely, the costs associated with the ”time
needed for adaptation of the socio-economic system”. That is, the employment
of hazardous production techniques may urge the policy maker to spend a con-
siderable amount in order to compensate for possible catastrophic consequences.
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These expenses constitute socio-economic irreversibilities in the sense that they
cannot be used for more productive utilisations and, therefore, inevitably distort
economic development.
For example, unexpected events during the process of the ultimate disposal of
nuclear waste may force society to make available financial means in consider-
able amount within a short time period. The expenses for the ultimate disposal,
respectively, the final storage of nuclear waste is estimated to account for ¿1.2
billion per nuclear reactor (cf. Fouquet et al. 2003: 312). Operators in Germany
are, in principle, mandated to cover these costs themselves and, accordingly, to
build adequate reserves. Nevertheless, it is still a controversial issue whether these
obligations are substantially concretised (ibid.). For example, in 2009 the Federal
Office for Radiation Protection had to take over the – initially privately organised
– operation of the permanent disposal site ’Asse II’ in the federal state Nieder-
sachsen, when the intrusion of saline solution into the disposal site’s shaft started
to endanger the safe deposit of the radiative material.
Thus, nuclear risk can create irreversibilities in the sense that, once an adverse
incident has occurred, society has to bear the costs of risk adaptation ad hoc, which
in turn has an irreversible effect on both consumption patterns and social welfare.
Uncertainty and Scientific Progress
The scenario described above points to a third particularity of various forms of
social hazards, which has to be considered by policy makers, namely, the preva-
lence of uncertainty or ignorance. Chapters 2, 3 and 4 referred to the problem
of nuclear risk – outcomes and corresponding probabilities of occurrence could
be identified. The scenario of a reactor core melt accident served as an example.
A situation of scientific uncertainty, on the contrary, is characterised by the lack
of information on outcome probabilities, while the case of ignorance is accompa-
91
5. Nuclear Risk and Precaution
nied by the impossibility to identify both the consequences and the likelihood of
potential catastrophic events (cf. Sunstein 2005: 33).
Within this respect, both the controversial question about the ultimate disposal
of nuclear waste and the capability of scientific progress has to be addressed.81
Several strategies to cope with the permanent disposal (PD) of radioactive material
are, in fact, inadequate. Marine or space disposal as well as the transmutation of
waste or long-term interim storage turn out to be either too dangerous, too complex
or too costly, respectively (cf. Brasser et al. 2008: 6). Therefore, the PD in specific
geological formations, i. e., the long-term isolation of harmful substances contained
in nuclear waste by means of a natural rock barrier, constitutes the only feasible
option according to current scientific standards.
Scientific results imply that it is, in principle, possible to resort to specific salt
formations in order to install a PDS in Germany. Nevertheless, the scientific com-
munity still has to establish a commonly accepted procedure that allows to infer
from both laboratory experiments and ’natural analoga’, since no direct experi-
ence exists in respect of long-term behaviour of solid rock formations (cf. Brasser
et al. 2008: 32, 38, 54 and 64). Therefore, it seems that scientific uncertainty has
not entirely been unravelled. The incidents at the PDS ’Asse II’ serve as an exam-
ple. It has to be highlighted, however, that scientific progress is potentially able
to resolve problems of uncertainty in the future.
In their article on the US American approach towards the construction of a PDS
at Yukka Mountain, Winograd & Roseboom (2008) address another important
issue in this respect, namely, political assertiveness. People tend to resist nuclear
disposal sites to be established in their near neighborhood, a phenomenon which is
81Brasser et al. (2008) provide a comprehensive survey on the possibility of a permanent disposal
site (PDS) in Germany. This survey was conducted by the German Institute for Applied
Ecology together with the Gesellschaft fu¨r Anlagen- und Reaktorsicherheit (GRS).
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labelled ’not-in-my-backyard’ (NIMBY) within economic literature. This will be
especially the case if site selection procedures are not communicated openly and
in a comprehensible way as is currently the case, e. g., in the USA.82 Short term
political business cycles, therefore, can substantially delay inevitable long term
solutions further increasing the risk of the generation of nuclear energy.83 Thus,
within the present thesis, it is argued that scientific uncertainty is accompanied
by political ambiguity. As a consequence, both the final outcome of nuclear risk
and corresponding probabilities of occurrence can be classified as highly uncertain
as long as a permanent disposal site has not been successfully installed.
Importantly, a further source of uncertainty has to be highlighted. As already
mentioned in Chapter 3 on risk prevention, the estimated probabilities of a core
melt accident potentially followed by catastrophic consequences only take into con-
sideration the possibility of technical malfunction. ’Initiating events’ like human
error, terrorist attacks or natural incidents like earthquakes are explicitly excluded
from risk analysis and are, therefore, located in the domain of scientific uncertainty.
Experience has shown that the error-prone nature of human action plays an im-
portant role in the genesis of nuclear accidents. The recent events in Japan vividly
visualise that risk management and science still have to overcome many difficulties
in order to adequately incorporate natural hazards into the analysis.
82The approach in Switzerland is an exception worthy of mentioning (cf. HSK 2005). The Swiss
policy maker started to investigate in the late 1970s, identified clear rules for the selection
process and managed to continuously inform the public on scientific progress. Potential sites
have been identified, however, technical difficulties have still to be overcome.
83Clearly, this line of reasoning is built on the assumption that policy makers solely take decisions
in order to maximise votes. Further investigation on this topic would be necessary to reinforce,
respectively, to reject this hypothesis. However, this would go beyond the scope of the present
thesis.
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5.2. The Precautionary Principle
The precautionary principle (PP) is a concept closely linked to the idea of en-
vironmental ’sustainability’, which has, so far, not been defined in a universal
and precise way. Loosely speaking, its aim is to organise the (mainly econom-
ically driven) human intervention in the ecosystem in a less harmful and more
sustainable way.84 Various conceptualisations of the PP exist, each of them being
”culturally framed” (O’Riordan & Cameron 1994: 12). That is, the formulation
of the PP depends on a specific society’s set of norms and values, respectively, on
the way people within a society perceive the status of the environment. A soci-
ety considering nature to be fragile and vulnerable in face of human intervention
might exhibit a different attitude towards the PP than societies that assume the
ecosystem to be robust within limits or that rely on a unlimited adaptability of
the environment (cf. COMEST 2005: 28). The different approaches to genetically
modified food both in the USA and in the EU serve as an example. However, from
a comprehensive perspective, the core concern of the concept of precaution is to
offer ”a broad guide to policy makers to move to anticipate problems before they
occur, which could involve acting before there is full scientific understanding of
the circumstances” (Jordan & O’Riordan 1999: 18).
In spite of the vague status of the PP, it is possible to clearly identify the
rationale behind the principle. The PP scrutinises the established interplay be-
tween (natural) science, economics, ethics, politics and law in the face of imminent
84An introduction to the genesis and the main characteristics of the PP is presented inter alia in
O’Riordan & Cameron (1994) and Jordan & O’Riordan (1999). For a brief historical overview
and a more applied discussion on the PP see, e.g., the UNESCO expert group report by the
World Commission on the Ethics of Scientific Knowledge and Technology ( COMEST 2005).
A discussion on the PP in respect of the different economic approaches towards uncertainty
is provided by Pearce (1994).
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irreversibilities and catastrophic consequences or in the presence of scientific uncer-
tainty. If potential environmental damage is accompanied by one or more of these
circumstances, in principle, scientific risk assessment, subsequent results of eco-
nomic (cost-benefit) analysis and the implication for the political decision process
can be questioned.
5.2.1. Historical Background
The emergence of the PP, which can be interpreted as a shift from damage control
ex post to a control of risk ex ante, is a logical consequence of scientific progress,
technological innovation and economic growth, respectively (cf. COMEST 2005: 7).
Economic prosperity accompanied by increasing pollution levels and progressive
environmental destruction started to exhaust the ecosystem’s assimilative capac-
ity. As a consequence, policy makers tried to involve the economic sources of this
deficiency by implementing the polluter-pays-principle (PPP). Where the PPP oc-
curred to be insufficient, governments, under the assumption of manageable social
hazard, started to emphasise the principle of risk prevention by installing ade-
quate liability rules or by setting regulatory safety standards. The final stage of
governmental action, namely, the rise of a precautionary principle, was reached
when various forms of social risk emerged, which were accompanied by scientific
uncertainty and entailed consequences of potential catastrophic extent. The threat
of global climate change, the problem of acid rain and the risk of prevalent defor-
estation serve as examples.
Interestingly, the PP goes back to a precautionary concept within environmental
policy implemented by the German government in the 1970s, namely, the ’Vor-
sorgeprinzip’. Initially, ”Vorsorge implied fitting the best available abatement
technology in order to minimize polluting emissions at the source” (Jordan &
O’Riordan 1999: 19). The principle was established on the assumption that both
95
5. Nuclear Risk and Precaution
economic growth and environmental protection can, in general, enforce each other
rather than being in an antagonistic relation (ibid.: 20). The concept of ’Vorsorge’,
in succession, included various forms of pollution and social risk and was accompa-
nied by four supplementing principles intended both to limit and to contextualise
the PP, namely, the polluter-pays-principle, the principle of economic feasibility,
the common burden principle and the idea of societal consensus (cf. Boehmer-
Christiansen 1994). Subsequently, German policy makers tried to further establish
the concept of precaution within the area of European countries, mainly in order
to avoid competitive disadvantages. Within the EU, the PP currently constitutes
a guiding principle in the fields of environmental policy (cf. Jordan & O’Riordan
1999: 21). On an international level, the breakthrough of the PP dates from
the UN Rio Declaration on Environment and Development in 1992. Since then,
the PP has become part of several international agreements, among others, the
WTO’s Agreement on Sanitary and Phytosanitary Measures in 1994 (cf. COMEST
2005: 8).
5.2.2. Concepts and Criticism of Precaution
As implied at the beginning of the section, a unique and formal version of the PP
does not exist. For example, a communication of the EU commission from the
year 2000 expresses the precautionary concern in the following, rather tentative,
way:
The precautionary principle applies where scientific evidence is insuf-
ficient, inconclusive or uncertain and preliminary scientific evaluation
indicates that there are reasonable grounds for concern that potentially
dangerous effects on the environment, human, animal or plant health
may be inconsistent with the high level of protection chosen by the
EU. (cited according to COMEST 2005: 13)
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Importantly, this statement does not impose any restriction on EU institutions.
The equivalent in German legislation dates from 1984. The PP in Germany devel-
ops its effect at the level of tort law and administrative jurisprudence (cf. COMEST
2005: 24). Its formulation has a more compulsive character. Importantly, it indi-
cates its applicability to the context of nuclear risk:
Responsibility towards future generations commands that the natural
foundations of life are preserved and that irreversible types of dam-
age [. . . ] must be avoided. [. . . ] The principle of precaution com-
mands that the damages done to the natural world [. . . ] should be
avoided in advance and in accordance with opportunity and possibil-
ity. [...] Precaution means to develop [. . . ] technological processes that
significantly reduce environmental burdens, especially those brought
about by the introduction of harmful substances. (cited according to
COMEST 2005: 10)
The list of different versions of the PP could be prolonged. In spite of the
absence of a universal formulation, Jordan & O’Riordan (1999: 24 et seq.) identify
several topics, which seem to be central to the concept of precaution and which
are of interest in respect of economic analysis.
Firstly, the PP is characterised by the political disposition to take pro-active
measures even if the decision maker lacks a formal scientific proof of certain (catas-
trophic) scenarios to occur. This criterion clearly exceeds a policy of prevention.
On the side of economic analysis, this has been severely critisised, since a PP,
taken literally, has a strong paralysing effect and entails opportunity costs in sub-
stantial amount itself. It has to be mentioned, however, that the PP only comes
into consideration if – due to scientific uncertainty – conventional risk analysis
is impracticable, scientific results imply a certain plausibility and the extent of
the potential damage caused by inactiveness is sufficient to trigger precautionary
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thinking.
Secondly, the PP, therefore, is accompanied by the criteria of proportionality and
cost-effectiveness. A possibility to evaluate the social opportunity costs of imple-
menting precautionary measures would be to take the difference between expenses
on full precaution and the costs of reducing the potentially harmful activity down
to the level suggested by traditional cost-benefit analysis. A decision rule whether
or not to implement the PP in a strict sense would then require the presumed ben-
efits to far exceed these opportunity costs. Economists still tend to favour a line
of argument resorting to the instrument of cost-benefit analysis. However, some
economists challenge the conventional decision rule of cost-benefit analysis within
the environmental context; a precautionary perspective – even in a cost-benefit
framework – could be realised insofar as the benefits of a potentially harmful ac-
tivity should be much greater than corresponding costs (cf. Pearce 1994). This
goes in line with the arguments presented in the economic literature on decision-
making under uncertainty. The related concept of the ’option value’ is discussed
in the subsequent Section 5.3.
Thirdly, the PP stresses the importance of the well-being of future generations
and widens the time horizon of political consideration. It, therefore, partially
challenges the necessity of time discounting, the latter being widely accepted in the
economic literature on environmental policy.85 Nevertheless, common economic
reasoning within a cost-benefit framework might be inadequate in the presence of
highly toxic stock pollutants such as atomic waste. The following section 5.4 on
worst-case analysis will discuss this topic in more detail.
Fourthly, the PP, in its strictest interpretation, implies a shift in respect of
the burden of proof. Accordingly, the development of potentially hazardous tech-
nologies should only be undertaken if the possibility of substantial environmental
85As a starting point for the discussion cf. Stavins (2005).
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harm can be excluded. Clearly, this criterion must partially be criticised from
an economic standpoint, since it can impede scientific innovation and economic
development.
Furthermore, the different formulations of the PP highlight both the importance
of the ecosystem as a necessary precondition for human existence and its intrinsic
value, respectively. Again, from an economic standpoint, the principle involves
conceptual drawbacks, since it does not offer a clear guideline. In its crudest form,
the principle would not allow to sacrifice any resources in order to achieve both
economic growth and material wealth, respectively. Clearly, such a decision rule
cannot be favoured from an economic perspective.
In a nutshell, theoretic results can be summarised as follows (cf. Sunstein 2005):
 On the one hand, it can be argued that the PP in its weakest form is a
general assumption of human behaviour.
The unopposed obligation to use the seatbelt when driving a car or the tendency
within wealthy societies to resort to balanced diet serve as examples.
 On the other hand, in its strongest conceptualisation, it can be shown that
the principle consequently creates ’substitute risks’, which would, in fact,
contradict the idea of precaution. Thus, the principle is widely criticised to
take a paralysing effect.
For example, a strongly regulated process of the final approval of new drugs pro-
tects patients from uncertain negative effects of medication but at the same time,
it exposes them to a substitute risk in the sense that they may never receive the
potential benefits of several promising compounds.
So far, it should have become clear that different approaches to, and correspond-
ing problems associated with a PP are complex and occasionally located at the
frontiers of economic analysis. To arrange the arguments and referring to results
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obtained by Sunstein (2005), the subsequent Sections 5.3 and 5.4 conceptually
separate two possible sources of the precautionary principle, namely, irreversibility
and catastrophic harm, respectively.
A presentation of the concept of the ’option value’, a discussion of economic
models spotlighting different economic motives behind precaution and a summary
on the basic elements of worst case analysis addresses several problems concerning
the PP that have been outlined so far. This could make it possible both to identify
and to evaluate the potential economic rationale behind a PP in the case of nuclear
energy generation.
5.3. Irreversible Harm and Decision-Making under
Uncertainty
This part of the thesis addresses the notion of an irreversible harm precautionary
principle (IHPP), according to which – under well-defined circumstances – it is
economically efficient to pay a positive premium in order to avoid non-reversible
damage and to preserve flexibility.
IHPP: ”When regulators lack information about the likelihood and magnitude of
a risk, it makes sense to spend extra resources to buy an ’option’ to protect
against irreversible harm until future knowledge emerges.” (Sunstein 2005: 4)
For this approach of precaution, the concept of the ’option value’ serves as an in-
telligible theoretical basis. The corresponding literature on decision-making under
uncertainty is a valuable extension to the field of cost-benefit analysis.86
86The discussion was raised by articles of Weisbrod (1964) and Arrow & Fisher (1974). Weisbrod
(1964) developed the idea of an ’option demand’ for commodities with infrequent and uncer-
tain purchase, which is, in general, not taken account of by private suppliers. Accordingly,
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The concept can be outlined as follows: It is assumed, firstly, that scientific
uncertainty prevails in respect of the potential consequences of certain alterna-
tives. Secondly, it is supposed that at least one alternative can be referred to as a
hazardous activity in the sense that its outcome is irreversible. It is, furthermore,
assumed that scientific progress takes place. If these three presumptions hold, it
is rational to adjust the expected return of the reversible alternative by an ’op-
tion value’ (OV), which can be interpreted as the opportunity cost of maintaining
flexibility in the future (cf. Sunstein 2005: 17).
The subsequent discussion presents both the significant assumptions and the
main results of two economic models built on the notion of the OV. It is tried
to answer the question whether the models’ settings consort with circumstances
of the generation of nuclear energy. Accordingly, it should be possible to make a
point about irreversibility as a potential source of a precautionary principle in the
nuclear context.
5.3.1. Option Value
Arrow & Fisher (1974) were among the first to examine the implications of includ-
ing uncertainty into cost-benefit analysis. The latest version of the model including
it was argued, that the private market solution may not guarantee the (potentially) socially
efficient realisation of projects like national parks or urban transit. In the fields of environ-
mental economics, Arrow & Fisher (1974) addressed the notion of a strictly positive (quasi)
’option value’ associated with potentially reversible alternatives. The discussion on this OV,
which explicitely does not depend on the assumption of risk aversion, was supplemented
by contributions of Henry (1974) and Hanemann (1989). A similar concept is presented in
Dixit & Pindyck (1994) who, in the domain of finance, discuss the characteristics of invest-
ment decisions under uncertainty. For a brief summary, see, e. g., Fisher (2000). A valuable
attempt to further determine and evaluate the OV can be found inter alia in Fisher (2001)
and Farrow (2004).
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the results by Henry (1974) and Hanemann (1989) is presented in Fisher (2000).
The model’s ingredients can be summarised as follows: It analyses the problem
of a policy maker to decide between two alternative uses of a natural environment,
namely, ’preservation’ and ’development’, within a two-period time frame. The
alternative of ’preservation’ can be referred to as a precautionary measure, while
the ’development’ option constitutes an irreversible transformation of the environ-
ment. In period one, certain knowledge about the alternatives’ future benefits does
not exist but it is supposed that uncertainty will unravel at the beginning of the
second period allowing the decision maker to capitalise on prospective information.
The decision maker’s preferences are explicitly not assumed to contain any form
of risk aversion. S/he maximises the net value of present and future profits.
It shows that the result of cost-benefit analysis changes in the presence of uncer-
tainty. A risk-neutral decision maker has to extend the net benefit of the reversible
alternative by a positive option value. The OV can be interpreted as ”the value of
information about future benefits conditional on retaining the option to preserve
or develop in the future” (Fisher 2000: 201). Under the circumstances captured
in the model, ”the implications for an efficient control policy will generally involve
some restrictions of the activity” (Arrow & Fisher 1974: 312 [emphasis added]).87
It is argued within the present thesis that the model, to a certain extent, resem-
bles the problem of deciding whether or not to (further) resort to nuclear forms of
energy production. The ’development’ of a natural environment can be compared
with the employment of specific natural resources to generate nuclear energy. Bear-
ing in mind the irreversibilites associated with nuclear risk addressed in Section
5.1, the model is able to identify the existence of an OV within a nuclear context.
Firstly, the physical irreversibility in form of nuclear waste, the lack of evidence in
87In the mathematically more elaborate version of the model (cf. Fisher 2000), however, the
precautionary measure is restricted on a zero-one basis.
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respect of a permanent disposal site’s practicability and the consequential uncer-
tainty regarding the actual costs and benefits of nuclear strategies, respectively,
give rise to the applicability of the model in the specific context. Secondly, the
model is able to capture the idea of ’irreversibilitiy’ in a socio-economic sense. Un-
expected expenses on the final waste disposal entirely born by society, which could
substantially change the progress of consumption patterns, serve as an example.
Thus, on the basis of the model, it is possible to plead in favour of the irreversible
harm precautionary principle.
It has to be highlighted that, according to the version presented in Fisher (2000),
the model implicitly incorporates the possibility of ’substitute risks’ accompanied
by precautionary measures, since it compares the results of cost-benefit analysis
– both under risk and under uncertainty – based on net benefits. Benefits of
’development’ are explicitly adjusted to possible environmental costs, which of
course reduce the latter, but it seems conceptually unobjectionable to also refer
to the revenues as net of ’substitute risks’, which would consequently increase the
net benefit of ’development’.
Nevertheless, the utilisation of nuclear resources could cause an additional form
of irreversibility, which cannot be analysed applying this theoretical framework.
’Development’, in a nuclear context, constitutes a technical commitment to a spe-
cific source of energy production. The decision in favour of atomic energy con-
sequently diminishes investment opportunities in alternative energy sources. The
resulting dependency on nuclear energy – at least in a medium-term time horizon
– can be interpreted as non-reversible from a present viewpoint. Adopting the
diction of the model, if at the beginning of the second decision period improved
information would advise against the option of ’development’, the commitment
of the first period could still be binding in the sense that an insufficient technical
development of alternatives may prevent an immediate exit of a strategy of further
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’development’.
Two further drawbacks of the model can be identified, namely, the rather vague
implication for policy makers and the ambiguity in respect of the direction of
precautionary measures, respectively. Firstly, the model can, indeed, prove the
existence of a positive OV under specific circumstances. However, it does not offer
a clear decision rule for political authorities. OV theory implies that the net present
value of an irreversible alternative should significantly exceed its costs in order to
be able to profit on better future information. But it does not identify a specific
threshold that would trigger a rational decision maker to pursue a precautionary
strategy.
Secondly, the model assumes a situation, in which, so far, no ’development’
has taken place. In a context of applied policy, this assumption usually is not ful-
filled. Industries, in fact, constantly emit carbon dioxide and various industrialised
countries, indeed, utilise nuclear forms of energy generation. Under these circum-
stances, irreversibilities exist that point in opposite directions. ’Environmentalists’
would stress the irreversibilites manifested in the natural system, while ’industrial-
ists’ would highlight the importance of irreversibilities within the economic system,
i. e., the forgone potential revenues due to restricted investment into current ac-
tivities. Thus, it is a priori not clear whether the claim for precaution is on the
side of ’environmentalists’ – who insist on precautionary measures in favour of the
ecosystem – or whether the status quo is determined by the concerns of ’indus-
trialists’ – who invoke precaution in the sense that their activities should not be
curtailed as long as negative consequences of their actions have not been ultimately
substantiated.
The economic literature provides models that try to overcome these conceptual
difficulties.88 For example, Fisher (2001) points to the opposing results of different
88A corresponding analysis in the context of nuclear risk has not, so far, been conducted. Both
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approaches regarding an IHPP in the context of carbon emission reduction poli-
cies. Nevertheless, Farrow (2004) presents a theoretical framework to identify a
threshold for the justification of an IHPP.89 By means of a stochastic cost-benefit
analysis and empirical parametrisation, the author is able to show that in the case
of the US American approach to control emission levels (the ’Clean Air Act’),
an IHPP – from an environmentalist’s perspective – is a rational strategy under
all circumstances. From the standpoint of environmentalists, the benefit-cost ra-
tio exceeds the estimated threshold. Hence, a precautionary measure should be
chosen, i. e., emissions should be reduced. Surprisingly, from the viewpoint of in-
dustrialists, the estimated threshold level is not reached, therefore, ’precaution’ is
rejected and emissions, again, are advised to be controlled.
Results can be summarised as follows:
 The theory of the option value within the context of environmental eco-
nomics is a valuable extension of traditional cost-benefit analysis in the pre-
dominance of uncertainty.
 Economic models exist that also indicate the presence of an OV in a context
of the generation of nuclear energy.
 OV theory faces conceptual problems in the case of irreversibilities (environ-
mental or economical) pointing in opposite directions.
 Economic approaches exist that, in general, are able to overcome these dif-
ficulties. However, methods so far have not been applied to the context of
nuclear energy generation.
theoretical requirements and empirical methods are elaborate. It would, therefore, go far
beyond the scope of the present thesis to conduct a project of this magnitude.
89Farrow resorts to an OV model by Dixit & Pindyck (1994).
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5.3.2. ’Irreversibility Effect’ and ’Precautionary Effect’
The following section sketches the main characteristics of a model by Gollier &
Treich (2003), who present an elaborate framework for decision-making under un-
certainty allowing for a more differentiated economic interpretation of the pre-
cautionary principle. They are able to identify two separate economic sources of
the PP, namely, the ’irreversible effect’ (IE) and the ’precautionary effect’ (PE),
respectively.
The outline of the model is similar to the approach presented in the previous
section. At the respective beginning of two periods, a decision maker has to decide
upon the ’development’ of a resource in order to maximise expected lifetime utility.
Initially, the model does not make any assumptions about the decision maker’s
attitude towards risk. Scientific knowledge at period one is insufficient to determine
the actual future revenues of the alternatives but the option of ’development’ is
irreversible in the sense that it is supposed to limit the future radius of operation.
Corresponding to the information available in period one, the decision maker has
a belief about the probabilities of potential future outcomes to occur. Again, it
is assumed that uncertainty will unravel at the beginning of the second period.
Importantly, scientific progress is understood, therefore, as the confidence in the
policy maker’s ability to take the efficient decision in the future. Thus, again, the
intuition behind the PP is to manage ”the wait for better scientific information”
(Gollier & Treich 2003: 86).
The authors are able to derive an irreversible effect (IE), which stands in the
tradition of the OV. The optimal level of ’development’ in period one decreases
with the prospect of better scientific knowledge in the future. Again, this model
does not offer a clear decision rule, respectively, it does not provide a quantitative
criterion that determines when a precautionary measure is actually appropriate
and when not.
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Importantly, the model reveals that an IE can only be postulated under the
assumption that second period utility does not depend on decisions made in the
first period, i. e., the model, in its initial version, does not allow for the possibility
of (negative or positive) externalities entailed by the ’development’ alternative.90
Clearly, this assumption does not hold in the context of nuclear risk, since the
stock of nuclear waste will most likely affect consumption patterns and the welfare
of many future generations. Therefore, the implication of scientific learning in
a decision framework of uncertainty is examined supposing present consumption
of a good with negative externalities, e. g., nuclear energy, to increase social risk
in the future. To that end, it is supposed that first period consumption entails
a negative externality (in the sense that it is accompanied by stock pollution),
reducing second period utility proportionally to the level of initial ’development’.
The persistence rate of the stock pollutant is known and assumed to be constant.
It shows that both uncertainty and the potential of scientific learning involve
two opposing effects, depending on the preferences of the decision maker – the first
surprisingly favouring the alternative of environmental ’development’, the second
advising for a strategy of precaution.
On the one hand, the prospect of more reliable future information suggests the
decision maker to behave more efficiently in the future, which ,in turn, increases
expected future consumption levels, i. e., future income. A wealth effect (WE),
undermining the idea of precaution, can be identified: ”[. . . ] the increase in con-
sumption generated by the better information structure tends to induce society to
worry less about the future” (Gollier et al. 2000: 239). Hence, in order to smooth
consumption patterns over time, the decision maker will not reduce consumption
in the first period, despite the prevalence of negative externalities. The authors
90The following discussion on the impact of scientific learning in the case of stock pollutants and
negative externalities is based on the analysis provided in Gollier, Jullien & Treich (2000).
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highlight that the likelihood of the WE to occur increases the more the decision
maker’s preferences show signs of ’absolute risk aversion’, a measure of the inten-
sity of the decision maker’s desire for insurance coverage.91
On the other hand, the prospect of more efficient future information increases
uncertainty ex ante in the sense that future decisions will strongly vary according
to the the actual scientific knowledge in period two. A precautionary effect (PE),
supporting a policy of precaution, can be determined: higher uncertainty at the
beginning of period one changes expected marginal utility of future consumption.
Hence, the decision maker tends to decrease current consumption for a precaution-
ary motive, i. e., efforts for ’development’ are reduced in the sense of a precautionary
principle. The PE is conditional on the social preferences in the sense that it de-
pends on the decision maker’s ”willingness to save [in order to] to forearm oneself
against future exogenous risks” (Gollier et al. 2000: 238). The authors underline
that the likelihood of the PE to be the dominant effect increases the more the
decision maker’s preferences show signs of ’absolute prudence’.92
The authors conclude that the ”way in which learning affects the current decision
depends on the utility function” considered in the model (Gollier et al. 2000: 237).
They are able to define a criterion guaranteeing the PE to outweigh the WE:
uncertainty, the potential of scientific learning and the prevalence of negative stock
externalities for future generations give rise to the justification of a precautionary
principle if and only if the ’relative risk aversion’ according to the decision maker’s
preferences is less than unity.93 (For example, the condition is satisfied if the utility
91The level of ’absolute risk aversion’ is defined by the Arrow-Pratt coefficient A(·) = −u′′(·)u′(·) ,
where u(·) denotes the decision maker’s utility function.
92The coefficient of ’absolute prudence’, P (·) = −u′′′(·)u′′(·) , is a concept firstly introduced by
Kimball (1990) to measure the strength of the precautionary saving motive (cf. Gollier et
al. 2000: 238).
93This result holds for the class of ’hyperbolic absolute risk aversion’ (HARA) utility functions.
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function takes the form of the square-root. However, it can be shown that in the
case of logarithmic utility, scientific uncertainty has no effect on the optimal level
of precaution.)
Unfortunately, the criterion does not offer a clear guideline for a precautionary
policy in the context of the use of nuclear energy sources. The economic liter-
ature, indeed, provides a variety of empirical approaches to estimate individual
and societal risk aversion. However, there is no economic consensus on this topic
(cf. Eisenhauer & Ventura 2003), since, e. g., evaluations of the ’relative risk aver-
sion’ range from less than unity – which would support a PP in the case of stock
externalities – to well over 40 – which would clearly advise for a progressive policy
in direction of the WE. Furthermore, the applications of these estimates to the
context of nuclear risk seems to be limited. Empirical results are based inter alia
on common consumption and saving decisions or on insurance purchases in the
actuarial domain. However, it has already been underlined in previous chapters
that nuclear risk takes a rather exceptional position within this context. People’s
preferences towards social hazards entailing potential catastrophic consequences
could likely differ from those towards risks included in conventional investment
decisions. The following Section 5.4 on worst case analysis will further discuss this
topic.
However, the analysis reveals that arguments in favour of a PP cannot be ex-
cluded within a nuclear context a priori. Finally, the question arises whether and
how far results of the analysis change if both the predominance of irreversibili-
ties and the occurrence of stock externalities, respectively, are considered – as is
the case in the context of the production of nuclear energy. Importantly, the au-
thors are able to demonstrate that – once the decision maker’s preferences satisfy
The analysis does not provide clear results for all non-HARA functions, i. e., the effect of
uncertainty cannot be unambiguously identified (cf. Gollier et al. 2000: 238).
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the criterion presented above – the precautionary effect (PE) and the irreversible
effect (IE) work in the same directions, yielding an even stronger argument for
precaution against irreversible harm (cf. Gollier et al. 2000: 242).
Results can be summarised in the following way:
 Economic analysis indicates that two driving forces behind a precautionary
approach, namely the precautionary effect (PE) and the irreversible effect
(IE) (the latter standing in the tradition of the OV concept) cannot be
identified independently from the decision maker’s preferences.
 Against the spirit of precaution, even under uncertainty, a decision maker
may prefer to extend the potentially hazardous activity in order to avoid
heterogeneity in consumption patterns. This behaviour can be referred to as
the wealth effect (WE).
 Nevertheless, this result crucially depends on the specific way scientific progress
is formulated within the model implying that the decision maker will cer-
tainly be able to take efficient decisions in the future.94
 Under well-defined circumstances, which cannot be excluded in the case of
nuclear energy production a priori, both the IE and the PE imply that
uncertainty and scientific learning affect rational decision-making in the sense
of a irreversible harm precautionary principle.
 Further empirical research on the specific social preferences towards nuclear
risk needs to be done in order to decide upon the accordance of the necessary
criterion to justify precautionary policy actions. Thus, based on the theo-
94It will be shown in the subsequent Section 5.4.1 on the ’tail thickening effect’ (TTE) that
results substantially change once the concept of scientific progress is modelled in a different
way.
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retical analysis presented so far, it is not possible to make a final statement
on the precautionary principle in the nuclear context.
5.3.3. Concluding Remarks
The discussion, so far, provided insight into the justification of a PP on the grounds
of (environmental) irreversibilities, the prevalence of negative stock externalities
and a specific concept of scientific progress, according to which uncertainty is
supposed to resolve over time entirely. Two results should be kept in mind:
 Firstly, from a theoretical perspective, the context of nuclear hazard turned
out to exhibit all premises that suggest the establishment of precautionary
actions, which could either originate from the motive to capitalise on future
knowledge (OV and IE) or from an initial precautionary concern (PE). How-
ever, it transpired that – from an economic point of view – it is inadequate
to pass a final judgement on the IHPP’s applicability as long as the decision
maker’s preferences, respectively, the social attitude towards nuclear risk has
not been empirically analysed in detail.
 Secondly, from a policy-perspective, within the current political debate in
Germany about the lifetime extension of nuclear power plants, respectively,
about the immediate shutdown of the most precarious nuclear reactors, eco-
nomic theory provides some qualitative arguments in favour of precautionary
measures. Based on the economic models that have been presented so far,
importantly, it is not possible to identify the optimal extent of precautionary
strategies. However, in consideration of structural scientific uncertainty, the-
oretic results reject the application of traditional cost-benefit analysis within
the nuclear context. Thus, the reference to particular ’substitute risks’ in
form of irreversibilities within the economic system does not constitute the
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strong argument against the PP, as would be the case in the presence of
manageable risk.
In order to draw a complete picture, it is necessary to further address the role of
governmental authorities in respect of the realisation of the IHPP and to discuss
two diverging perceptions of the term ’irreversibility’, which leads to the next
section on catastrophic harm and worst case analysis.
Firstly, it has been shown in the economic literature that precautionary measures
– i. e., in the specific context, the phase-out of nuclear energy and the investment
in alternative sources – will not be established within a competitive environment
(cf. Weeds 2002). As opposed to economic efficiency, agents in a framework of
decentralised decision-making under uncertainty will not revert to the concept of
the OV. This could serve as an incentive for the policy maker to actively promote
precautionary policies (cf. Gollier & Treich 2003: 92 et seq.). Nevertheless, for
the sake of economic efficiency, the policy maker is well advised not to develop
’present-biased preferences’ (cf. O’Donoghue & Rabin 1999), according to which
governments tend to rashly implement precautionary measures in order to gain
special affirmation by their voters. This gives rise to a constraint for policy makers
not to engage in precautionary matters in an inefficient way (cf. Gollier & Treich
2003: 94).
Secondly, it shows that the final justification of an IHPP crucially depends on the
specific conceptualisation of ’irreversibility’ (cf. Sunstein 2005: 20 et seq.). On the
one hand, if it is strictly understood in terms of ’sunk cost’, every regulatory action
implies other non-reversible conditions and various forms of ’substitute risks’. For
example, the investment in alternative energy sources is ’sunk’. Furthermore, the
transition phase from nuclear to renewable technologies could involve distortions
in the economic system. The corresponding costs, again, are ’sunk’ and, therefore,
’irreversible’. An immediate phase-out of nuclear forms of energy production is
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likely to imply an augmented utilisation of carbon dioxide intense energy sources
– at least in the short run – further increasing the risk of global warming. Hence,
both the hazardous activity and the decision not to undertake it, in principle,
entail ’sunk costs’, which are ’irreversible’ in their very nature. From this point
of view, the IHPP can hardly be justified.95 Nevertheless, whether the concept
of the IHPP should be included into the analysis or not, primarily depends on
(empirical) assumptions about the relative costs of these ’irreversibilities’ pointing
in opposite directions. Importantly, it has already been mentioned in Section 5.3.1
on OV theory that economic approaches exist trying to resolve these conceptual
frictions.
On the other hand, the analysis changes if an action is defined as ’irreversible’
”when restoration to the status quo is impossible or at best extremely difficult, at
least on a relevant timescale” (Sunstein 2005: 18). According to this interpreta-
tion, the question of ’irreversibility’ cannot be answered independently from the
question of ’seriousness’. That is, ’irreversibility’ is not an absolute term. It is a
concept that has to be related to both a specific time horizon and certain criteria
for the seriousness of a catastrophe. Thus, the IHPP is closely related to a catas-
trophic harm precautionary principle, which is discussed in detail throughout the
subsequent section.
5.4. Catastrophic Harm and Worst Case Analysis
The following part of the thesis discusses the notion of a catastrophic harm pre-
cautionary principle (CHPP), according to which – under specific circumstances
– it is a rational strategy to explicitly focus on hazards that are associated with
95Based on this reasoning, many economists have tended to argue against precautionary mea-
sures in the discussion on carbon emission and global warming (cf. Fisher 2001: 19 et seq.).
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tremendous worst-case scenarios.
CHPP: ”When risks have extremely bad worst-case scenarios, it makes sense to
pay special attention to those risks, even if they are unlikely to come to
fruition and even if existing information does not enable regulators to make
a reliable judgment about the probability that they will occur.” (Sunstein
2005: 4)
The CHPP can take different forms of intensity, denoted by CHPP1, CHPP2
and MP, respectively. The two weakest versions of the principle even apply in
the context of risk.96 Under the general assumptions of risk-neutrality or risk-
aversion, they represent essential rules to correct for irrational attitudes towards
various (not least environmental) hazards under specific extreme circumstances.
Therefore, from an economic point of view, they are unobjectionable.
(Adjusted) Expected Value Analysis
The modest form of the catastrophic harm precautionary principle (CHPP1) is
the implementation of a social decision rule based on expected value analysis.
Psychological experiments and surveys show that individuals – although naturally
assumed to exhibit risk-neutral or risk-averse preferences – tend to treat low-
frequency events of catastrophic harm as if accident probabilities were actually
zero (cf. Sunstein 2005: 28).
For illustration, Sunstein (2005: 29 et seq.) conducts the following experiment:
test persons are asked to decide upon the priority between two environmental
problems – the first ensued by a loss of 200 million lives at a likelihood of one in
a million and zero losses with the complementary probability, the second ensued
by the loss of 2000 lives at a probability of one in ten and zero otherwise. Both
96See previous Chapters 2, 3 and 4
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problems entail expected losses of 200 deaths. Nevertheless, a relative majority
of 41 percent declared that a government should spend more resources to avoid
the second environmental problem accompanied with the higher probability of
occurrence.
To correct this misperception of risk, a modest CHPP ensures that different
events with equal expected losses are treated equally. Clearly, this principle is
generally accepted in the context of nuclear energy generation. Policy makers do
not neglect the supposedly small probability of a potential core melt accident.
Operators are obliged to spend positive amounts on risk prevention and on pro-
vision against potential compensation requirements – either directly through the
regulation of safety standards or indirectly through strict liability rules.
Nevertheless, it is, in general, questionable whether this weak principle of precau-
tion can accommodate events of catastrophic dimension. Expected value analysis
is insofar inadequate, as it treats each single unit of ’loss’ equally. When it comes
to the potential loss of thousands of human lives caused by catastrophic events
like nuclear accidents, the ’social loss’ might no longer be presumed to be a linear
function.
Sunstein (2005: 31) refers to the notion of a ”social amplification of risk”, sug-
gesting a second round of damage due to psychological, sociological and/or macroe-
conomic factors, which can potentially outweigh the initial effect of a catastrophic
event. Such ’second round effects’ are likely to occur in the context of nuclear acci-
dents. For example, following the catastrophic event in Chernobyl, people within
a wide area around the site of the accident had to abandon their homes. The
exclusion zone will be uninhabitable for many future generations and – with the
exception of certain ”touristic projects” – will not be suitable for any economic
activities for a long timespan.
Sunstein conjectures that individuals ”might be willing to show a kind of catas-
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trophe premium, stemming [. . . ] from special distaste for risk of true disaster”
(Sunstein 2005: 32). Importantly, Sunstein highlights that this distaste for catas-
trophic damage is unrelated with any risk or ambiguity aversion. Thus, the shape
of people’s preferences gives rise to arguments in favour of a stronger version of the
catastrophic harm precautionary principle (CHPP2), adjusting the benefits of the
precautionary measure by accounting for the potential second round cost savings.
Nevertheless, for the latter principle to provide sufficient arguments in favour of
precautionary measures, again, potential substitute risks have to be taken into
account.
Worst-Case Analysis
It has been shown in the literature on decision-making under uncertainty that
a strong PP in form of worst-case analysis, in general, cannot be entirely ruled
out as a rational strategy for risk-avers decision makers (cf. Sunstein 2005: 33 et
seq.).97 Accordingly, the maximin principle (MP) is a decision rule, which chooses
the alternative with the best worst-case scenario. Within the specific context,
this would translate into an immediate phase-out of nuclear energy sources. It is
important to highlight that, in contrast to the two weaker forms of the CHPP, the
economic rationale behind the MP is the prevalence of (scientific) uncertainty.
Sunstein (2005: 37) presents a benchmark case that would, in principle, allow
for the application of the MP. Firstly, an (environmental) decision problem is con-
sidered where at least one alternative entails worst-case scenarios of catastrophic
extent. Secondly, it is assumed that uncertainty prevails about the likelihood of the
scenarios. Thirdly, the costs of a certain precautionary measure is socially accept-
able and, finally, there exists a scientific threshold of plausibility for catastrophic
97Sunstein inter alia refers to theoretical results by Arrow & Hurwicz (1972) and Woodward &
Bishop (1997).
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events to occur.
Nevertheless, from an economic perspective, at least two caveats regarding the
MP have to be mentioned (cf. Sunstein: 38 et seq.). The first points to the exis-
tence of various ’substitute risks’ followed by any precautionary measure. Within
the specific context, an abrupt phase-out of nuclear energy sources poses the ques-
tion about the adequate compensatory energy supply – at least in the short run.
Currently, energy supply in most industrialised countries, to a predominant ex-
tent, is still guaranteed by fossil energy sources. Bearing in mind the potential
catastrophic effects of global warming on economic development, an immediate
change from nuclear to fossil energy sources might in fact not be justified on the
basis of the MP. For that purpose, it would be necessary to clearly identify the ac-
tual worst-case scenarios of all alternatives. In the specific context, this is not the
case. On the one hand, expert estimates of worst-case scenarios caused by nuclear
accidents range from ¿10 billion to ¿100 billion. On the other hand, economists
do not agree on potential worst-case scenarios in the domain of global warming.98
A second caveat points to the actual degree of uncertainty. There are many sit-
uations in an environmental context, in which there is no certain knowledge about
actual probabilities but where it is possible to identify a plausible range of proba-
bility of a certain event to occur.99 Sunstein (2005: 35) asks the question, whether
the MP could simply be ”a way of neglecting probability, and hence a form of
irrationality”. Taken seriously, the MP tends to develop a strong paralysing effect.
Hence, in situations where a decision maker can assign probabilities to various
98For exapmple, Farber (2007: 17) highlights that estimated costs of reducing carbon emissions
to levels implied by the Kyoto protocol vary by a factor of 500.
99For example, it is not possible to make a clear statement about the future development of global
temperature levels, but the science community is able to conjecture that the probability of a
temperature increase of less than 1.5 degree centigrade is above zero but below ten percent
(cf. Weitzman 2007: 2).
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outcomes, an MP cannot be justified, since it would otherwise be necessary to im-
plausibly assume the decision maker to exhibit an unlimited degree of risk aversion
(cf. ibid.: 36). Thus, as long as policy makers can resort to expert estimates on
risk probabilities, an MP cannot serve as a rationale for precautionary policies in
the domain of nuclear hazards.
Nevertheless, it has already been highlighted in Chapter 2 and Section 5.1 that
nuclear risk management still has to overcome several difficulties in order to assess
the influence of both human error and exogenous events like natural catastrophes
and terrorist attacks on the genesis of nuclear accidents.
5.4.1. ’Tail Thickening Effect’
Finally, the following section lists the main results of a highly formal paper by
Weitzman (2007), which provides a strong approval of the CHPP. Like the ap-
proaches presented in previous Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, the Weitzman model ex-
amines the behaviour of rational decision makers under the presence of scientific
uncertainty. However, the focus of the analysis lies on both the potentially catas-
trophic extent of the hazardous activity and pollution stocks, rather than on en-
vironmental irreversibilities.
The model’s structure can briefly be outlined as follows: a decision maker with
strictly ’relative risk averse’ preferences is assumed to maximise expected lifetime
utility over two periods. The consumption growth rate is supposed to be related to
future changes in the environmental system. Weitzman applies the model within
the context of global warming and the risk of carbon dioxide emission. Accordingly,
future social welfare is assumed to be negatively correlated with a potential rise
in global temperature levels.
Within the present thesis, it is argued that the model, to a certain extent, is
applicable to the hazard entailed by the generation of nuclear energy. Correspond-
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ingly, the parameter ’temperature response’ has to be replaced by the periodical
change in society’s exposure to nuclear radiation, respectively, by the change in
societal exposure to the consequences of the employment of nuclear energy sources.
Clearly, future exposedness to nuclear risk is positively correlated with initial lev-
els of activity, i. e., with both the generation of nuclear waste, specifically, and the
production of atomic energy, in general.
Importantly, the model postulates uncertainty about the final extent of this
influence. On the one hand, the current production of nuclear waste could severely
increase human exposition to nuclear radiation in the future. On the other hand, in
the future period, problems regarding a permanent disposal site could satisfactorily
be solved and major core melt accidents could have successfully been avoided
during the first period, which would, of course, substantially diminish the actual
sensitivity of economic development to high activity levels in the nuclear industry
sector in the initial period. ’Uncertainty’ is modelled as ignorance of the probability
distribution of future sensitivity to present risk. Scientific progress is assumed to
take place in form of ’inductive learning’ – i. e., by means of scientific studies
and experiments relying on empirical data – potentially reducing the degree of
uncertainty over time. Clearly, if the number of scientific observations would
go to infinity, it would be possible for the science community to make a clear
statement about the sensitivity of economic development towards nuclear hazard
and traditional cost-benefit analysis would be applicable within a risk-managing
framework. However, not least in the context of atomic hazard, the potential
for ’inductive learning’ is restricted a priori. Especially, the ”ability of empirical
learning or inductive knowledge to shed light” on the probability of extreme events
is fundamentally limited (Weitzman 2007: 17). As a consequence, extreme events,
i. e., a high risk sensitivity and a sharp decline in the consumption growth rate,
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become more likely.100
This ’tail thickening effect’ (TTE) has enormous implications on the results of
expected utility theory. Weitzman is able to show that the amount of current
consumption a rational risk-averse decision maker is willing to constraint in favour
of a marginal unit of certain consumption in the future is indeed unlimited!
Thus, within a cost-benefit framework, the social interest rate of a hazardous
activity has to be substantially reduced in order to accommodate the predominance
of scientific uncertainty. Even more, the factor of uncertainty may be dominant,
so that the question about the discounting of potential losses in the future is
completely negligible considering the possibility of severe catastrophic events. In
a nutshell:
The overarching general message is that from inductive experience
alone one cannot acquire sufficiently accurate information about the
probabilities of tail disasters to prevent the expected marginal util-
ity of an extra sure unit of consumption from becoming unbounded
for any utility function having strictly-positive relative risk aversion.
(Weitzman 2007: 5)
This is an astonishingly strong result in favour of a generalised precautionary
principle. Nevertheless, the result is sensitive to the expected catastrophic mag-
nitude a (nuclear) disaster may entail. ”[U]ncertainty about the unknown scale of
a disaster has the potential to dominate expected-utility cost-benefit calculations
unless there is some a priori knowledge limiting the scope [. . . ] of such disasters
relative to the amount of inductive knowledge” (Weitzman 2007: 20). Unfortu-
nately, Weitzman does not provide a distinct criterion that would unambiguously
100Note that this is in contrast to the modelling of ’uncertainty’ and ’scientific progress’ within
the economic approaches presented in Sections 5.3.1 and 5.3.2, where it was assumed that
uncertainty unravels assuredly at the beginning of the second period.
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justify the use of the model, suggesting the implementation of precautionary mea-
sures within a specific (environmental) context. The question as to how far nuclear
risk involves open-ended catastrophic consequences cannot be answered within the
present thesis. However, it can be argued – at least on a regional level – that a
potentially unlimited scope of a nuclear catastrophe cannot be excluded a priori.
5.4.2. Concluding Remarks
It has to be highlighted that the research questions – similar to the case of the
IHPP – cannot be answered completely within the present thesis. The previous
discussion has shown that economic theory, in principle, is able to analyse the
adequacy of different arguments in favour of a CHPP regarding nuclear hazard.
Although the literature on environmental economics offers a variety of models
that can be applied to the nuclear context, the criteria advising for precautionary
measures, however, are too vague in order to make a final statement. To this end,
it would be necessary to further adapt the models to the specific problem, which
would go far beyond the scope of the present thesis. Conclusively, the obtained
results can be summarised in the following way:
 Weak forms of the CHPP are generally accepted and implemented within
nuclear policy. Within the specific context, however, economic theory can-
not justify the use of an MP, since an immediate phase-out of nuclear energy
sources creates substitute risks, which would themselves call for the imple-
mentation of precautionary measures.
 The presented economic approach, modelling decision-making under uncer-
tainty while supposing scientific progress to take the form of inductive empir-
ical learning, strongly provides arguments in favour of a generalised CHPP.
In a situation of uncertainty, a decision maker exhibiting preferences of strict
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relative risk aversion would, in principle, sacrifice an unlimited amount of
current consumption in order to prevent extremely improbable catastrophic
events to occur.
 The latter result is sensitive to an open-endedness of the catastrophic event in
relation to a limited potential of inductive knowledge. Nevertheless, although
the model does not offer a clear criterion of applicability, it alleges qualitative
arguments in favour of a CHPP in the context of the generation of nuclear
energy. Thus, the results of the model imply that a risk-avers decision maker
should follow a dynamic strategy to withdraw from the utilisation of nuclear
energy sources.
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6. Conclusion and Executive
Summary
The main objective of the present thesis was to collect and to systematise the
contributions of economic theory within the domain of NRM. Furthermore, based
on these theoretic results, the thesis aimed at evaluating both the institutional
framework provided by the German policy maker and the corresponding strategies
chosen by German nuclear plant operators and potential victims of atomic hazard
in order to comply with current statutory requirements.
A first challenge was to find an adequate framework that allowed to arrange
both a variety of problems associated with nuclear hazard and corresponding pos-
sible solutions in a complete and consistent way. To this end, the approach of
SRM turned out to serve as a valuable conceptual basis. It showed that a direct
link between a certain type of social hazard like nuclear risk and expected future
losses for society does not exist, in general. Social welfare, ultimately, depends
on how society is able to adapt to the specific characteristics of a certain social
risk. Within this context, the shape of institutions and the implementation of
various policy measures play a substantial role. The concept of the ’risk vulner-
ability chain’ illustrated the realisation process of social risk and drew attention
to the possibilities a policy maker has in order to influence the social outcome of
a risky event or of a hazardous economic activity like the generation of nuclear
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energy. Within the present thesis, four different types of SRM strategies have been
identified: firstly, risk prevention strategies, which aim to reduce the probability
of a catastrophic event to happen ex ante. Secondly, the measure of risk expo-
sure reduction, which ex ante tries to alleviate the sensitivity of potential victims
to specific types of risk. Thirdly, risk mitigation strategies, which constitute a
commitment ex ante to reduce the potential adverse impacts of a future realised
hazard. Fourthly, risk coping strategies, which ex post aim at alleviating the risk
impact once a catastrophic event has occurred.
Based on this framework, the main tasks of NRM could be clearly identified,
namely, to reach an optimal level of risk prevention ex ante and to guarantee an
adequate amount of compensation ex post. Within the context of NRM, four im-
portant points should be kept in mind: firstly, although potentially improving the
social distribution of nuclear risk, all risk management strategies entail real as well
as opportunity costs to a substantial extent, which have to be explicitly taken into
consideration from a policy maker’s perspective. Secondly, in order to reach an
efficient distribution of risk, the policy maker can either rely on a command-and-
control approach or create economic incentives that urge agents within the risk
generating process to search for efficient solutions themselves. Thirdly, the success
of each individual risk management strategy cannot be identified independently
from the implementation of all other regulative instruments; examples have been
presented in order to illustrate the complexity of the strategies, which exacer-
bates the policy maker’s objective to reach a socially preferable risk distribution.
Fourthly, in the specific context of nuclear hazard, the statutory framework causes
reactions both on the supply side of nuclear energy and on the side of potential
victims of nuclear technology, the latter, in principle, also representing the demand
side of atomic energy.
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The subsequent discussion addressed various policy measures aiming at the eco-
nomically efficient level of risk prevention. It showed that economic theory prefers
the policy instrument of economic incentive effects to a regulative command-and-
control approach. A conceptual objection against regulation highlights its inflex-
ibility in the sense that it prevents nuclear plant operators to search for, and to
implement cost-efficient solutions. According to the principle of ’least-cost avoid-
ance’, however, nuclear operators would be best informed to efficiently decide upon
both methods and levels of risk prevention. A second objection points to the le-
gal authority’s limited capacity to monitor plant operators, which substantially
impedes an efficient regulation process. By contrast, economic theory is able to
define a distinct optimality criterion for an efficient level of risk prevention: from
an economic perspective, nuclear plant operators have to extend their precaution-
ary effort up to the point where the marginal costs of prevention are equal to the
victims’ marginal benefit – a condition, which is satisfied as long as the supply
side of the generation of nuclear energy fully internalises risk costs including all
negative externalities caused by the hazardous activity.
It showed that these theoretical reflections can be transferred into the discussion
on optimal civil liability rules. By means of an economic model of tort-law, the
thesis opposed two different liability rules, namely, strict liability and the negli-
gence rule, respectively. In the specific case of nuclear risk, it transpired that it is
economically efficient to hold nulcear plant operators strictly liable without limit,
since only strict liability guarantees full cost internalisation. Correspondingly, due
to the adequate legal and economic incentive, nuclear plant operators voluntarily
choose the efficient level of risk prevention. The market equilibrium price incorpo-
rating all external risk costs, furthermore, sends the right signal for consumers to
demand the socially desirable amount of nuclear energy. Form an economic view-
point, a negligence rule has to be rejected, since it creates the perverse incentive
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for nuclear operators to escape full cost internalisation by acting non-negligently.
Thus, in respect of the optimal level of risk prevention, the thesis emphasised two
important results of economic theory: firstly, since strict liability creates optimal
economic incentives on the supply side of nuclear energy, it should be preferred to
a negligence rule. Secondly, for similar reasons liability for nuclear plant operators
should be unlimited; according to economic literature, this result does not change,
no matter whether basic assumptions of the benchmark case are weakened – e. g.,
the assumption of an ’unilateral accident’ –, the obligation of safety standards is
included into the analysis or the important issue of the ’insolvency problem’ is
considered. Furthermore, it has been argued within the thesis that besides these
theoretical aspects, strict liability entails practical advantages; it reduces admin-
istrative costs within the litigation process and encourages potential victims to
engage in lawsuits, which in turn increases the pressure for nuclear operators to
ensure efficient precautionary levels.
In a next step, the thesis summarised and evaluated the basic principles and the
organisational structure of the main international nuclear liability regimes. On
the one hand, economic theory would advocate the international agreement on
’strict liability’, the principle of ’exclusive jurisdiction’ as well as the obligation
of nuclear operators to purchase financial coverage to meet future compensation
requirements. On the other hand, from an economic viewpoint, it has to be criti-
cised that liability, in general, is limited in amount and in time, since restrictions
of liability constitute distorting (indirect) subsidisations to the nuclear industry.
Furthermore, it turned out that the principle of ’exclusive liability’, i. e., the chan-
nelling of liability to the downstream supplier of nuclear energy, can lead to wrong
incentives for prevention in the cases of limited liability or presumed insolvency of
the nuclear operator in the case of an accident.
The legal system in Germany distributes nuclear liability among three levels. It
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is important to highlight that, in contrast to most international liability regimes,
all tiers of financial provision for future victim remuneration are funded privately.
The first tier accounts for ¿256 million and is guaranteed via the compulsory
purchase of liability insurance by the individual operators. The second tier is en-
sured by means of a mutual risk-sharing pool organised by German energy groups
and amounts to ¿ 2,244 million. Additionally, German operators are held liable
without limit with their entire assets, which is, in fact, a unique jurisdiction sup-
ported by economic theory. Nevertheless, de facto it is the operator’s expected net
worth ex post, i. e., once an accident has occurred, that constitutes an implicit cap
on liability. Hence, the evaluation of the German nuclear liability regime can be
summarised as follows: firstly, German legislation in reference to direct financial
provision in amount of ¿2.5 billion does not create optimal incentives for nuclear
risk prevention. Secondly, regardless of the policy of unlimited liability, NRM in
Germany does not guarantee the optimal level of risk prevention as long as the
’insolvency problem’ has not been solved satisfactorily; especially, this is the case
if recourse claims of potential victims can only resort to capital funds of the op-
erating companies. Thirdly, in order to solve the ’insolvency problem’, the policy
maker would either have to ensure adequate arrangements for victim compensation
ex ante or to guarantee that victims can resort to the capital funds of the parent
companies of the operators.
In a next step, the thesis discussed the different instruments to guarantee adequate
financial means for victim compensation – namely, liability insurance, financial
reserves, risk-sharing pools, first party insurance, government provided compensa-
tion and NCBs – and analysed the role of the policy maker in order to promote
these approaches. Three evaluation criteria were defined in order to compare the
instruments and, based on economic reasoning, to identify the favourable compen-
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sation approach within the context of the generation of nuclear energy in Germany:
firstly, cost-effectiveness and sustainability on the side of nuclear energy supply.
Secondly, complete coverage for potential victims of nuclear accidents; the thresh-
old level was set to ¿10 billion, which coincides with low-end expert estimates of
damage entailed by nuclear catastrophes. Thirdly, lowest possible effort on the
side of the policy maker in order to guarantee each instrument’s effectiveness.
Third party liability insurance obtained by nuclear operators turned out to be
an inadequate instrument for victim compensation. The thesis provided a list of
conceptual reasons that explain the exceptional role nuclear risk is playing within
the insurance industry, among other things, the non-actuarial nature of nuclear
risk, the monopolistic and nationally restricted organisational structure of nuclear
(re)insurance pools and the insurance industry’s limited opportunity of building
financial reserves in the domain of nuclear hazards. From an NRM perspective, the
German situation could be summarised in the following way: firstly, Germany’s
nuclear policy regime is inefficient from a supply side point of view; resorting to
private liability insurance to cover parts of potential compensation requirements
entails excessive costs for nuclear operators if the ’fair’ insurance premium serves
as reference value. Secondly, from the perspective of potential victims, too, the
instrument is inappropriate; the insurance industry would not be able to cover
victims’ entire financial needs and an increase in direct provision for compensation
would not be financially sustainable for nuclear operators.
Economic literature has pointed to several advantages of an alternative instru-
ment, namely, the building of financial reserves on the part of nuclear operators.
Most importantly and in contrast to liability insurance premiums, reserve building
avoids excessive ’sunk costs’ for the operators. Nevertheless, since resources are
temporarily immobilised, the compensation method entails substantial opportu-
nity costs. In order to estimate those costs, the thesis relied on the concept of the
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CAPM. The analysis emphasised three main findings: firstly, in order to qualify
the building of financial reserves as an adequate instrument for financial victim
remuneration, it is a crucial task of legal authorities to effectively restrict the use
of the funds entirely to third party liability requirements. Secondly, as opposed to
liability insurance, reserve building constitutes a more favourable instrument on
the supply side; nevertheless, the analysis implied that cost saving potentials in
Germany are lower than, e. g., saving potentials for the nuclear industry in France
as indicated in comparable economic studies. Thirdly, given that nulcear opera-
tors’ parent companies can be obliged to take over responsibility and supposing
that legal provision binds reserves to liability claims, financial reserves still do not
constitute a sustainable solution for adequate victim compensation.
It has been shown that the instrument of a risk-sharing pool – a mutual agree-
ment ex ante between nuclear operators in order to distribute the liability of each
single operator to all members of the risk pool – is supported by results of economic
theory. From a theoretic perspective, it was argued that, given the legal opportu-
nity, potential risk pool members will efficiently reach a mutual agreement in order
to differentiate nuclear risk. The thesis presented economic results implying that
the identification of efficient risk differentiation criteria as well as the effective mon-
itoring process of the pool members are guaranteed through economic incentive
effects. Thus, the instrument avoids the presumed loss of efficiency in the context
of an alternative command-and-control approach. The present thesis analysed the
three different ways to organise a risk-sharing pool, namely, the building of finan-
cial reserves ex ante, contribution payments ex ante and contribution payments
ex post, respectively. Furthermore, it estimated the corresponding (opportunity)
costs for members of the nuclear risk pool in Germany and evaluated the different
approaches according to an NRM perspective. It has been shown that, in general,
pool members would prefer to contribute on an ex post basis, which constitutes
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the cost-effective approach from a supply-side perspective. From the point of view
of potential victims, however, pool members should be obliged to effect contribu-
tions ex ante, in order to guarantee and to alleviate access to the funds in the case
of an accident and to avoid perverse incentives on the part of nuclear operators
within the process of risk prevention. Currently, nuclear policy in Germany suc-
cessfully employs the compensation instrument, giving German energy groups the
legal opportunity to organise a nuclear risk-sharing pool to cover potential liability
requirements in the obligatory amount of ¿2,244 million per accident. According
to theoretical reflections within economic literature and based on specific methods
to estimate the operators’ (opportunity) costs of a risk-sharing pool, the thesis
indicated three suggested improvements within this respect: firstly, the German
risk-sharing pool should be legally based on statutory obligation in order to guar-
antee the availability of financial compensation funds and to reinforce economic
incentive effects for risk prevention. Secondly, to avoid moral hazard issues and to
protect the demands of potential victims, the pool should be financed by means of
contribution payments ex ante; suppliers of atomic energy in Germany could bear
the additional costs. Thirdly, from the standpoint of victim compensation, direct
financial provision by German energy groups should be substantially extended; ac-
cording to estimation results, this policy would be sustainable for the supply side,
since production costs of atomic energy would only increase marginally, leaving
the relative competitiveness of the nuclear industry rather unaffected.
The thesis, furthermore, turned the focus on alternative compensation mecha-
nisms, namely, first party insurance and government provided compensation, re-
spectively. Based on theoretical reasoning, it had been argued that in contrast to
natural catastrophes such as hurricanes or earthquakes, where first party insurance
is a feasible option favoured by economic theory, nuclear catastrophes generally do
not allow for the adoption of this demand-side compensation instrument.
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Government-provided victim compensation empirically appeared to be an im-
portant pillar in the aftermath of major nuclear catastrophes. Basically, public in-
tervention ex post is provided through two different institutional channels, namely,
the social security system and specific catastrophe funds. The thesis presented the
potential financial extent of these compensation instruments and analysed corre-
sponding caveats from both a legal and a socio-economic perspective, which have
to be considered by the policy maker within an NRM context. It showed that
NRM in Germany incorporates the main results of economic analysis in respect
of state-aided victim compensation in the sense that it tries to support poten-
tial victims at the maximum level while, as far as possible, it maintains efficient
incentives for risk prevention on the part of nuclear energy supply.
To complete the discussion on both nuclear policies aiming at adequate finan-
cial victim remuneration and various compensation mechanisms, respectively, the
thesis addressed the instrument of an NCB. In principle, the implementation of
NCBs could be a valuable strategy considering the incapability of both the insur-
ance industry and the community of nuclear operators to provide financial funds
covering the entire losses implied by nuclear accidents. Although financial markets
have already gained some experience regarding risk diversification of natural risks,
NRM has, so far, not considered financial markets as a possible option within the
context of victim compensation. Therefore, it has been argued within the present
thesis that the outcome of a policy promoting private solutions via the financial
market cannot be identified a priori. An NCB has to be tested empirically before
it is possible to evaluate this strategy. It has been emphasised, however, that the
success of the implementation of specific NCBs crucially depends on the policy
maker’s effort to avoid the ’insolvency problem’.
Within the final part of the thesis, the scope of the analysis was augmented by
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considering the prevalence of (scientific) uncertainty. While the part on NRM only
referred to the risk of a reactor core accident, the last section conceptually incor-
porated various types of nuclear hazards regarding ultimate storage and disposal
of radioactive waste. With reference to the current political debate in Germany
about the legal extension of a nuclear installation’s operational lifespan, the thesis
tried to answer the question about the adequacy of a PP within the regulation
process of atomic energy generation from an economic viewpoint. In particular,
it was tried to identify the economic motives that could serve as a rationale of
a PP in the specific context. To this end, the objective was to analyse various
existing economic models of ’decision-making under uncertainty’ and to identify
the adequacy of the models within the nuclear context.
In a first step, the discussion gave an overview of certain fundamental problems
that jointly arise with the generation of nuclear energy, namely, the extraordinary
time horizon to be dealt with, the accumulating stock of nuclear waste and the
controversial question about ultimate waste disposal. Furthermore, various forms
of both ecological and economical irreversibilities associated with the generation
of nuclear energy were addressed. The thesis continued with an conceptual expla-
nation of the PP, provided the principle’s historical background and presented the
corresponding points of critique from the perspective of economic analysis. Based
on results of economic literature, it has been argued that, on the one hand, the
PP in its weakest conceptualisation is a generally accepted assumption of human
behaviour. On the other hand, it has been shown that, taken literally, the PP
consequently creates ’substitute risks’, which in turn would contradict the very
idea of precaution; therefore, the principle is widely criticised to take a paralysing
effect.
To structure the analysis, the thesis first addressed the notion of an IHPP ac-
cording to which it is economically efficient to pay a positive premium in order to
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avoid non-reversible damage and to preserve flexibility. The review of economic
models in the domain of ’option value theory’ led to the following results in re-
sponse to the initial research question: firstly, the theory of the OV within the
context of environmental economics is a valuable extension of traditional cost-
benefit analysis in the case of structural scientific uncertainty. Secondly, economic
models exist that also indicate the presence of an OV in a context of the generation
of nuclear energy; under well-defined circumstances, it is rational for a risk-avers
decision maker to adjust the expected return of a reversible alternative by a pos-
itive premium, which constitutes the opportunity cost of maintaining flexible in
the future; thus, it would be efficient to (temporarily) refrain from nuclear energy
sources in order to profit on improved scientific information in the future. Thirdly,
OV theory faces conceptual difficulties in the case of irreversibilities (both envi-
ronmental and economical) pointing in opposite directions, which is the case in the
specific context. Thirdly, economic approaches exist that are able, in principle, to
overcome these conceptual problems; such methods, however, have so far not been
applied to the context of nuclear risk.
The analysis of related economic models of ’decision-making under uncertainty’,
which incorporate the occurrence of negative externalities in form of stock pol-
lution and which, therefore, resemble the specific characteristics of nuclear risk,
allowed to further differentiate the possible economic motives behind precautionary
strategies. The thesis emphasised six main results: firstly, two distinct economic
motives in favour of a PP can be identified, namely, the IE according to which a
decision maker wants to maintain flexibility in the future in order to profit from
better future information and the PE according to which a decision maker wants
to forearm oneself against future exogenous risks. Secondly, these potential driving
forces behind a precautionary approach cannot be identified independently from
the decision maker’s preferences. Thirdly, economic theory points to a WE ac-
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cording to which – against the spirit of precaution and even under uncertainty
– a risk-avers decision maker may prefer to extend the potentially hazardous ac-
tivity in order to avoid heterogeneity in consumption patterns. Fourthly, results
crucially depend on the specific way scientific progress is formulated within the
economic models implying that the decision maker will certainly be able to take
efficient decisions in the future. Fifthly, if it is the case that the decision maker’s
preferences exhibit a coefficient of relative risk aversion smaller than unity – an
assumption which cannot be excluded in the case of nuclear risk a priori – both
the IE and the PE imply that uncertainty and scientific learning affect rational
decision-making in the direction of an IHPP. Sixthly, further empirical research on
the specific social preferences towards nuclear risk needs to be undertaken; thus,
based on the results of the analysed economic models, is was not possible to make
a final statement on the adequacy of a PP in the nuclear context.
Finally, the thesis tried to answer the question whether in the context of nuclear
risk economic theory provides arguments in favour of a CHPP according to which
it is a rational strategy to give special attention to hazards that are associated
with tremendous worst-case scenarios. In this respect, the thesis provided a brief
discussion on three theoretical concepts serving as a potential basis for the CHPP,
namely, traditional expected value analysis, an adjusted form of expected value
analysis, which additionally accounts for potential second round losses from the
aftermath of a catastrophic event, and worse-case analysis, respectively. Further-
more, the results of an economic model were presented, which involve arguments
in favour of the CHPP in the nuclear context. The obtained findings can conclu-
sively be summarised as follows: firstly, weak conceptualisations of the CHPP are
generally accepted and implemented within NRM; however, an immediate phase-
out of nuclear energy sources creates substantial ’substitute risks’, which would
themselves call for the implementation of precautionary measures; therefore, it
134
has been argued that within the context of nuclear risk, economic theory cannot
justify the use of an MP stating that the alternative entailing the best worst-case
scenario should be chosen. Secondly, based on results of an economic model of
’decision-making under uncertainty’, which assumes scientific progress to take the
form of inductive empirical learning, a generalised form of the CHPP can be sup-
ported; in a situation of uncertainty, a rational risk-avers decision maker would be
willing to sacrifice an unlimited amount of current consumption in order to prevent
extremely improbable but explicitly disastrous events like nuclear accidents from
occurring. Thirdly, this strong claim is sensitive to the assumption of catastrophic
losses to an unlimited extent in relation to a rather limited potential for scientific
progress; therefore, the model does not offer a clear criterion for the applicability
of the CHPP. Finally, the model, nevertheless, alleges qualitative arguments in
favour of a CHPP in the context of the generation of atomic energy; thus, re-
sults imply that a risk-avers decision maker should follow a dynamic strategy to
withdraw from the utilisation of nuclear energy sources.
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B. English Abstract
The present thesis tries to shed light on the question about the adequate insti-
tutional and commercial attitude towards nuclear risk. The first purpose is to
collect and to systematise the contributions of economic theory within the domain
of nuclear risk management . Secondly, it is tried to identify optimal policy mea-
sures that guarantee a socially efficient diversification of nuclear risk. Based on
theoretic results, in particular, the thesis aims at evaluating both the institutional
framework provided by the German policy maker and the corresponding strate-
gies chosen by German nuclear plant operators and potential victims of nuclear
accidents in order to comply with current statutory requirements.
The first part of the thesis (Chapter 2) introduces the concept of social risk
management (SRM) and provides an insight into SRM related strategies, namely,
risk prevention, risk exposure reduction, risk mitigation and risk coping, respec-
tively. Furthermore, it states the specific objectives and challenges of nuclear risk
management (NRM).
The second part of the thesis (Chapters 3 and 4) covers the specific nuclear risk
of a core melt accident. In a first step, policy measures aiming at risk prevention
are addressed. Based on economic criteria, the thesis discusses the optimal de-
sign of civil liability rules in the context of the generation of nuclear energy. The
nuclear liability regime in Germany is critically addressed. It shows, most impor-
tantly, that the insolvency problem has not yet been solved satisfactorily, which
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in turn substantially lowers the incentive effect for efficient risk prevention on the
side of German nuclear operators. In a second step, the thesis focuses on strategies
aiming at an optimal level of victim compensation, namely, liability insurance, the
building of financial reserves, risk-sharing pools, government provided compensa-
tion and financial market solutions, respectively. Both efficiency and applicability
of each strategy are analysed in the context of atomic energy in Germany. Based on
theoretic results and according to estimates regarding nuclear operators’ (oppor-
tunity) costs of applying different compensation instruments, the thesis provides a
list of suggested improvements within the context of efficient victim compensation
in Germany.
The final part of the thesis (Chapter 5) includes forms of nuclear risk like the
ultimate disposal of radioactive waste, which are, to a certain extent, still in the
domain of scientific uncertainty. Correspondingly, the thesis turns its attention to
the question about the adequacy of a precautionary principle within the context
of nuclear policy. Economic arguments in favour of, and against a precautionary
principle are analysed, which could serve as a guideline for political landmark
decisions in the field of nuclear energy.
152
C. Deutsche Zusammenfassung
Die vorliegende Diplomarbeit stellt die Frage nach dem ada¨quaten institutionellen
und kommerziellen Umgang mit nuklearem Risiko. Es wird versucht, Resultate
o¨konomischer Theorie im Zusammenhang mit Nuklearem Rikomanagement sys-
tematisch darzustellen und jene regulativen Maßnahmen zu identifizieren, die eine
gesellschaftlich effiziente Verteilung von nuklearem Risiko gewa¨hrleisten. Darauf
aufbauend werden diesbezu¨gliche gesetzliche Rahmenbedingungen in Deutschland
evaluiert und diverse Strategien auf Seiten von KKW-Betreibern und von poten-
ziellen Opfern nuklearer Unfa¨lle einer o¨konomischen Analyse unterzogen.
Der erste Teil der Diplomarbeit (Kapitel 2) fasst das Konzept von Nuklearem
Risikomanagement zusammen, thematisiert die damit verbundenen Herausforderun-
gen und diskutiert die unterschiedlichen Strategien, die in diesem Zusammenhang
vom politischen Entscheidungstra¨ger unternommen werden ko¨nnen.
Die Analyse des zweiten Teils (Kapitel 3 und 4) beschra¨nkt sich auf die nukleare
Gefahr einer potenziellen Kernschmelze. In einem ersten Schritt werden regulative
Maßnahmen mit dem Ziel effizienter Risikopra¨vention untersucht. Hierbei werden
vor allem die in Deutschland geltenden Regelungen zur zivilen Haftbarkeit im Kon-
text atomarer Energiegewinnung evaluiert. Es wird gema¨ß o¨konomischen Krite-
rien argumentiert, dass KKW-Betreiber verschuldensunabha¨ngig und unbegrenzt
fu¨r potenzielle Scha¨den haftbar gemacht werden sollen. Die Analyse zeigt, dass
die gesetzlichen Regelungen in Deutschland das Insolvenzproblem nicht ga¨nzlich
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verhindern. Dies reduziert die Anreizwirkung zur effizienten Risikopra¨vention auf
Seiten der Betreiberfiremen. In einem zweiten Schritt werden verschiedene Strate-
gien zur Gewa¨hrleistung von Entscha¨digungszahlungen analysiert (Haftpflichtver-
sicherungen, finanzielle Ru¨cklagen, Risk-sharing Pools, staatliche Kompensations-
fonds und Finanzmarktinstrumente). Im Besonderen wird auf die Eignung dieser
Strategien innerhalb des deutschen Atomenergiesektors eingegangen und es werden
– aufgrund theoretischer U¨berlegungen und basierend auf Scha¨tzungen von (Op-
portunita¨ts)kosten der deutschen Betreiberfirmen – einige Verbesserungsvorschla¨ge
zu einer effizienteren und umfassenderen Opferentscha¨digung vorgebracht.
Der letzte Teil der Diplomarbeit (Kapitel 5) integriert auch jene Formen nuk-
learen Risikos in die Analyse (beispielsweise die Endlagerung radioaktiven Mu¨lls),
welche zu einem gewissen Teil noch immer im Bereich wissenschaftlicher Unsicher-
heit liegen. In Anbetracht der Debatte u¨ber eine Laufzeitverla¨ngerung deutscher
Reaktoren wird der Frage nachgegangen, inwieweit das Vorsorgeprinzip innerhalb
politischer Grundsatzentscheidungen zur Anwendung kommen sollte. Zu diesem
Zweck werden, basierend auf den Resultaten umwelto¨konomischer Modelle, Ar-
gumente fu¨r und wider das Vorsorgeprinzip im Kontext der Nutzung nuklearer
Energieformen vorgebracht und kritisch diskutiert.
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